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NATIONALISM AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE:
A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL CONFLICT
AND THE EMERGENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

BY

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled NATIONALISM AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE: A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE EMERGENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES submitted by FENTON UROMBO RUPARANGANDA in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION.

ABSTRACT

The focus of this study was to examine the role of nationalism in the development of education in Zimbabwe. More specifically, it analyzed how conflict between European settlers and Africans affected the nature of the educational systems which emerged and the development strategies that were instituted by the various administrations. A common aspect of the research on the development of African education by many scholars, is that it ignores disparities in political developments and environmental factors which influenced educational and economic policies in various parts of the continent.

Political influences on the emergence of dual educational systems were strongest in Zimbabwe and South Africa, where different systems were established to serve the various groups. Thus, in contrast to European schools whose physical plants were of high calibre, the resources for African education were often inferior. The result was that unlike the settlers who dominated higher levels of the coccupational hierarchy, Africans were dispersed in lower levels of the economy. However, as Africans became more politically assertive in the settler era, some of them began to secure high positions in the modern sector of economy.

While other British dependencies in Africa also experienced similar developments, the conflict in Zimbabwe was more acute. The constitutional crisis of the 1960s and 1970s which stemmed from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence led to fiscal policies

unknown elsewhere on the continent--possibly with the exception of
South Africa. In order to determine the impact of the nationalist
movements on the emergent educational and economic strategies, a
survey of the conflict was conducted and contrasted with the
various pieces of legislation to assertain the underlying motives.
The results were further evaluated in the light of domestic
reaction and international response to political developments in
Zimbabwe. Thus, after reviewing pertinent literature in chapter
one, emphasis was placed in chapters three and four on the origins
of the conflict and its gradual expression in social institutions
established by the settlers.

Since there were differences in the ideal societies envisaged
by Africans and Europeans, chapter five examined disparities in
the ideologies of development adopted by the various
administrations. It was demonstrated that in contrast to settler
governments which emphasized the development of the modern sector,
the African administration implemented policies designed to
improve the quality of life in rural areas. A further examination
of the conflict undertaken in chapter six corroborated the link
between the nationalist conflict and educational development.

In chapter seven, the evidence from the survey of the
conflict revealed that due to the potency of settler economic
nationalism which surpassed its African counterpart, Europeans
were more successful in translating policies to educational
objectives. To some degree, the persistence of the settlers'

traditional role in the national economy accounts for the resistence of education to the reforms instituted in the post-independence period. From the international comparison, the conclusion was that both American and Francophone nationalism exhibited stronger links between education, the economy and national ideologies, than was the case in Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

General Political Developments in Zimbabwe

European presence in Zimbabwe dates back to the early 16th century when Antonio Fernandes, a Portuguese explorer, visited its Emperor Monomotapa.[1] Because his exploration achieved much in terms of increasing European knowledge about the country's terrain and its much sought-after mineral wealth, it inspired confidence in early missionaries and traders to enter the territory. Encouraged by the success of this pioneering adventure, traders and missionaries gained confidence in attempting similar journeys into Zimbabwe. By the 17th century, a considerable number of Portuguese traders had ventured into the country. Their aim was to capture lucrative markets and trade in gold and ivory. Portuguese missionaries quickly appeared on the scene as they were desperate to establish a Christian Empire in order to contain Islam which had spilled into Zimbabwe from Mozambique during the period of Arab mercantile expansion in the Indian Ocean. Such religious zeal prompted Father Gonzalo da Silveira, a Portuguese Catholic clergyman, to obtain permission from the African Emperor in 1560 to proselytize in Zimbabwe.[2]

The Jesuit and Dominican evangelizing monopoly continued unchallenged until the 19th century when British missionaries

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began operating from the southern and western parts of the territory.[3] From then onwards, the entire country came increasingly under the influence of British missionaries such as Knight Bruce, an Anglican Bishop and Robert Moffatt of the London Missionary Society. Later, other missionaries consolidated David Livingston's work in Central Africa. By the middle of the 19th century, Portuguese missionaries had virtually been replaced by the British clergy. This was also the case with their traders who were ousted from the region by British explorers and mineral prospectors.[4]

The period of informal occupation of Zimbabwe by Europeans was followed by one of systematic colonization by the British. Four factors explain the sudden change in British policy in Southern Africa. One was apprehension of the German plan of linking its colonies of Tanzania and Namibia with Zimbabwe. The achievement of such a scheme could have frustrated British imperial ambitions in Africa, for the British wanted their influence to extend uninterrupted from the Cape Colony to Egypt. This was crucial to Britain's control of the Cape and the Suez Canal which were of strategic importance to its African and Oriental Empires. Another reason was Cecil Rhodes' plan to crush the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State which were viewed as constituting a major threat to the English colonies of Natal and the Cape. The Anglo-Boer War of 1899 was

actually the climax of this policy.[5] A third reason was British fear that the Portuguese might annex Zimbabwe to Mozambique, as the boundaries between the two countries were not clearly defined. Finally, the overestimated natural resources of Zimbabwe greatly motivated the British to occupy the territory immediately. Among Anglophones in Natal and the Cape Colony, access to mineral resources in Zimbabwe was seen as being crucial in matching the economic power of Afrikaners in the Transvaal, whose monopoly of the gold fields elevated their economic status far above English settlers in South Africa. The outcome of these factors was the assembling of a Pioneer Column comprising civilians and soldiers. In 1890, that column occupied the territory by force.

Initial African reaction to European settlement was mild, as the British had concealed their main objective of controlling the country politically, militarily, and economically. The confusion over their motives arose from the fact that The Rudd Concession, the document that gave mining privileges to the British, was highly technical in scope since it was couched in legal and contractual languages alien to Lobengula, the African King. On realizing that the British had misled him, Lobengula repudiated the treaty and mobilized armies in an attempt to terminate European settlement.

The war which erupted in 1893 culminated in the defeat of Lobengula. Despite this humiliation, the importance of the war lay

in that it had registered African resistance to foreign domination
and that conflict became one of the bases on which African
nationalism later emerged in the 1940s. In 1896, further
resistance to the occupation resulted in the Matebele War which
escalated to Mashonaland. Although the settler army emerged
triumphant as before, sporadic anti-settler unrest persisted
throughout the country. Failure by Africans to sustain unified
resistance to European occupation was partly due to inter-ethnic
rivalries. Such animosity temporarily fragmented the two
indigenous ethnic groups, thereby preventing the creation of a
cohesive political organization.

The period between 1900 and 1945 marked a new epoch in the
development of nationalism in Zimbabwe. This period is also
associated with significant changes in approaches to the political
situation. Whereas during the 1890s opposition to white rule was
always violent, Africans now abandoned that approach to the
consitutional problem. They did not aim to recover self-
determination as had been the case in the 1890s. On the contrary,
they attempted to resist peacefully the injustices they
experienced.

This was done through protests against low wages, poor
working conditions, racial discrimination and high taxation. It
was a period when Africans sought to change through negotiations
the repressive political and economic conditions prevailing under

the settlers. As a result, many political associations through which African grievances were expressed emerged in the 1920s. In the 1930s, some of these associations evolved from local to quasi-national rural and urban political organizations.

Another reason for the failure by Africans to forge one national political organization was the fact that the territory was a closed society. As such, its African population lacked contact with the outside world, particularly with other parts of colonial Africa and with Black America, where embryonic nationalist movements were gaining popularity. As this situation changed in the 1940s and 1950s, African nationalism gained a momentum that was fuelled by a cross-fertilization of local and international ideas. Of greater importance in this respect were influences of the ideas behind the French and American Revolutions, Pan-Africanism and the Second World War. Equally significant in evoking mass psychological and political awakening were the indigenous religious sects such as Ethiopianism that encouraged political dissension.[6]

From 1945 onwards, the pace of nationalism increased dramatically. This was due to the return of Africans from overseas who introduced radical ideas about freedom and patriotism. In particular, African students who had studied in Western countries and soldiers returning from the war introduced revolutionary thinking on the continent.[7] This became evident in the political

stirrings in such British colonies as Ghana and Kenya. The uprisings which followed legitimized nationalist sentiments in Zimbabwe and everywhere on the continent. In Zimbabwe this was an era of mass demonstrations, boycotts, strikes and arson directed against the settlers. In the 1970s, the tempo changed as Africans became more impatient and radical in their approach to the constitutional crisis.

The conflict which followed provided an arena for East-West ideological confrontation; for whereas the government obtained economic assistance and weapons from sympathetic Western nations, the nationalists received military aid from socialist countries. This ideological element of the conflict also became linked to the educational policies espoused by Africans and Europeans in the territory. In contrast to settler governments, which planned education to dominate Africans politically and economically, nationalist manifestos promised an education system which they claimed would create a society in which political and economic equity would prevail.

Scope and Purpose of the Study

A survey of the development of educational policies in Zimbabwe shows that they were highly political in scope. In the period during which the settlers governed the territory, for instance, official education policy was motivated by that desire of Europeans to dominate Africans politically and economically,

especially when selecting and organizing subject matter. As well, the government formed by Africans in 1980 was established to foster the ideals of the nationalist movement, which was committed to a policy of restructuring instruction and recruiting schools to achieve political and economic expediency. This policy was articulated during the transitional period which extended from 1981 to 1985. In 1982, for example, a major conference convened by the Minister of Education concluded that formal education should be structured to transform the social institutions established by Europeans.

The conflict between Africans and Europeans which began with colonial rule thus dominated the settler period and even extended into the independence era. From the 1890s up to 1985, the educational, legal, and economic policies adopted by the various administrations epitomized the conflict between African and settler nationalism. The development of a link between educational and economic policies, for instance, became an important feature of the political ideologies adopted by Africans and Europeans as seen in official documents of the respective administrations. In the light of these considerations, the purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which the conflict between settler and African nationalism influenced the link between education and political as well as economic developments in the territory.

Justification and Significance

Although a limited number of studies on the development of educational and economic policies exist, they were conducted under a political climate that was not conducive to objective scholarship. Most scholars who were granted permission to conduct research in the territory were academics who endorsed government policy of a segregated society. As a result, African scholarship was often discouraged or confined to black schools, since it was perceived to be a threat to settler society. The prevention of African scholars from undertaking research in European schools was in fact given legal expression by the Land Apportionment Act which prohibited Africans from conducting economic activities in areas occupied by Europeans, although there were no similar conditions excluding Europeans from undertaking research or assuming senior positions in African schools. In the 1950s, a special Act of Parliament had to be passed in order to permit African students to enroll at the territory's university since it was located in an area classified as European under the legislation. The policy of curbing academic freedom was further extended by the expulsion of liberal expatriate lecturers who held political views conflicting with official policy.

The study at hand has the advantage of being undertaken after the first democratic elections which created a fairly stable political climate. The absence of censorship in the period during

which data were collected enabled the author to have access to government documents and archival material previously classified by the settler administration. Also, genuine dissolution of the segregated Ministries of Education which followed independence allowed the acquisition of data from the entire educational system.

A study of this nature has important contributions to make in policy matters for the young nation which is still in the process of reforming its education and reconstructing the shattered economy. Considering the crucial role of education in developing the economies of emergent nations, it is hoped the study may be useful to the educational and economic reforms being considered for adoption in Zimbabwe.

Limitations

Although the dissertation examines various aspects of the Zimbabwean economy, its emphasis is on the political economy of development and underdevelopment arising from the conflict between African and settler nationalism. Also, besides adopting a general approach to examine the educational policies, the focus is at the secondary level, as the technical instruction and social studies of the high schools were important in asserting nationalism. In particular, the fact that the graduates of secondary schools were the most politically astute individuals constituting a major group of workers in the modern sector of the economy, justifies greater

emphasis at this level of education. Finally, even though the prelude to the colonial experience is examined in chapter two in order to establish a basis for evaluating the territory's political and educational background in addition to its participation in the international economic system, the policies comprising the main aspects of the study emerged between 1897 and 1985.

Source of Data

The study utilizes primary documents obtained from four sources, namely, the British Colonial Office, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Education and Culture, the National Archives in Harare, and the International Review of Missions. As can be seen from these sources, the data are intended to reflect British imperial educational policy in addition to missionary and settler influences on education under white rule and in the post-independence era. Documents consulted include Command Papers of the British Colonial Office, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Education Annual Reports, and Reports of Education Commissions existing in the national archives. Finally, Development Plans published by the various governments as well as syllabuses and textbooks for technical instruction and social studies were examined.

Secondary sources were obtained through library research of pertinent literature from books, the Journals of African Political Economy and Development Studies, national dailies such as the

Zimbabwe Herald, and theses related to the topic.

Although the study is based on a general survey of the nation's educational system, it focuses on some of the most typical educational institutions such as Mount Selinda and St. Augustine's Missions, the Bulawayo and Harare Polytechnic colleges. Data were also gathered from Domboshawa and Tjolotjo industrial training schools which provided instruction in modern agricultural methods and low-level technical skills.

Review of Related Literature

Studies having theoretical significance to the development of education in Zimbabwe were conducted by various scholars. In one category, some writers advanced the view that ethnicity and social class were important in understanding scholastic achievement. As early as the 1920s, studies of this type had appeared, arguing persuasively that the intellectual capacity of Polish, Greek, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese immigrants who entered the United States was remarkably inferior to that of other white groups. Surveys of raw scores on standardized tests of such immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in 1914 had registered IQ scores ranging between 70 and 80; scores that were indeed far below the national average.[8] In the late 1960s, Arthur Jensen and his disciples also advanced the argument that Afro-Americans could not attain intellectual parity in society due to hereditary factors which inhibited their cognitive development.[9] Jensen's conclusions

had a profound influence on other writers, including liberals such as Christopher Jencks and his associates, who later rejected the notion that equalizing educational opportunities could close inter-ethnic gaps in scholastic achievement.[10] By advancing these biological determinist theories of academic achievement, such writers created a negative intellectual climate that appeared to scuttle the reformist social thought of the 1960s. The 'messianic' view of schooling that had been adopted and popularized by liberal intellectuals began to be questioned by policymakers. Conservative elements in American society, for instance, became more tentative in their support for compensatory education and social programs designed to alleviate poverty among minority groups.

As for the validity of the above theoretical assumptions, some tentative conclusions can be made in the light of schooling in American and Third Word nations. Jensen's contention lacks clarity since it overlooks the unique environmental factors in American society which may be crucial in the evaluation of cognitive ability. In the United States, political, economic and socio-psychological factors are important variables which are significant in determining the development and distribution of cognitive skills. As many studies have suggested in recent years, although European and Oriental immigrants arrived there possessing IQ scores that were below the national average, their scholastic

abilities later improved considerably due to a number of factors. In particular, the fact that European immigrants could disguise their ancestry once cultural and linguistic identities had been erased made their assimilation into elite positions much easier than was the case for other visible minorities. This was confirmed by an increase in the IQ achievement for Italian and Polish Americans which rose by 25 points between 1914 and 1970.[11] The significance of a favorable environment in the rise of IQ scores in America is also supported by studies of Black orphans raised in white families who registered IQ scores above the 106 mark.[12]

Another aspect of Jensen's conclusion which is not consistent with reality, one which has to some extent been supported by Jencks, is the suggestion that improvement in educational resources through the provision of first class schools and highly qualified staff can only have a modest effect on academic achievement. While Jencks did not subscribe to geneticism as conceived by Jensen, he was convinced that regardless of qualitative improvements that may be instituted in the school system, the interracial cognitive structure in American society would persist as long as no major changes in social policy were introduced. Emphasizing this point he contended that:

> Equalizing the quality of elementary schools would reduce cognitive inequality by 3 percent or less. Equalizing the quality of high schools would reduce cognitive inequality by 1 percent or less.[13]

There are serious flaws in these theories which should be discussed here in order to show how limited the position taken by both researchers is, not only in the American context, but with respect to identical multi-ethnic societies whose policies resembled that of the United States. For this purpose, it is worthwhile to discuss the attitude of white settlers in Zimbabwe to the interracial academic achievement debate. Although a tiny minority of Europeans in the territory sometimes expressed similar opinions, the more sophisticated white settler opposed any scheme designed to equalize educational opportunities between Africans and Europeans. This was obvious in the mid-1960s, when a British plan which could have brought about massive expansion of African education was rejected by the government although Britain had offered to cover costs of the scheme.

The situation in Zimbabwe, more than conditions existing in the United States, provides an ideal criterion for interracial comparisons as the territory had an identical High School system with a more standardized examinations system than was found in America. Table one, compiled by Dorsey for the purpose of contrasting academic achievement between Africans and Europeans in Zimbabwe in 1975, shows that the performance of Africans who sat for the Ordinary Level examinations in 1971 compared favorably with the results of their European counterparts.

Considering the enormous differences in home facilities such as electricity and nutrition which became important as many secondary schools were later transformed into day schools, in addition to disparities in educational resources existing in the institutions attended by Africans and Europeans, the results shown in this table should not be interpreted as an outcome of the genetic differences.

TABLE I

Comparison of Examination Achievement of European and African
O-Level Candidates in 1971

Grade Level of Passes	African		European	
	N	%	N	%
1	395	2.1	2,578	9.8
2	1,333	6.9	1,850	7.1
3	4,260	22.1	2,761	10.5
4	1,897	9.9	2,943	11.2
5	2,315	12.0	3,360	12.8
6	4,148	21.6	3,239	12.3
7	2,422	12.6	2,554	9.7
8	1,491	7.8	3,638	13.9
9	977	5.1	3,315	12.6
Total Subject Entry	19,238	100.1	26,238	99.9

SOURCE: Betty J. Dorsey, "The African Secondary School Leaver," in Education Race and Employment, ed. M.W. Murphree (Salisbury: Mardon Printers Ltd., 1975), p. 137.

Finally, a major weakness of the literature which has been reviewed up to this point is that the writers portray a universalistic view of academic achievement based on American and

sometimes Euro-centric conceptions of intelligence which in some respects do not have empirical support when applied to conditions prevailing in the developing world.[14] For example, although it was illustrated earlier that socio-economic status may have a bearing on scholastic attainment in the United States, that conclusion should be applied with caution in the case of developing societies, for there is no conclusive evidence suggesting that social selection constitutes an educational handicap to students from less privileged families. Thus, apart from financial constraints which often impose severe restrictions on poor families to educate their children, there is little evidence indicating that students from the upper classes dominate the academic scene.

The work of Niles which surveyed inter-state academic achievement of students from the various social classes of schools in African, Asian and South Pacific nations casts doubts on the external validity, in absolute terms, of the above theories.[15] Although Niles found class structures to be rigid in some developing nations which she studied, she cautioned that in some regions these social structures may have no bearing on academic achievement, as they existed prior to the emergence of Western educational systems. She cited the cases of India and Sri Lanka, where formal schooling merely reinforced the traditional class structures, as opposed to conditions in Africa where formal

education played a major role in stratifying society.[16] Furthermore, Niles believed that in developing nations, academic achievement is mainly determined by interaction between home and school environments. Her point was that where both environments complement each other in a positive way, student performance improves noticeably.

Current research in Africa also points to serious doubts about the influence of socio-economic status on school performance. In a major study of academic performance of the secondary school entrance examination in Uganda, for instance, Heynman found evidence which disputes the proposition that socio-economic status determines scholastic achievement. In that major research, students from rural areas and the least developed regions of Uganda had a higher level of performance than their cohorts from rich families or the most advanced regions.[17]

Heynman pointed out that because class structures in less affluent nations are not as distinct as they are in the industrialized world, as the vast majority of people depend on subsistence agriculture, students from poor families have an easier task than their counterparts in the developed nations in matching the cognitive skills of those from rich families, for the 'cultural capital' of dominant classes in developing countries is not as potent as one acquired by upper classes in Western nations. As a result, he contended that schools in less developed nations

compensate more easily for whatever preschool cultural gaps may have existed among students from the various social classes. This mediating effect may be more distinct in educational institutions where physical resources such as buildings, laboratories, accommodation, furniture, electric appliances and the teaching staff do offer an environment that is more educational than conditions existing at home.[18]

Finally, some comments should be made with regard to the language structure which has emerged since the beginning of white rule and its relevance to intellectual life in African schools because scholars who adhere to environmental interpretations of IQ distribution in the United States and other Western nations believe that language codes conform to both social class and IQ structures. Bernstein, who pioneered in theorizing about this relationship, for example, drew attention to the effect of restricted and elaborated linguistic codes on the ability of students from the various social classes to perform complicated cognitive tasks.[19]

This argument holds in societies with distinct class structures and mature language traditions. In the case of developing nations, a reasonable estimate for example, would place only about 10 percent of the population living in urban areas as utilizing Western lingua francas with the same intensity as in the industrialized world. Even so, that percentage should be lower

because of the negative attitudes towards these languages which arose in part from colonial-born hostility which combined with language nationalism to weaken the strong position which English and French once occupied in foreign lands. Attempts by the Governments of India and Tanzania to establish Hindi and Swahili respectively as basic official languages following independence, for instance, were expressions of a desire to reduce the influence of English as a medium of communication in homes and public places. In spite of the fact that these proposals were rescinded, with the result that the English language retained its importance as a medium of instruction and language of work, science and technology, the vast majority of workers in modern industries including the public service and education do often revert to local vernaculars in their homes.[20] Exceptions to this rule in Africa may be countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa with large numbers of Europeans who still dominate the modern industrial sectors.

Furthermore, because there is no universal access to national dailies and periodicals, as well as other forms of mass communication systems which assist in foreign language development, it is unrealistic to regard the language structures in emergent nations as functioning at the same level of socialization as is the case in their countries of origin where daily consumption of news items, entertainment and sports

programmes through the print and electronic media is a pastime for almost every household. What has resulted from such massive circulation of information in the developed world is that the cultural capital reaches schools having been structured according to the different levels of political socialization experienced in the homes.[21]

The second category of literature relevant to this study deals with Zimbabwe's unique historiographical development. A discussion of the factors which influenced the writers is essential, especially in familiarizing researchers with difficulties encountered in evaluating educational publications and official documents of a frontier society such as Zimbabwe, a society that was plagued with conflict which impaired objectivity.

This problem was addressed by L. M. Thompson in a study of historical and academic writings produced by Afrikaner scholars in South Africa.[22] Thompson argued that the material that appeared in schools in the 19th century often characterized ruthless subjection of the governed as a noble struggle for freedom.[23] He further found that other writers who conducted research there formed their opinions through the eyes of the government, and that this had the potential of representing official biases. The significance of Thompson's observations to the Zimbabwean situation lies in the fact that from the beginning of white settlement in the territory up to the early 1950s, its secondary

school system was partly South African, as that country offered
its University Junior Certificate and the Joint Matriculation
Board examinations. Consequently, the textbooks and syllabuses
used at the various levels of the system were published in South
Africa.

Apart from the typical effect of the political culture of
frontier societies on academic content, most of the writings that
appeared throughout the settler period were influenced by
controversy over the origin of the Great Zimbabwe that began in
the late 19th century. In a study that has traced the background
of the territory's historiography, Chanaiwa identified two schools
that emerged from the mystery surrounding the origin of the
ancient ruins.[24] In one group, what Chanaiwa has categorized as
diffusionist writings were characterized by pre-determined
theorizing that arose from the practice of providing historical
explanations from the point of view of a conquest culture. In this
regard, he argued that the general attitude of researchers who
studied the ruins as well as social and political change in
Zimbabwe, was to draw conclusions based on the need to conform to
the ideology of political domination; especially since the state
often provided grants for such research projects.[25]

Chanaiwa's contentions are corroborated by Garlake's
observations on the conclusions offered by Bent, who was
commissioned by Rhodes in 1891 to investigate the origin of the

ruins.[26] Garlake suggested that the strong preconceptions about African creativity, in addition to settler resentment of evidence that pointed to local origin, influenced his findings. As Garlake further noted with respect to the hostility that followed Randall-MacIvers' study of 1905,[27] which had ascribed the Great Zimbabwe as an African invention, "The controversy that his findings caused among the settlers in Southern Africa lasted a generation."[28]

A random survey of textbooks that were used in the school system supports some of the above contentions. Tindall's study of the history of Central Africa, for instance, covering the period before European settlement to the early 1960s, exhibits these biases. In one section dealing with the exploration of that region, Tindall depicted Burton and Speke as the discoverers of Lake Tanganyika - a geographical feature known to Africans many centuries[29] before Europeans arrived on the continent. Another example of this approach is evident in the chronological table of an important study of the ruins compiled by Hall and Neal which attributed Livingstone as the first person to see the Victoria Falls,[30] despite the fact that before Europeans arrived there, the falls were known to Africans as 'The Smoke that Thunders'. In this regard, Hall and Neal oddly declared that "In 1855 Livingstone discovered the great Zambesian wonder - the Victorian Falls...."[31]

A striking feature of such disregard of the presence of the indigenous people in these places clearly emerges when one further

examines discrepancies surrounding the attribution of "founders" of geographical features in Africa. In the same study, for example, the writers stated that Renders - an American and the first white man from the English-speaking world to see the Zimbabwe Ruins in 1868 - rediscovered the ancient palace.[32]

There are two reasons for this change in describing the experiences of European explorers in the region. In South Africa, which was used by Western Europeans to enter the territory, accounts of the ruins written by Portuguese pioneers were available to explorers. In Mozambique itself, English sailors acquired their knowledge of the interior from Portuguese settlers who maintained trade with paramount chiefs in Zimbabwe. Therefore it made no sense to ascribe the discovery of the ruins to Renders, as their existence was recorded in Portuguese official documents. Again, portraying Renders as the founder of the stone buildings could have implied an admission of Africans as their builders, since it would have clearly suggested that no other foreigner had seen them before he did.

Elsewhere in Tindall's study, one encounters another clear case of the cultural bias of the frontier that was typical in the settler period, particularly in characterizing the uprising of 1896 as a 'rebellion'[33] despite the fact that the settlers had yet to establish a government recognized by Africans, as they were in the territory under terms of the agreements spelled out in the

concession. Thus, for the resistance to attain the status of a rebellion, African opposition to white rule had to occur after the settlers had established a de jure government, following their crushing of the resistance movement, as did happen in October 1897. As things stood before that date, Europeans were in Zimbabwe under contractual agreements of the concession which had no clause suggesting any surrender of political power to the settlers.

Lastly, whereas both Africans and Europeans resorted to extreme violence in the wars which broke out in this period, only Africans are portrayed as having used excessive force in the conflict. For example, while Tindall is correct in her account of the share of Africans in the brutality that characterized the crisis, she does not seem to believe that the weapons used by their adversaries also had destructive power. In one particular instance which deals with the developments leading to the political settlement of 1897, Tindall described the Africans who fought the settlers as people who had committed numerous murders.[34] Yet again, while it is true that Africans committed these atrocities, there is no corresponding reference to the violence directed towards them by the settler army.

Another category of writers who have been identified by Chanaiwa belong to what he described as the indigenist group. As defined in his study, these writers were not a pro-African group

as such: they were a community of scholars who conformed to proper rules of investigation when conducting research. Their priority was to establish the facts and communicate the results regardless of adverse public reaction. The Randall-MacIver study which has been cited above, was the first project of this type, so it is easy to see why its conclusions provoked hostility from the settlers. The outcry prompted the British Association for the Advancement of Science that had commissioned it to despatch Caton-Thompson to Zimbabwe in 1929 to repeat Randall-MacIver's study. Her conclusions nevertheless confirmed the 'African origin' theory.[35]

The studies conducted by Caton-Thompson and Randall-MacIver had several implications on the future of social research in the territory. In the first place, their application of scientific methods applied in archaeological investigations that had yielded identical results at different times later became a standard procedure adopted in writing pre-settler history. The results were combined with linguistic data and oral tradition, as well as Portuguese records, to reconstruct the past.[36] In addition, although the debate regarding the origin of the Great Zimbabwe was far from being over as a result of these findings, the conclusions drawn by Randall-MacIver and Caton-Thompson set a precedent for scholars whose ideas did not conform to official policy to carry out research projects that were unpopular with the state. But as

will be seen later, researchers whose conclusions did not conform
to the mainstream of political thought made them public at the
risk of facing deportation or even political restriction. Finally,
because the conclusions drawn by both scholars were perceived as
undermining the ideology of political domination, as they pointed
to   the   existence   of   organized   ancient   kingdoms   whose
administrative centre was the Great Zimbabwe, they later gave rise
to studies that were conducted to refute them.[37]

Although Atkinson's study of the development of educational
policy from the 1890s to the declaration of independence in 1965
is by no means indigenist, as evident in his support for separate
schools, it is one of the most comprehensive works on this
subject.[38] Besides outlining the development of the territory's
school system as it evolved under the settlers, the major focus of
the study was the issue of problems encountered in delivering
educational services to the territory's diverse communities. In
particular, the study is useful as a guide to understanding the
emergence of   the dual educational system for Africans and
Europeans; and it gives a clear picture of how the two systems
were linked to the economy. As such, it should be judged as a
valuable piece of research that is highly informative to both the
researcher and the general reader.

Despite these qualities, however, and the clear description
of reforms[39] that were introduced at various stages in the 1890-

1965 period, the study fails to adequately address the persistent problem of social inequality that stemmed from educational policies that were linked to political and economic systems designed to enhance the disparities. This occurs because Atkinson's study is basically a descriptive work, lacking depth as a critical evaluation of the political and economic ideologies which impinged on the educational system.

The problem of the relationship between the territory's educational policies and employment opportunities for Africans and Europeans was the focus of a five-year in-depth study conducted by Murphree, Cheater, Dorsey and Mothobi.[40] Divided into three sections dealing consecutively with the labor situation among African secondary school graduates, the occupational structure in both the commercial and industrial sectors, and conclusions drawn from the overall economic picture, the study was carried out under the auspices of the World Council of Young Men's Club.[41]

From an academic standpoint, the study is an excellent piece of research, revealing the degree to which the individuals who executed it had a full grasp of the obstacles that were impeding the territory's achievement of its economic potential. The methodologies applied in analyzing the problem, including the assembling of high quality data, participant observation, interviews with company directors; and above all, an open mind in analyzing and interpreting the data, makes the study one of the

best of those few that approached the conflict with a high degree of objectivity in the 1970s. There may, nevertheless, be justification for expressing some reservations about the validity of the statistical data and the responses elicited from company directors and government officials, as their research was conducted when the settlers were reluctant to release information that had the potential of increasing the impact of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

Finally, the study differs from others reviewed earlier in that whereas their objective was to satisfy intellectual curiosity, it was conceived primarily as a project that could prompt social action,[42] as its sponsors were anxious to gain insights into educational strategies that could be adopted to improve race relations in the territory. This was evident in the recommendations made by its authors. Besides appealing for the adoption of fair hiring policies and the creation of programs which could provide employment to African secondary school leavers, the report called for an immediate reform of instruction to achieve both objectives.[43]

The last category of literature to be examined deals with the relationship between education and nationalism. In Quebec, the authors of a document which formed part of a Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the state of Education in that province (established in 1961), proposed changes that had important

consequences on the nature of instruction provided in schools. As an outcome of the Quiet Revolution which swept across that province in the 1960s in an attempt to assert French nationalism in the economic and political arenas, the report called for the creation of polyvalent secondary schools to replace the classical system. The change was deemed to be important in competing with the Anglophone educational system which prepared students for modern occupations. The document emphasized this objective by calling for the introduction of comprehensive instruction at the post-secondary level of education which focused on the arts, the sciences, languages, and technology. The commission described the nature of the proposed program when it said:

> We recommend that this course shall be the preparatory
> stage required for higher education, in the case of
> those intending to continue their studies, and, for all
> others, a terminal phase in general education and
> vocational training, preparing directly for a career.[44]

The adoption of the reforms proposed by the commission into the educational system was the focus of an important article published by Norman Henchey in 1972.[45] Its emphasis was on the development of educational policy in the province as an expression of the emerging nationalist movement of the 1960s. Henchey discussed how legal structures were introduced into the constitution, including Bill 21 passed in 1967,[46] which created the post-secondary institutes later known as Collèges

d'Enseignement Général et Professionel (CEGEPS). In particular, the importance of Bill 63[47] enacted in 1969, which required new immigrants to educate their children in French schools, was seen as a major aspect of language nationalism arising from the Quiet Revolution.

As in Quebec, where the revolution had influenced educational literature, the Sputnik Scare of 1957 was responsible for the revival of American nationalism in the 1960s which manifested itself in educational publications. As early as 1959, books and articles addressing the problem of the future of educational policy appeared. In 1960, for instance, a unique report[48] of the conclusions of an interdisciplinary team of leading American educators, who had convened to examine the future of instruction, proposed radical changes to existing methods of teaching and curriculum development.[49] While innovation of instruction in this period was a common feature of educational development in most of the industrialized countries, the reforms discussed in this particular work were motivated by national pride arising from the need to respond to the challenge of Soviet entry into space.

The anxiety prevailing in American academic circles which followed the launching of the Sputnik, together with the actual reforms implemented in educational policy as a result of the crisis were documented by Herold.[50] Herold first discussed how complacency with the state of American education that had

dominated the post-war period turned to despair, as the Sputnik appeared to point to the superiority of the Soviet educational system.[51] He stated that the uneasiness experienced during this period was expressed by President Eisenhower who appealed to educators, parents, and students to moderate their adoption of progressive education. Stressing this point, the President said "They must be induced to abandon the educational path that, rather blindly, they have been following as a result of John Dewey's teachings."[52] Herold also identified changes that were introduced in order to promote American space programs including a bill that was hastily passed by Congress which provided massive aid to education;[53] especially to organizations established to reform science and mathematics instruction. Another direct outcome of the nationalism which permeated the educational system, was the expansion of the physics and engineering degree programs at the graduate level.[54] The objective was to produce researchers in these fields who could assist in the advancement of American space exploration.

As nationalist developments in Quebec and the United States were influencing government policies and the nature of publications that appeared in the 1960s, the attainment of independence in Third World nations in that decade equally gave rise to official documents and studies revealing the influence of nationalism in the formulation of educational policies. For

example, after the conference of African ministers of education held in Ethiopia in 1961 to develop a common strategy for education, a report summarized the recommendations adopted by the various states in their effort to establish a link between education and nation-building.[55] Apart from explaining the importance attached to national cohesion through adaptation of instruction to local requirements, the report stressed the significance of assimilating Western science and technology as an instrument for accelerating political and economic development. According to this document, one of the major conclusions of the conference was that:

> ...African educational authorities should revise and reform the content of education in the areas of the curricula, textbooks, and methods, so as to take account of African environment, child development, cultural heritage and the demands of technological progress and economic development, especially industrialization....[56]

The adoption of some of the policies discussed in the report was the focus of Dolan's dissertation which examined the transition of the Tanzanian school system from colonialism to Self-Reliance.[57] As a survey of the evolution of education in the two eras, his study contrasted the forces which accounted for the emergence of the colony's school system during the Trusteeship period with those which produced the post-independence system. Dolan suggested that while the British Colonial Office and the United Nations Trusteeship Council influenced the development of

education in Tanzania between 1919 and 1961, the political and economic aspirations of Africans in the territory determined the scope of education in the independence era.[58] A major aspect of the ascendancy of African nationalism in this period identified by Dolan was the phasing out of the three educational systems which had been created by the colonial administration, and their replacement by an integrated system in 1962.

Although these publications attempt to explain the forces which determined the development of a link between nationalism and education policies in the United States, Quebec and Tanzania; they do not emphasize other factors which influenced educational reforms in the three societies. For instance, the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement in America clearly influenced educational change, as curriculum developers and policymakers instituted changes designed to accommodate the concerns of pressure groups produced by both events.[59] In particular, the study conducted by Herold overlooked the fact that the reforms which were implemented in American education as a whole in the 1960s resulted partly from the reaction of policymakers to the Vietnam crisis and the civil rights movement, especially towards the end of the decade, when the United States had regained its leadership in space exploration.

Dolan's study exhibits identical weaknesses in that it surprisingly ignored the regional and international forces which

influenced educational policies in Tanzania before and after independence. For instance, his research did not show that the Mau Mau nationalist uprising which destabilized the East African colonies was responsible for the appearance of the Swynnerton Plan[60] in 1955 that resulted in the expansion of agriculture in the rural areas of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The extension of this plan to primary and secondary schools in Tanzania is recorded in the Fuggles-Couchman report which appeared in 1956.[61] As will be demonstrated in the conclusion, the Ujamaa scheme that was instituted as a major component of the ideology of self-reliance was indeed a combined version of the Swynnerton Plan and the Phelps-Stokes program of 1925; all of which had sought to achieve economic development through confining the vast majority of Africans in rural areas.[62] Dolan further ignored the fact that despite the emphasis placed on adapting education to national economic and political needs, there was expansion of international links as shown by the unprecedented increase in the number of Tanzanian students who enrolled in British and American universities in the 1960s and 1970s. Also, the diffusion of Western science and technology into the new nation suggests that rather than isolating itself from the international community as some writers have assumed, the state adopted a more open policy in the post-independence era.

The tendency to view educational reforms as having arisen

exclusively from local political developments is also evident in Henchey's study of the changes which occurred in Quebec's school system. Even though his research justifiably concluded that Francophone nationalism was primarily responsible for the innovations implemented in the structure and content of education, it failed to recognize the role of latent forces which were transforming education throughout the world. The reforms that were being adopted in France and elsewhere, for instance, had an impact on the attitude of Quebec policymakers in the 1960s, as the two societies had identical educational systems and a common cultural heritage. The international aspect of the reforms that were implemented becomes evident when one considers the implications of Magnuson's conception of the Parent Commission when he said:

> Its findings and recommendations, many of which have been implemented by the Government, were drawn from hundreds of briefs submitted by interested citizens and organizations, and from the commission's on-the-spot-investigations of educational practices in other parts of Canada, the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. In fact the Parent Commission is a first-class comparative education document.[63]

To summarize, the purpose of reviewing the above publications, was to gain insights into the major arguments associated with the relationship between education and development in plural societies. In particular, the relationship between inequality and the provision of education led to the realization that such disparities which existed both nationally and

internationally were crucial in fuelling the momentum of the respective nationalist ideologies in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Quebec, and the United States. Finally, while it was important to survey the reaction of scholars and governments to nationalist forces that transformed education on the international scene, it was equally important to examine the unique character of frontier scholarship which allowed cultural biases and nationalist sentiments to influence the conclusions made by researchers.

Theoretical Framework

In order to provide direction in analyzing the extent to which the conflict between African and settler nationalism influenced the link between education and political as well as economic developments in Zimbabwe, the research problem will be examined in the light of Julia Kwong's study of the development of Chinese Education between 1949 and 1966.[64] Kwong's contention was that the hegemonic group which controlled the economic structure and the state apparatus in China also dominated the educational system, through its ideology, which provided the mediating link between educational and economic superstructures.[65]

Her study demonstrated that, because of its control of the economy and the national ideology, the dominant group determined the nature of education offered in China in the period covered by her research. She showed, for instance, that despite the social

relations of production which continued to follow the adoption of an alien model[66] in the post-liberation period extending from 1949 to 1959, whatever reforms were implemented in education were consistent with the transfer of property from foreign to state ownership. Kwong further illustrated that after the economy had been fully transformed from private to state ownership under the banner of the slogan 'red and expert' by the Great Leap Forward (GLF) program established between 1958 and 1959, the government introduced an education system designed to achieve technical efficiency.[67] She also suggested that in the era of Retrenchment encompassing the period from 1960 to 1962, which experienced more centralized planning of the economy and greater emphasis on technological expertise, due to the ideology of self-reliance adopted to compensate for the withdrawal of Soviet aid, the education system that emerged was elitist,[68] as it had to conform to the regimented economic structure.

Apart from viewing educational outcome as arising from the interaction between the economy and the dominant ideology, Kwong also found that the ideological conflict within the hegemonic group, which produced a split among implementers of national policy, influenced educational development in China.[69] To support her conclusion on this aspect of Chinese Education, she cited the impact of the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, which represented the division between bureaucrats adopting the

emerging proletarian culture and those exhibiting affinity for the old bourgeois values. According to Kwong, although Mao's socialist policies were retained after his resignation in 1958, they were moderated by the Liuist regime, which shifted education and the economy from emphasizing the mass line to stressing the role of experts in achieving industrial expansion. Again, the argument is that the values of the pre-liberation period survived the reforms implemented during the first decade of The People's Republic of China.[70]

Lastly, Kwong's study identified measures that were taken by Mao to consolidate socialism after his return to politics in 1962. She illustrated that in the period preceding the Cultural Revolution, the government drifted from the Liuist economic policies toward Maoist development strategies. This was followed by the purging of top level administrators and intellectuals who resisted Mao's policies at the various levels of education.[71] Another development, one that took place as a measure of political socialization was the articulation of ideological education comprising the study of Mao's works, and further elevation in the curriculum of the status of national heroes who had fought in the war of liberation.[72]

The significance of Kwong's study in examining the conflict between African and settler nationalism and the link between education and political as well as economic developments in

Zimbabwe, is the importance of her contention regarding the role of the economic base in determining educational outcomes. For as will be seen in chapter three, the economic motive was the primary force that had given impetus to colonization, as there was political freedom in the countries from which the settlers had originated. This differs from the colonization of the United States, which to some degree was the result of individuals seeking political and religious freedom. By contrast, a considerable number of Europeans in Zimbabwe had emigrated from South Africa, where they enjoyed political freedom that far exceeded their experiences in the old world. The point is that, as there was a potential for the educational system which they established to enhance economic gains, it will be important to examine the relationship between the economic structure and the educational system that was introduced. Also, since the African Government formed in 1980 administered the economy in a society where Europeans exercised considerable influence in fiscal matters, it will be necessary to evaluate the relationship between education and the economy in the post-independence era.

Another aspect of Kwong's study which will be related to the Zimbabwean case is the idea that a change in the leadership of the hegemonic ideology can affect education, as illustrated by her analysis of the transitional period, during which the moderate socialism adopted by the Liuist administration and the radical

version of the same ideology that prevailed under Mao's regime, had different effects on the content and structure of education. Because comparable developments took place in Zimbabwe, an assessment of the impact of the changes that occurred in the settler ideology and the effect of the multi-party government of the post-independence era on educational, political, and economic institutions will be undertaken. A preliminary investigation conducted to determine the periods during which the dominant ideologies were moderated or articulated identified five developmental stages.[73]

A further aspect of the Chinese experience that will be applied in examining the Zimbabwean situation is the reaction of policymakers to the decline of relations between the new republic and the Soviet Union. As Kwong pointed out, the period of Retrenchment (1960-1962) which followed the withdrawal of Soviet aid involved more emphasis on central planning of the economy, which was intended to promote self-reliance through the development of industry and agriculture.[74] Since the advancement of technology was viewed as being crucial in achieving economic independence, there was a corresponding shift in educational policies designed to produce experts. As both the Rhodesian regime and the African administration were at some point shaken by a deterioration of economic relations with neighbors or the international community, their reactions will be ascertained to

determine their implications for educational and economic developments.

Finally, since an assessment of the development strategies that were implemented in Zimbabwe after independence was a factor which influenced the research problem, the social structure that emerged as a result of African initiative will be contrasted with the GLF reforms, especially in gauging the extent of the socialist policies that appeared in the 1980s. And while the development of rural areas in the African nation will be compared with the communes established by the Asian republic, the educational policies of the former colony will be evaluated in the light of the Chinese system that had acquired most of the basic socialist characteristics by the end of the GLF era.[75] The comparison is realistic, as the reforms are evaluated at a stage when both nations had enjoyed nine years of independence following the introduction of new policies.

In analyzing the research problem, the study will develop as follows: following this introduction, chapter two examines the social and political conditions existing before British occupation of Zimbabwe. Chapter three will focus on the rise and development of nationalism in the territory. Chapter four deals with conflict between African and settler nationalism, and attempts to determine how both were manifested in the country's educational system. The next chapter analyzes the development strategies to determine

differences in economic policies. Chapter six evaluates the relationship between education and development policies in the two periods in order to determine the social structures which evolved from the training and dispersal of labor into the economy. The last chapter will provide the conclusion of the study in the light of the Chinese experience. Finally, since this dissertation is basically a case study of the relationship between social conflict and educational policy, its conclusions will be related in a general way to the educational experiences of Quebec, Tanzania and the United States of America.

NOTES

1 Robert I. Rotberg, the Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 2.

2 Arthur F. Loveday, Three Stages of History in Rhodesia (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, n.d.), p. 14.

3 Adrian Darter, The Pioneers of Mashonaland (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton Kent and Co. Ltd., 1914), p. 53, passim, Chapter VIII.

4 Constance E. Fripp, Gold and the Gospel in Mashonaland (London: Chatto Windus, 1949), p. 15.

5 For a detailed view of an abortive plan to invade the South African Boer Republics by Cecil Rhodes and Starr Jamieson, administrator of Southern Rhodesia in 1891, see H.M. Hole, The Jamieson Raid (London: 1930).

6 One radical religious leader in Malawi was John Chilembwe whose failure to reform the church resulted in many Africans deserting missionaries and establishing independent denominations.

7 For a thorough treatment of the post-war political climate in African colonies, refer to Ndabaningi Sithole's views in African Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), passim, chapter two.

8 These conclusions are summarized by Thomas Sowell in an article entitled "New Light on the Black I.Q. Controversy," New York Times Magazine (March 27, 1977):53-56.

9 Among some of his publications expounding this theory is Jensen's renowned article "How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement?", Harvard Educational Review 39 (1969):1-23.

10 Christopher Jencks, Inequality (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 225.

11 Sowell, "New Light on the Black I.Q. Controversy," p. 57.

12 Ibid.

13 Jencks, Inequality, p. 109.

14 F. Sushila Niles, "Social Class and Academic Achievement: A Third World Reinterpretation," Comparative Education Review Vol.25, No. 3 (October, 1981):419-430.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p. 427.

17 Stephen P. Heynman, "Influences on Academic Achievement in Uganda," (Ph.D. diss.: University of Chicago, 1975). Also idem, "Differences in Construction, Facilities, Equipment and Academic Achievement Among Ugandan Primary Schools," International Review of Education 23 (1977):35-46.

18 Niles, "Social Class and Academic Achievement: A Third World Reinterpretation," p. 422.

19 B. Bernstein, "Language and Social Class," British Journal of Sociology 11 (1960):271-276.

20 Exceptions to this rule are West Indian and Latin American countries where Spanish, Portuguese, English or French are legitimate national languages.

21 Another difference between students in most African nations and those in the United States is that whereas African students are most likely to attend a boarding school at the secondary level of education, their American counterparts usually live with their parents. The degrees of family socialization differ in such cases. Further details of the American situation are discussed by Peter Blau and O.D. Duncan in The American Occupation Structure (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 412.

22 L.M. Thompson, "Afrikaner Nationalist Historiography and the Policy of Apartheid," Journal of African History Vol. III, No. 11962:125-141.

23 Ibid., p. 125.

24 David Chanaiwa, The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial Historiography (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1973).

25 Ibid., p. 81.

26 Theodore Bent ultimately concluded that the ruins were built by Arabs. For details of the conclusions drawn by his

survey refer to his book, The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1985).

27   David   Randall-MacIver,   Medieval   Rhodesia   (London: Macmillan and Co., 1906).

28 Peter   Garlake, The Making of the Past: The Kingdoms of Africa (Oxford: Elsevier Publishing Projects, 1978), p. 35.

29 P.E.N. Tindall, A History of Central Africa (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1967), p. 95. Note: Tindall was a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe.

30 R.N. Hall and W.S. Neal, The Ancient Ruins of Rhodesia (London: Methuen & Co., 1904), p. XXVI.

31 Ibid., p. 1.

32 Ibid., p. XXVI.

33 Tindall, A History of Central Africa, passim, Chapter 12.

34 Ibid., p. 173.

35 For the methodology and conclusions of the study, refer to Gertrude Caton-Thompson, The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and Reactions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931).

36 See D.P. Abrahamson, "Maramuca: An Exercise in the Combined Use of Portuguese Records and Oral Tradition," Journal of African History Vol. II, No. 2 (1961):211-225.

37 One of the major problems was that early European writers who ascribed the origin of the ruins to external sources had coined the term 'The Zimbabwe Civilization' to depict the culture that existed at the site during the period when the structure was constructed. As a result, accepting the African theory implied violation of settler policies that were justified on the basis of introducing civilized ways. For an example of later publications and adoption of the term refer to R. Gayre, The Origin of the Zimbabwe Civilization (Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1972).

38 Norman Atkinson, Teaching Rhodesians (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1972).

39 One of the strongest points of Atkinson's study is its covering of all the reforms that were implemented from the 1890s, when formal   education was   introduced, to the 1960s, when

recommendations of the Judges Commission were adopted in African schools. Chapters Two and Five of the study deal with some of the major reforms of the settler period.

40 M.W. Murphree et al., Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia (Salisbury: Mardon Printers Ltd., 1975).

41 Ibid., p. 5.

42 Ibid., p. 9.

43 Ibid., pp. 303-304.

44 Government of Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission on Education in the Province of Quebec, Part II (The Parent Commission) Quebec City: Pierre des Marais Printers, 1965), p. 90.

45 Norman Henchey, "Quebec Education: The Unfinished Revolution," McGill Journal of Education Vol. VII,No.2 (Fall, 1972):95-118.

46 Ibid., p. 108.

47 Ibid., p. 113.

48 The report of that conference was compiled by Jerome S. Bruner in The Process of Education (Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1960).

49 Although both aspects are given attention throughout the report, they are emphasized in Chapters Two and Six.

50 Jeffrey Herold, "Sputnik in American Education: A History and Reappraisal," McGill Journal of Education Vol. IX No. 2 (Fall, 1974):143-160.

51 Ibid., p. 147.

52 Ibid., p. 149.

53 Ibid., p. 158.

54 Ibid.

55 UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, Addis Ababa, 15-25 May 1961 (New York: Unesco, 1961).

56 Ibid., p. 23.

57 Louis Francis Dolan, "Transition from Colonialism to Self-Reliance in Tanzanian Education," (Ph.D. diss.: The University of Michigan School of Education, 1970).

58 An examination of the conflicting motives of education under colonial rule are discussed in chapter three of Dolan's dissertation in which the objectives of education in the post-independence era are outlined in chapter five.

59 The author argues that whereas the civil rights movement influenced reforms in the social studies and the structure of education, the Vietnam crisis was also responsible for innovations in technology and curriculum design.

60 Implementation of the scheme resulted in the intensification of agricultural instruction in schools and in rural areas as the colonial government was eager to divert the attention of Africans in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda from the influence of the Mau Mau. For details of the plan refer to the document published by the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya entitled <u>A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture (The Swynnerton Plan)</u> (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1955).

61 N.R. Fuggles-Couchman, <u>Report on An Inquiry into Agricultural Education at Primary and Middle Schools</u> (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1956).

62 The Phelps-Stokes Commission was particularly anxious to achieve the development of rural areas through agricultural training and community health education throughout the African colonies. For its specific activities in the East African territories, refer to Richard Heyman, "The Initial Years of the Jeans School in Kenya, 1924-1931," in <u>Essays in the History of African Education</u>, eds. Vincent M. Battle and Charles H. Lyons (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1970), p. 17; and Kenneth King's dissertation entitled "The American Background of the Phelps-Stokes Commissions and Their Influences on Education in East Africa, Especially Kenya," (Ph.D. diss: Edinburgh University, 1968).

63 Roger Magnuson, <u>Education in the Province of Quebec</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 16.

64 Julia Kwong, <u>Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution</u> (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University

Press, 1979).

65 Ibid., p. 15.

66 Ibid., p. 65.

67 Ibid., p. 84.

68 Ibid., pp. 117-118.

69 Ibid., 27-28.

70 Ibid., p. 125.

71 A list of government ministers and faculty members affected by this is provided at ibid., pp. 156-157.

72 Ibid., pp. 154-155.

73 These are as follows: 1897-1923; 1923-1940; 1953-1964; 1965-1980; and 1980-1985.

74 Kwong, Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution, p. 116.

75 Today Zimbabwe's independence is as old as the Chinese republic in 1959 - a year which closed the GLF era.

CHAPTER II

ZIMBABWE BEFORE BRITISH OCCUPATION

The Territory Under The Monomotapa Dynasty

Many centuries before British occupation of Zimbabwe, the territory had been governed by powerful African rulers. Beginning around 1420, King Mutota whose administrative centre was the Great Zimbabwe led his army through the central and northern parts of the country.[1] After subsequent campaigns which established his authority in the area now known as Matebeleland and Mozambique, the entire country came under a single government. The Monomotapa Empire, so called because of the absolute rule which followed the conquest, reached its zenith towards the end of the 15th century, particularly during the reign of emperor Matope, Mutota's son.[2]

However, due to the absence of modern transportation that was needed to administer the vast and scattered dominions effectively, the first emperor relied on three major approaches to govern the state. To begin with, the old southern province surrounding the Great Zimbabwe was ceded to Changa, a vassal believed by some researchers to be his son.[3] The same approach was taken in the administration of other provinces such as Mbire, Manyika and Barwe. A similar but modified system was also followed in governing the northern portion of the empire that was directly under his administration. But in contrast to the more distant

- 49 -

viceroys who wielded greater political power, the lords and chiefs appointed by the emperor in the most immediate provinces exercised limited freedom in executing their official duties, which included collecting annual tribute and enlisting soldiers for the imperial militia. In this sense, one can characterize the method used to govern both the old and new acquisitions as one that relied on delegation of power to individuals who acted as viceroys.[4]

Another system that effectively assisted the imperial authority in the administration of these dominions was the role of the Mwari (God) religion in unifying the polity and exalting the emperor far above his subjects.[5] To grasp how this process worked, it is necessary to shed light on the philosophical assumptions of that religion when it appeared around 1075 AD. Due to their dependence on natural phenomena including seasonal changes, rainfall, and vegetation for survival; the Shona-speaking people who inhabited Zimbabwe during this period rationalized about the existence of a supernatural Being who regulated the universe. This deity was seen as manifesting himself in society at three levels. At one stage, it was held that every family shared a Mudzimu - a common ancestral spirit - whose representative on earth was the living head of a household. Everyone related to a senior member of this clan therefore looked up to him as a religious spokesman for the entire family. At another stage, a chief was the recognized representative of the people under him as he was their

spokesman to the Mhondoro, the higher spirit medium of his community. Finally the emperor, the highest authority in the land, represented everyone to Mwari - the national deity - including lords, chiefs or the appointed viceroys, because his authority to govern was viewed as having been sanctioned by Mwari.[6]

Evidently, the significance of a stratified religious system of this nature to the political life of the empire was that it assisted incumbent rulers in asserting their authority and establishing order and stability throughout their dominions. For whereas the heads of the various families enjoyed reverence from their respective descendants, the local chiefs equally gained respect from individuals under their jurisdiction. Similarly, because of their authority, which was the greatest in the empire, the rulers of the Monomotapa dynasty gained allegiance from their subjects partly through their claim of governing by divine right that had originated at the Great Zimbabwe.[7]

An additional aspect of this religion which deserves attention due to its importance in established tranquility, was the role of the Mudzimu in the life of ordinary people. In contrast to modern states that seriously regard as their responsibility the social welfare of the individual, that obligation belonged to a family's ancestral spirit medium. As a result, paramount chiefs as well as other officials were generally absolved of the social problems experienced by individuals.

Finally, the trade which members of the Monomotapa dynasty carried out with Swahili merchants fairly enhanced their status as supreme rulers of the state. Beginning in the middle of the 15th century, when the dynasty was securely established, the emperors who governed the territory continued the practice of trading with foreign merchants which their predecessors had adopted many centuries before the emergence of imperial rule.[8] While there is little evidence showing that such trade greatly increased the power of the ruling emperors in this period, there is no doubt that the wealth they acquired from the sale of Zimbabwean gold, copper, and ivory which were exchanged for cloth, china and beads, reaffirmed their authority. Among their subjects, loyalty was partly achieved through conditions that regulated the flow of commercial items to trade fairs established inside Zimbabwe and to outlets on the east coast of Africa.

The appearance of the Portuguese on the commercial scene as a result of Vasco da Gama's voyage to India in 1497 had important ramifications in transforming the politics of trade and government in some of the regions controlled by the emperor. To start with, the newcomers established naval superiority over the Swahili traders in the Indian Ocean who had enjoyed a monopoly of shipping and the inland trade. At the same time the Portuguese despatched Antonio Fernandes - a reprieved convict, to make a reconnaissance of the territory governed by the emperor for the purpose of

assessing its commercial potential. Oliver and Atmore, who have studied many aspects of precolonial Africa, observed with regard to this historic expedition that:

> One of them, Antonio Fernandes, succeeded between 1512 and 1516 in travelling through virtually all important Shona states from Kiteve and Manyika in the east, through the Mwene Mutapa's metropolitan district and to the kingdom of Butwa in the far south-west, modern Matebeleland.[9]

Again, the responsibilities which increased with the appearance of a more advanced mercantile group broadened the role of the African monarch, especially because the arrival of the Portuguese intensified commercial activities at trade fairs in Zimbabwe. Thus, although commercial relations between the emperor and the Swahili traders had declined as a result of the Portuguese monopoly, the volume of goods which reached the markets in the first half of the 16th century grew steadily for several reasons. The failure of the luxury items that were introduced by the Portuguese to capture the Indian market - as Hindu merchants at Goa and Calcutta preferred gold and ivory to goods that were brought by da Gama - shifted their attention to the Zimbabwean trade.[10] But although the gold that was acquired from Zimbabwe found its way into the oriental economy, it was its ivory that was in great demand in India where it was used in religious ceremonies and for making bracelets. In addition, despite the fact that the Swahili traders were displaced by the Portuguese in the Indian

Ocean and the major entrepots at Sofala, Sena and Tete, a considerable number of them continued to act as middlemen in the trade. The effect of the combined presence of the two groups on the mercantile scene and in dealing with Monomotapa's officials added to the majesty of the sovereigns.

However, the forces which appeared to strengthen the empire were also the ones that later undermined its stability. The emergence of the Portuguese on the trade scene, which initially magnified the influence of the rulers, indeed sowed the seeds which ultimately destroyed the Monomotapa dynasty.[11] As time passed, the Portuguese began to control trade routes and to gain support among weak paramountcies - all of which gradually eroded the sovereignty of the emperors. More than that, familiarity with African customs and knowledge of both the terrain and economic potential of the territory that was based on reports submitted to Portuguese officials by Fernandes and other contemporary explorers as well as traders, provided the Portuguese with the incentive to broaden their interests in Zimbabwe.[12]

In 1561, the assassination of Gonzalo da Silveira - a Jesuit missionary who had been successful in converting 300 Africans and the emperor's family to the Christian faith, gave a pretext for the deployment of an army intended to discipline individuals believed to have committed the murder. Besides dealing with these people, including Moslems who had instigated the assassination,

the general plan drawn by King Sabastian of Portugal was to
provoke a conflict that could escalate into a contest for control
of the territory. These considerations led to the assembling of
1,000 soldiers under Francisco Barreto in 1568.[13] Even though the
plan was an abortive adventure due to the resistance it faced and
the fever of the Zambezi Valley which inflicted many casualties
among Barreto's men in 1572, the expedition achieved one of its
goals which was to resolve the problem of Moslem influence in the
Manicaland province. Describing the execution of the plan, Oliver
and Atmore again declared that:

> The Swahili Arab traders of the Zambezi were massacred
> with revolting cruelty and their places taken by
> Portuguese traders, whose descendants and successors,
> taking African wives and assimilating progressively to
> African customs, gradually developed into the largely
> self-governing 'estate-holders' (prazeiros) of the
> Zambezi Valley.[14]

Another element that undermined the strength of the empire
was the immense size of its geographical and ethnic makeup which
exposed its weaknesses as officials who were far removed from the
seat of government in the north later began to assert their
independence. The dissidents who engineered these divisions were
aided by the absence of an efficient communication system which
made it impossible for the sovereigns to detect such conspiracies
until they were hatched. To some degree, this problem contributed
to the declaration of independence by some vassals, as was the

case with Changamire Dombo, who was viceroy of the southern
kingdom based at the Great Zimbabwe. In 1490, for instance, he
marched northward and defeated Nyahuma who had succeeded his
father Matope as emperor. Later, however, Kakuyo Komunyaka (1494-
1530)[15] regained the empire after defeating the rebel forces, but
since Changamire Dombo was determined, not only to assert his
independence in the south but also to extend his rule throughout
the territory, he revived the war, which culminated in his
acquisition of the middle and western provinces of Zimbabwe.

The Emergence and Growth of the Rozvi Empire

Despite the fact that the Monomotapa dynasty as an
institution survived the conflict with the secessionist Changamire
Kingdom based at the Great Zimbabwe, it lost its influence as the
only political force in the territory.[16] Beginning in the late
1490s, when the southern kingdom rebelled against imperial rule,
its leaders again advanced their armies toward the north and west,
thereby gaining control of the Togwa and Mbire paramountcies,
which were incorporated into the new Changamire state encompassing
the eastern part of Butwa and central Mashonaland. Rulers of the
empire which emerged as a result of these military campaigns came
to be known as the Rozvi dynasty.

Their approach toward the administration of the provinces
they governed, though identical to the Mutapas, was slightly

Zumbo

Chikova

River

Zimbabwe ▲

Tete ■

ZAMBIA

Bokoto ■

Damba ■

Chipiriwiri ■

Luanze ■

Lake Kariba

Dambarare ■

MUTAPA

Makaha ■

Sena ■

Zambesi

Mbire ◆

Z I M B A B W E

MOZAMBIQUE

Rimuka ■

Chipangura ■

Ntaba zika Mambo ●

EMPIRE

ROZVI

N'natali ●

Sabi

Beira ●

BOTSWANA

Guru-Huswa ◆

Sofala ●

Indian

Ocean

The Great Zimbabwe ▲

Khami ●

EMPIRE

River

■ Trading markets

◆ Relics of Portuguese habitation

● Other settlements

River

0   50   100   150   Km

Limpopo

Manekweni ●

SOUTH AFRICA

The Rozvi and the Mutapa Empires in the 16th Century. Adapted from A.J. Wills in <u>An Introduction to the History of Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 21-27.

different from the system adopted by their predecessors who had served under the old dynasty. Their role as representative of God on earth, for example, was strengthened and combined with their tendency to claim expertise in traditional medicine, in order to appear more stately to their subjects.

Other major differences which occurred in the structure and form of government are discernible; particularly under Dombo I, who founded the Rozvi Empire (1684-1833) by conquering the areas covering present day Matebeleland and most of the region between the Great Zimbabwe and the Indian Ocean.[17] For instance, in contrast to the Monomotapas who had relied more on revenue drawn from the Swahili and Portuguese traders to supplement income acquired from the tax imposed on their subjects, the Rozvi emperors (Mambos) largely depended on tribute levied on the provinces. The significance of this innovation in gauging the political atmosphere of this period should not be underrated; for whereas payment of the tribute implied allegiance of vassal rulers to the emperor, refusal to do so was viewed as an act of rebellion. In order to enforce the system, the tribute which was paid in cloth, beads, hoes, axes, gold, ivory, cattle and tobacco among other items, was collected by Tumbare - the emperor's only envoy in this business.[18] The appointment of one individual to execute official policy of this nature, which differed from the Mutapas' preference of collecting the revenue through their

viceroys, was an indication of the difference between a highly-centralized administration and a system that was less structured.

Besides securing loyalty through a rigid system of annual tribute, the Rozvi Mambos developed a system of appointing provincial administrators which differed from the one followed by other rulers. Instead of relying mainly on the delegation of power to the lords in order to govern the regions that were under chiefs which was common in the Monomotapa Empire, the Rozvi Mambos preferred to govern through the traditional chiefs of the regions they had conquered. After they had approved them, representatives of the sovereigns installed the hereditary leaders at special ceremonies where they were given regalia which often included black and white calico and sheepskin.[19]

The Rozvi dynasty further differed in the extent to which it revived the construction of new zimbabwes, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, which were characterized not only by the surge of these structures, but also by industrial activities that included the manufacturing of iron hammers, trowels and chisels. Starting at the Great Zimbabwe, a new enclosure that came to be known as the Great Wall,[20] with a conical tower measuring about 56 feet in circumference and rising 30 feet above the ground, was built. This structure, together with the original citadel provided a commanding surveillance system over a wide horizon in case of attack by invading forces.[21] Apart from functioning as a defense

system, the entire complex was of strategic importance to commercial transactions between the Rozvi Mambos and the Portuguese. These were carried out at the Great Zimbabwe and Manakweni on the Mozambican coast. Situated near the Sabi River, which was fairly navigable, both locations took advantage of the trade which developed between Africans and the Portuguese as well as their Moslem predecessors. One of the prominent students of this period has suggested, after making a unique archaeological discovery of the coastal settlement that:

> Indeed, Great Zimbabwe may have stood at the centre of a
> considerable regional trading network. Products from the
> whole plateau were collected and reworked at Great
> Zimbabwe and many of them sold to foreign traders. A
> unique horde of the most diverse and bizarre goods were
> unearthed in 1902 in an enclosure outside the Elliptical
> Building. It exemplified the contact between regional
> and overseas trading system. It contained great quantity
> of locally made iron hoes - a widely used form of
> tribute among the Shona. There was a great quantity of
> coiled wire of iron, copper, bronze and gold, and beads
> of gold, ingots of copper; and copper jewelry. Three
> iron gongs, each made of two sheets of metal welded
> together around the edges, were found.[22]

While there is no consensus among scholars about the function of the few zimbabwes that were built between the Great Zimbabwe and the Indian Ocean, there is a great possibility that these stone structures were used as warehouses by merchants and as refreshing stations for porters.[23] This was more so with the ruins that were established in the Sabi basin; which in addition to providing shelter for trading caravans, were equally useful as

points for checking smugglers.[24]

In the south-west part of the country that covers the Matebeleland region, there is a cluster of similar buildings that were erected at Khami, Dhlo Dhlo, and Nanatali. As dwelling places, their location was usually on an elevated site from which an approaching army could easily be detected. In addition to mining and the manufacturing of agricultural implements, as well as trade items which were characteristic of this era, some of the human activities that have been archaeologically confirmed were mixed farming emphasizing cattle raising, the cultivation of sorghum and beans, and the growing of squash and millet.[25]

As the empire grew steadily - chiefly because of improvements in the mining of precious metals and the unprecedented increase in the volume of goods that changed hands between Africans and foreign merchants - the trade stimulus led to territorial expansion of the Rozvi dynasty both within and outside the confines of Zimbabwe. Initially, the whole adventure began as an integral part of the expansionist forces that had given rise to the empire. Inside Zimbabwe, Changamire Dombo marched northward where he attacked the demoralized Monomotapa Empire, which easily succumbed due to the Portuguese who were also advancing from the east. In 1693, the death of Mutapa Mukombe forced his successor Nyenyedzi, who had established an alliance with the Portuguese, to throw his lot with the Rozvi emperor.[26] The war which followed the

collapse of the alliance brought about the ejection of the Portuguese and their agents from the trading fair at Dambare which laid south of Zumbo, the commercial terminal of the Portuguese inland trade situated at the confluence of the Luangwa and Zambezi rivers. The loss of Dambare was a blow to Portuguese commercial interests in the Zambezi valley, as it denied them access to the centre of the gold trade situated at Monomotapa's capital in the region.

In 1695, further attacks on the remainder of the Portuguese at Masekesa, in the eastern province of Manicaland, dealt another setback to their economic designs in the territory.[27] This again gave Africans control of the Pungwe River, which regulated trade between the port of Sofala and the greater part of this province. After these victories, Changamire Dombo issued a decree declaring it an offense for foreigners to trade in the main towns of the country except through African middlemen.[28] So, even though the Portuguese had initially refused to conform to the regulation by refusing to restrict their commercial activities to the designated areas, they later found it more reasonable to shift to less hostile regions. By the end of the 17th century, their trade was largely confined on the northern bank of the Zambezi, where they conducted commercial activities with rulers of Malawi.[29]

Before proceeding to discuss some of the reasons for Changamire Dombo's military success in these conflicts, it will

help to give a clearer picture of his campaigns against the
Portuguese. As seen above, the Portuguese had gained considerable
influence in the region occupied by the Mutapas, particularly in
the second quarter of the 17th century. This situation had arisen
from divisions in the paramountcies which gave the Portuguese the
opportunity to intervene directly. Believing that resistance to
the intervention was irrational, Mutapa Mavura declared himself a
vassal of the Portuguese in 1629.[30] Henceforth,in addition to the
plantations they had occupied in the lower Zambezi valley as a
result of Baretto's expedition of 1572, the Portuguese extended
their influence to a greater part of north-eastern Mashonaland,
which thus nominally belonged to the emperor. As a result of his
new status, the Mutapa began paying tribute to the Portuguese king
until the early 1690s.[31] Thus, one of the main reasons why
Changamire Dombo organized the military campaign of 1693 was to
drive the Portuguese and their foreign agents out of the
territory. As one writer has explained the developments which
followed the victory and the expulsion of the Portuguese from
Zimbabwe, "Changamire's forces flooded ...over Portuguese estates
to the very gates of Tete. They also captured several Portuguese
who were not ransomed until 1713."[32] The point is that the defeat
of the Portuguese both in Zimbabwe and in Mozambique was the first
major sign of the beginning of the end of their political
influence in Manicaland and north-eastern Mashonaland.

Apart from the efficiency that characterized these military operations, there are subtle factors that contributed to the defeat of the Portuguese. In the first place, Mozambique - like all Portuguese colonies in Africa during this period - was afflicted by a shortage of white settlers. The population crisis was partly the result of the popularity of Brazil as a destination for both the entrepreneur and the young Portuguese immigrant. The problem was compounded by the shortage of European women in most of Portugal's African colonies which sometimes prompted the settlers to marry local women.[33] Quite often this situation posed considerable disadvantages to officials recruiting soldiers for the colonial militia, particularly in some territories where the miscegenated groups exhibited divided loyalties.

Furthermore, political blunders stemming from Portuguese diplomacy in the territory accounted for most of the military victories scored by Changamire Dombo's soldiers. The policy of using excessive force[34] on defeated paramountcies backfired as their former allies defected to the emperor's side. This was also the case with their meddling in the choice of a successor to Mutapa Mukombe after his death in 1693. Although his son, Nyenyedzi was the legitimate candidate for the vacant throne, the strong support which he gained from the Portuguese prompted his brother Nyakambiru to seize the throne.[35] The intervention itself directly led to the formation of a temporary military alliance

against the Portuguese, consisting of an army assembled by Nyakambiru and Changamire Dombo, which defeated the Portuguese in that year. In spite of the fact that the Portuguese later reinstated Nyenyedzi as ruler of the Monomotapa Empire, the size of his dominions had diminished significantly as a result of these wars since they later covered only a small area between Tete and Zumbo, south of the Zambezi.[36] Even then, this greatly reduced empire was a puppet state of the Portuguese as they continued to influence some of its political activities there from their settlements outside Zimbabwe.

The emergence of the Dutch as an important maritime nation in the Indian Ocean in the 17th century[37] was another factor that had an impact on the outcome of these conflicts as it distracted the Portuguese and prevented them from increasing their navy in the region. By the 18th century, the appearance of France and Britain in these waters - not to mention the resurgence of the Moslems in the same region - virtually ended Portuguese dominance on the east coast of Africa.[38] All these developments ultimately destroyed the morale of the Portuguese settlers in addition to weakening their military position in Zimbabwe.

After 1700 several major developments took place as a result of the wars waged by the Rozvi Mambos. One was that the decline of the Monomotapa Empire forced most of the paramount chiefs who had formerly served as vassals of the decaying dynasty, such as

Makoni, Mangwende, Swose and Chinamhora, to switch their allegiance to Changamire Dombo.[39] The benefits of submitting to this dynasty were perceived as outweighing the disadvantages by those who opted to join the new empire. For although these paramountcies paid higher annual tribute than before, and conformed to the policies of a highly centralized administration; the more efficient Rozvi military machine was seen as a deterrence against foreign aggression. Another outcome of the war was that the conglomeration of these paramountcies in the period following Changamire Dombo's death created the Rozvi Confederacy[40]--a loose collection of autonomous states governed by an emperor who largely depended on the Mwari religion to assert his authority over the dominions.

Finally, the end of the war, which also saw the expulsion of the Portuguese from northern Mashonaland and Manicaland, marked the end of Portuguese interference in the political activities of Zimbabwe. From the beginning of the 18th century onwards, therefore, commercial activities between the Portuguese and the emperors were conducted through African traders (vashambadzi) who carried gold and other products to Zumbo where they were exchanged for luxury goods including sombreros, handkerchiefs, candles, scissors, and brandy.[41] It is clear from these developments that the hostilities which the Portuguese in Mozambique encountered in Zimbabwe and in the Indian Ocean helped to produce a colonial

identity among the settlers, particularly in the first decade of
the 18th century. This new attitude did not however destroy the
commercial relations between Africans and the Portuguese. Rather,
these links survived the conflicts and even extended into the 19th
century.[42]

Except for minor conflicts that occurred in some regions, the
period between 1700 and 1831 was generally a peaceful one which
saw the consolidation of the Rozvi confederacy and the development
of the Shona culture. As in the beginning of this period, when the
confederacy had established itself as the most dominant state in
Zimbabwe, it continued to eclipse the dwindling Monomotapa Empire,
which was almost extinct by the end of the 19th century. The
emergence of a common culture was made possible by a number of
forces. The migration of people arising from wars that were waged
by the Monomotapa and Rozvi dynasties, brought about the diffusion
of values from different regions. The conquest of Butwa and the
rest of the territory by ambitious emperors whose traditional
roots were at the Great Zimbabwe, for instance, helped to
disseminate the Gokomere culture[43] that was dominant in that area,
a culture characterized by subsistence farming, stock breeding,
and iron working. In addition to carrying out similar economic
activities, the Ziwa culture centred at Inyanga in the Manicaland
province had developed trade relations with the Swahili merchants
much earlier than other groups in the territory, due to the

proximity of people in this region to the Mozambican coast. A distinctive feature of the two cultural groups was their common architectural tastes, which exhibited preference for round houses that were built with poles and mud and thatched with grass.[44]

Although the Leopard's Kopje culture - so called because of a hill near Bulawayo where it was sited following a major excavation in 1947 - had some elements that were identical to the above Bantu cultures, it contained some features that were unique. Despite the fact that most of the economic activities carried out were similar to those of the Gokomere and Ziwa traditions, the Leopard's Kopje people were more advanced miners.[45]

As a cohesive force, the intermarriage of people from different regions of the territory was responsible for unifying the institution of marriage and kinship. The use of cattle and mineral products such as hoes in the dowry system throughout Zimbabwe, which was formerly restricted to few regions, was a result of the internal conflict and trade that developed within and among the paramountcies that sometimes emerged due to crisis situations like drought or other natural calamities. The long distance trade itself assisted immensely in the promotion of a common culture, as it increased the value of domestic products and made them universally accepted.[46] A further impact of the trade in promoting common values was the fact that although the mining and processing of products that reached the domestic and foreign

markets were in the main seasonal activities, they resulted in the development of common skills. For example, the mining of gold, copper and iron ore were small scale industries carried out in all the provinces using the same methods.

The general tranquility of the 18th century, a period that was characterized by the absence of major wars, contributed to a decline of military efficiency among the Rozvi Mambos who governed the confederacy. This state of affairs was caused in part by a new attitude among rulers of this period, who surprisingly placed their armies under the control of their tax collectors.[47] Since these armies rarely confronted opposition from the regions that paid the tribute, their fighting skills naturally began to rust to a point where they could no longer match the military might of stronger opponents. The inward looking policies adopted by these rulers loosened both commercial and political ties with the Portuguese, especially as the Portuguese adopted the same attitude, due to the regional and international conflicts that plagued them. The result was that there was a sharp decline in the weapons that changed hands in the trade, as the Portuguese were reluctant to deal in guns, even with the paramountcies who remained their strong trade partners.

The Rise of Nguni Power and the Emergence of British Policy in the Territory

Before discussing how the post-Dombo era was responsible for

the easy victory which the Nguni invaders inflicted on the fragmented Rozvi confederacy, it is important to trace the background of the ethnic groups that entered the territory in the 1830s. Beginning in 1819, the power struggle among the various Zulu paramountcies in Natal brought about political instability that culminated in the exodus of some of the chiefs which followed Shaka's conquest over them.[48] Prior to their leaving Natal, they constituted part of the Nguni ethnic group that had lived in the Zulu state. Another group that entered Zimbabwe was the Makololo clan, which came from the Orange Free State under the leadership of their Sotho chief, Sebitwane. But since it consisted primarily of transients who showed little interest in the territory when they passed through it on their way to Zambia, it will be sufficient to deal only with those groups that transformed the political structure existing in the territory.

On leaving Natal, Zwangendaba and his followers moved into the Delagoa Bay region where he joined another Nguni group under the leadership of Soshangane.[49] From there, they crossed the Limpopo River and settled in Gazaland, Mozambique, close to the area where the Sabi River enters the Indian Ocean. But following a dispute which was settled by a war in 1831 which Soshangane won, Zwangendaba fled to Zimbabwe. As can be concluded from the earlier survey of the African empires that emerged in Zimbabwe during the 15th and 17th centuries, Soshangane's entry into Mozambique soon

brought him into contact with Portuguese settlers. According to Parsons, Soshangane began attacking them in various regions of the territory. In this regard, he stated that:

> Soshangane, who had settled at Chaimite in hills near the Save river, attacked and defeated the Portuguese at Inhambane in 1834 and Sofala in 1836. He also destroyed trading posts in the former Manyika kingdom. The Portuguese at Tete and Sena along the Zambezi paid annual tribute to Soshangane for up to twenty years after being raided in 1844.[50]

In addition to these campaigns, Soshangane attacked the Ndau people living in the south-east part of Zimbabwe in the district of Chipinge, and subjugated them under his rule. The victory resulted in his relying on this region as a source of manpower and food supplies for further assaults that were carried out in the 1860s on Shona paramountcies in the Mtoko, Rusike, Swoswe and Mangwende areas.

Meanwhile Zwangendaba, who had been defeated by Soshangane in Gazaland in 1831, had moved northwards ahead of his adversary to Sena and Tete, where he raided other Portuguese settlements before attacking the tiny Monomotapa Empire. Advancing southwards, he reached the Midlands area where his army was defeated by Nxaba, another general who was conquered by Soshangane in 1831.[51] Having lost that war, Zwangendaba advanced to the Great Zimbabwe, which was still the capital of the weak Rozvi confederacy, in an attempt to gain control of the state. In the battle which followed his

attack of that centre, Zwangendaba was successful in smashing the power of the emperor. However, further attempts to destroy the dynasty in the Matebeleland region were scuttled by the resistance which his army faced. The failure to accomplish his military design in this area prompted Zwangendaba to shift his attention to Zambia which he raided in 1835. After his departure from Zimbabwe, the group which he had left behind violently stormed this region, thereby forcing many people to abandon their homes. Most of the military accomplishments of this group were due to the excellent strategies devised by Nyamazuma, a female Nguni general, who commanded the army that ultimately destroyed whatever was left of the Rozvi dynasty in 1836.[52]

The last Nguni group to arrive in Zimbabwe was led by Mzilikazi, who was king of the Ndebele people beginning in 1823 when they left Zululand. After having settled in the Transvaal and in Botswana, he was forced to advance northwards because of constant wars with the Boers. In 1838 he arrived in Zimbabwe, where his army easily subdued the Matebeleland region, which for two reasons was still largely occupied by the Shona people of the defunct Rozvi dynasty. The damage inflicted on the morale of the Shona paramountcies by Soshangane, Nxaba, Nyamazuma, and Zwangendaba was so great that most of them found it impossible to resist the Ndebele incursion.[53] In fact, even those who might have wanted to resist could not do so because of the absence of

strong leadership needed to act as a rallying point for the defense of their homeland. Lastly, the difficult conditions experienced by the Ndebeles over a long period, beginning with their exodus from Natal to their arrival in Zimbabwe, had helped them to develop endurance and to excel in the art of war. These qualities, together with the advantage of having Nguni pioneers in many parts of the country, made the conquest much easier than it might have been.[54] On arriving in the territory, for instance, Mzilikazi broadened his political base by marrying Nyamazuma and incorporating her soldiers into his army.

After Mzilikazi's death in 1868, two developments that later influenced political trends in Zimbabwe occurred. One was the attainment of independence by the Transvaal in 1881, which allowed the Boers to concentrate on pursuing economic interests beyond the Limpopo with minimum interference from the colonial powers. Another was that Britain established an alliance with Khama, chief of the Bamangwato people of Botswana, which resulted in the territory becoming a British Protectorate in 1885. Both events led to the signing of the Grobler Treaty[55] - an economic agreement that theoretically permitted the Boers to open trade with Lobengula and his subjects in Zimbabwe. Lobengula and his advisors had rationalized that establishing economic relations with their former adversaries was an important diplomatic strategy as this could neutralize the British and their allies in Botswana without

surrendering self-determination. This was also the rationale that had prompted Khama and his advisors to accept British overtures for the protectorate status, as it was seen to be important in checking aggression from the Boers and the more powerful African paramountcies in the region.

In evaluating the reaction of Western countries to these developments, it is important to consider the impact of the treaty on the nations that had political and economic interests in the region. Britain feared that the agreement was likely to exclude it from establishing relations with Lobengula. As Roberts wrote, "It was the Grobler Treaty which finally scared the British into staking a claim to the country beyond the Limpopo...."[56] The potential of the Boers gaining political ground in Zimbabwe was not an idea that could readily be entertained by the Portuguese either; for although the treaty was structured strictly in economic terms, the more advanced European colonial powers clearly understood its political implications. The Portuguese were the most apprehensive, since a large number of Africans in Mozambique were Shona-speaking, as is still the case today. The problem was that it was difficult to determine the political boundary between the two countries, as whoever gained paramountcy in Zimbabwe could also claim the Shona-speaking population in Mozambique to be under the jurisdiction of the colonizing power.

The most significant outcome of the intense diplomatic

activity that dominated the remainder of 1887 was the securing of
the Rudd Concession, discussed in the first chapter of this study,
by Cecil Rhodes in 1888. The terms of the agreement reached
between his envoy, Charles Rudd, and Lobengula stipulated that the
king was to receive 100 pounds (sterling) every year, in addition
to acquiring 1,000 rifles and a gunboat for use on the Zambezi
River.[57]

In order to understand why Lobengula concluded the two
treaties in such a short period, it is necessary to look at the
factors that accounted for this change of attitude. First of all,
the British had a diplomatic advantage over the Boers because of
the mutual affection that had developed between Robert Moffatt of
the London Missionary Society and Mzilikazi. In 1859 that
relationship had led to the opening of a mission station at
Inyati.[58] Therefore it is not surprising that it was John Moffatt,
son of the British clergyman, who was instrumental in persuading
Lobengula to accept the concession. Secondly, the decision to
nullify the Grobler Treaty should further be seen as the result of
the British offer which, in this author's opinion was more
attractive than the proposals submitted by the Boers. Their
suggestion that the territory and the king could benefit
economically as a result of allowing them to enforce the agreement
was less appealing when compared to the reality of acquiring the
annual stipend and the weapons cited in the concession. To a ruler

who was constantly at war with his neighbors, the prospect of acquiring fire arms in return for mining privileges was seen as a diplomatic advantage that had the potential of establishing peace and security in the region. The accord was further justified by its potential of neutralizing Khama and the Boers through Britain's dominant position in the subcontinent. A further point is that, when confronted with the two choices, Lobengula opted for the British offer because of the wars he had fought against the Transvaalers, which outnumbered similar conflicts with English settlers in South Africa. The proximity of the Boer Republic to the territory occupied by Lobengula must have made the choice still easier.

Nevertheless, Lobengula was again forced to revoke the Rudd Concession because of the developments which immediately followed its conclusion.[59] The decision by Rhodes and British diplomats in the Cape Colony to release details of the document to the local and other South African news outlets, incurred the hostility of the Pretoria administration, which had failed to secure a deal with the African king. The rationale for publicizing the concession was to discourage the Boers and any European colonial power that might have still wanted to secure a treaty with the sovereign. This however did not prevent Paul Kruger, president of the new Transvaal Republic, from alerting Lobengula that he had sold his country to the British. But even before this, the

behavior of the envoys who represented Rhodes in Zimbabwe was beginning to raise doubts about the motives behind the document.[60]

Since the actual implementation of the Rudd Concession, and the wars that were waged by Africans in their attempt to resist its adoption will be discussed in the following chapter, it is important to briefly assess Britain's role in the colonization of the territory. For even though British officials sometimes influenced the events which culminated in white control of the territory, there were individuals who played a leading role in the occupation of Zimbabwe. In order to evaluate this assertion, it is necessary to examine some of the arguments that have been advanced in this direction. In a major study that was conceived to determine if the sustained impulses towards the African empire were influenced by British officials or entrepreneurs in the 1880s, Robinson and Gallagher concluded that while these authorities were instrumental in the colonization elsewhere on the continent, in Southern Africa the British flag followed the conglomerates.[61] Their study further argued that British diplomats were actively involved in assisting white settlement in Zimbabwe and the surrounding territories only during periods of crises in the Transvaal and in regions that were of strategic importance to Britain's access to India. To support these claims, Robinson and Gallagher wrote:

In Southern Africa, imperial intervention against the

Transvaal was designed above all to uphold and restore the imperial influence which economic growth, Afrikaner nationalism and the Jameson fiasco had overthrown. Imperial claims in the Rhodesias, and to a lesser extent in Nyasaland, were contingent in turn upon Cape colonial expansion and imperial attempts to offset the rise of the Transvaal. The times and circumstances in which almost all these claims were made suggest strongly that they were called forth by crises in Egypt and South Africa rather than by positive impulses.[62]

In the survey of documents covering the period between 1885, when the British entered into Botswana, to 1888 after the Rudd Concession was concluded, this author has found conclusive evidence that Rhodes, who had become a financial magnate in South Africa, was the architect of British occupation of Zimbabwe. Relying on a vast wealth derived from his conglomerate, the de Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.,[63] to magnify his political influence in South Africa and the United Kingdom, Rhodes originated the idea of extending British rule in Zimbabwe. After the plan was conceived, he moved swiftly to implement the concession by persuading the British Government to grant a Royal Charter, which had the advantage of preventing other colonial rivals from staking claims in the territory. Towards the end of 1888, the British South Africa Company, another joint stock conglomerate which he had formed that year, received the charter to colonize Zimbabwe.

The influence of other individuals on the development of Rhodes' imperialistic vision should not be overlooked, however,

for they helped to reinforce his conviction that Britain had an important role to play on the continent. While studying at Oxford, for example, Rhodes had listened diligently to the views of John Ruskin regarding the advantages of British expansion. As Tindall has so aptly found:

> ...Oxford formed his ideals on no less scale. There Rhodes came under the influence of the philosopher, John Ruskin, whose vision of a united Africa under the British flag inspired him. He listened enthralled when Ruskin spoke of 'a destiny now possible to us, the highest ever set before a nation to be accepted or refused. Will you youths of England make your country for all the world a source of light, a centre of peace? This is what England must do or perish. She must found colonies as fast as and far as she is able, formed of the most energetic and valiant of men; seizing any fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on.'[64]

Another individual who assisted him in the occupation of Zimbabwe was Sir Sidney Shippard, Britain's deputy commissioner in Botswana, whose role in persuading Lobengula to accept the Rudd Concession was crucial at a time when the king experienced problems in verifying the credentials of members of the delegation sent by Rhodes to sign the agreement. After convincing Lobengula that he represented the British Government, Shippard saw the concession concluded without further delay. Then, as Rhodes left for London to obtain the Royal Charter required to occupy the territory, James Maguire and Frank Thompson - two members of his delegation - remained in Matebeleland to ensure that the king could not change his mind.[65] Nevertheless, Lobengula despatched

two of his soldiers to London in 1889 where they expressed his concerns about the accord.

Finally, the activities of the British South Africa Company in extending British rule in the territories lying north of the Zambezi were largely due to Harry Johnston, Britain's ambassador to Mozambique. During the period when Zambia and Malawi were brought under British rule, Johnston acted as Rhodes' personal envoy in arranging treaties[66] with local chiefs which made it difficult for diplomats from Portugal and Belgium to secure similar agreements. It should be emphasized, however, that although the company's administration was extended to Zambia (1899-1924), its influence was never established in Malawi, as this territory was declared a British Protectorate in 1891.

While these developments overwhelmingly support the conclusions made by Robinson and Gallagher regarding the crucial role of entrepreneurs in the occupation of Zimbabwe; there is also evidence which refutes their contention that political instability in the Transvaal, and security considerations of the passage to India, were major incidents which triggered British assistance to European settlers in the territory. Two developments in the wars which broke out in 1893 and 1896 illustrate this point clearly. The Bechuanaland Border Police, which joined the Matebele War of 1893 on the side of the settlers,[67] could not do so without official approval from overseas as the territory had gained the

protectorate status in 1885. When that war broke out, there were no political disturbances in the Transvaal, despite the fact that the uitlanders were unhappy with the government.

After containing the raid, British assistance to the settlers was more dramatic during the war that broke out in Mashonaland in 1896 which will be discussed in chapter three. In addition to the company's forces, British troops under the command of Major-General Sir Frederick Carrington arrived in the territory after passing through Beira.[68] Again, this was before 1897 when Joseph Chamberlain, colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1903, had appointed Alfred Milner as Britain's High Commissioner in the Cape Colony- a diplomat whose insistence on the recognition of the rights of the uitlanders provoked the second Boer War (1899-1902). Clearly, both incidents had nothing to do with political developments in the Transvaal or access to the Orient. What they reflected was a fresh attitude on the part of policymakers in London, who began to appreciate the effort of entrepreneurs who had worked so hard to extend British rule in Zimbabwe, and the advantages that might be gained from it.

Elsewhere in Africa, British policy progressed through two stages. In West Africa, for instance, the period extending from the 1780s to the 1880s was that of the Informal Empire during which British motives were mainly economic rather than political. For example, while Ghana produced gold that was exported to the

United Kingdom, Nigerian palm oil was also acquired by British merchants. This period further witnessed the rise of organizations that were philanthropic in nature; notably the Niger Expedition (1840-1841) that ultimately led to the establishment of a mission station in Nigeria.[69] From the late 1880s onwards, however, British policy towards territories in this region changed drastically, as was demonstrated by their annexations which ushered in an era of the New Imperialism that was both political and economic in its motives.

In the East African region, the imposition of British rule was mainly the outcome of competition among colonial powers such as Germany, France, and Britain itself to control the source of the Nile that was crucial to gaining sovereignty over Egypt and the Suez Canal. As a result the Imperial British East Africa Company, formed in 1888, gained control of Uganda[70] - the territory from which the White Nile originates. Then, after reaching agreement with the Germans, who were actively involved in this region since their occupation of Tanzania, Uganda became a British Protectorate in 1894. Britain was now anxious to consolidate its position there because of the territory's strategic importance to the canal, and it was found necessary to extend British rule to Kenya in order to have access to the Indian Ocean. The result was that Kenya became a British Protectorate in 1895.

Later, it became obvious that if Uganda was to be firmly
placed under British rule, it was imperative to build a railway
line that could guarantee easy access to the ocean.[11] The line was
also important in strengthening the Ugandan economy as well as
enhancing Britain's position in Egypt and the East African region.
These considerations led to the construction of the East African
railway system extending from Uganda to the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, British presence in the territory did not guarantee
its dominance in Egypt, since Italy was anxious to establish its
rule in the Horn of Africa which contained the source of the Blue
Nile. Although its attempt to permanently gain control of Ethiopia
failed,[12] Italian presence in Eritrea combined with French
colonization of Djibouti to make the British insecure about their
future in Egypt.

Foreign Trade and Education Before British
Occupation of the Territory

Before identifying the skills and customs which constituted
some aspects of the traditional educational system, it is
important to shed light on the impact of foreign trade on the
territory's economy during this period. The value of doing so is
that, contrary to modern scholarship which has largely ignored the
role of mercantile capitalism in the underdevelopment of Zimbabwe
between the 15th and 19th centuries, a discussion of this nature
reveals the extent to which trade was conducted under unequal

terms.

Beginning early in the 13th century, locally-produced gold, tin, copper, and ivory were introduced into the international trading system by the Swahili traders.[73] In addition to Sena and Tete which were important trading centres on the eastern and western parts of the Zambezi River, Sofala was the major port which handled goods bound for the overseas markets. However, the importance of Sofala as an entrepot from which Zimbabwean products found their way into the Asian and European economies appears to have been due to its proximity to the Great Zimbabwe. Although it is difficult to compute the volume of trade in these commodities due to the inefficiency of official records, a general picture of the balance of trade can be drawn from the accounts of writers on the topic. As one of them has described the activities of these merchants:

> The manner of their trade was that they came in little vessels, which they call zambucos,...bringing much coloured cotton cloth, some white and blue, some of silk, and many grey and purple and yellow beads....The Moors of Sofala kept this merchandise and sold it afterwards to the heathens of the Kingdom of Benomotapa, who came laden with gold, which they gave in exchange for the said cloth, without weighing, in such quantity that they commonly gained a hundred to one. These Moors also collect a large quantity of ivory which is found about Sofala.[74]

When the Portuguese appeared on the trade scene in the 16th century, the volume of Zimbabwean gold and ivory that entered the

international economic system increased sharply due to their advanced navigation and the level of sophistication they acquired in marketing these products. Yet in spite of the growth of commercial activities between Africans and Portuguese merchants, the extent to which these transactions benefited the local economy was limited. In fact, the increased demand for these commodities in Asia and Europe was responsible for the decline of the territory's economy in some sectors, particularly in the regions which supplied them where mining and hunting elephants, rather than the subsistence activities, were given priority. The emphasis placed on the elephant hunt was aptly described by a prominent scholar of this period when he said:

> The popularity of the ivory trade is clearly revealed in
> the records of the early factors of the Portuguese
> fortress in Sofala. In the year 1513-14 Soars, the
> factor, recorded 51,000 lbs of ivory. In 1518, 9,656
> kilograms of ivory worth 1,232 maticais of gold were
> exported from Sofala, possibly to Portugal.[75]

Although there were long periods when this trade was interrupted, there is evidence suggesting that it was resumed by western Europeans who entered the territory in the 19th century. The demand for ivory in Europe where it was used to manufacture combs, billiard balls, handles for knives, toilet articles, small ornaments, and piano keys; had a further demographic impact on the population of elephants in Zimbabwe. To illustrate using the activities of three separate expeditions that entered the

territory between 1850 and 1890: whereas Henry Hartley killed over 1,000 elephants, Jan Viljoen and Piet Jacobs returned from one hunting expedition with a harvest of 10,000 pounds of ivory, while George Westbeech exported over 30,000 pounds of the same commodity between 1871 and 1876.[76]

Since it was mostly luxury items which the paramountcies obtained in return for ivory and the precious metals,[77] these transactions accentuated disparities in gains accrued by Africans and foreign merchants. In particular, the fact that commercial activities were carried out under conditions which favored mercantile groups, shifted the balance of trade in favor of the merchants who acquired Zimbabwean products. The use of weights and measures that were alien to Africans, for instance, often brought confusion into the system which worked to the advantage of foreign merchants.[78] A further problem was experienced in periods when the merchants attained military supremacy over the paramountcies, during which they determined the value of the commodities. Finally, the predominance of a mercantile system which produced few tangible benefits in Zimbabwe due to the fact that European traders were unwilling to invest physical capital in the territory, enhanced the economic disparities existing between Zimbabwe and the trading nations.

Despite the absence of formal schooling in the period before British occupation of the territory, the African society had

developed a system which dispensed customs and skills that were required to integrate individuals into the community.[79] Apart from being structured to preserve the cultural heritage of the community, traditional education sought to adapt the young generation into the physical environment.[80] As the values and practical training which individuals acquired were fairly identical throughout the period covered in this chapter,[81] it will be sufficient to examine them in the context of the general social atmosphere prevailing in that era. Also, the fact that trade was the only major external force which induced change in Zimbabwe, makes it unnecessary to relate the effects of Islam and Christianity on the territory's cultural development since their influence was marginal.[82]

In examining traditional education, which was important in the process of systematic socialization of the young generation in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to determine the framework to be utilized in the analysis of the skills and customs which comprised the learning experiences. In their study of African education, Blakemore and Cooksey identified two types of societies in which indigenous instruction operated; namely, the stratified and unstratified societies.[83] Among some of the factors which they found as having been responsible for the emergence of stratified systems in this period were ownership of a large number of livestock and membership in traditional guild families including

blacksmiths, miners and specialists in iron-working.[84] They further suggested that external economic relations, resulting from long-distance trade between precolonial African paramountcies and advanced mercantile organizations in addition to the presence of individuals who played a dominant role in the religious life of these societies, were important features typical of stratified systems. On the other hand, the writers observed that in addition to lacking these characteristics, unstratified societies had egalitarian political and economic systems[85] which inhibited the development of specialized skills or a distinct cultural heritage.

The significance of the above framework in the analysis of traditional education in Zimbabwe is that, apart from assisting in the construction of a profile of the territory's political development and social classes as well as economic activities; it is useful in identifying the values and skills which were important elements of indigenous instruction. As Blakemore and Cooksey have contended, specialized skills and a rich cultural heritage thrived during periods when African societies had established mercantile relations with foreign traders under highly-centralized administrations.

In Zimbabwe, the periods during which the Mutapa and Rozvi paramountcies dominated the political scene saw the emergence of powerful families whose influence originated from connections with the respective dynasties who controlled economic relations with

foreign traders. In the Manicaland province, for instance, the trade stimulus gave rise to families which specialized in the iron-smelting industry that also produced hoes for the domestic market.[86] The standard practice adopted by families who controlled this industry was to confine knowledge of the processing skills to their relatives, with the result that some industrial activities were monopolized by a single clan. The fact that the procedures followed in processing crude ore into iron and hoes were not drawn from textbooks, due to the absence of a written script, assisted in preserving these skills as a monopoly of individuals who excelled in them. As a result, others acquired the skills only after long periods of observation and working under the experienced craftsmen.

It would be misleading nonetheless to conclude that all major industrial activities in Zimbabwe were exclusively controlled by families who had originated them. As many studies have shown following excavations of the ancient ruins including the Great Zimbabwe, these centres were more than residential sites since their occupants also manufactured large quantities of trade goods.[87] Therefore, the fact that the Great Zimbabwe was a manufacturing centre which was densely populated in the golden age of its culture, strongly suggests that whatever industrial skills had been developed by individuals were disseminated to the entire community. Under these circumstances, the transmission of skills

to the younger generation should be viewed as having been crucial to the integrity of a society which depended on agriculture and foreign trade for its economic well-being.

An important aspect of traditional education in the territory, one which distinguishes it from the modern system, was its emphasis in dispensing practical skills to young people. Evidently this reflected a conscious effort by adults to instill norms of industry that were important to the preservation of the African society. As one writer has noted with regard to youthful participation in the mining industry, "The gold-washing operations generally involved men, wives and children; the latter including 'the youngest ones' who had containers to suit their age."[88] In many regions, children were also involved in agriculture, especially during the planting season when they were familiarized with the procedures followed in the grading and sowing of seeds. Although these activities were by no means rigorous as some writers have suggested, they often achieved their objective of initiating children into the world of work.

The most serious effort to socialize the young generation into the adult world was made at puberty - a period during which parents actively prepared them for their role in society. In other parts of the continent where initiation was conducted in secluded areas, the activities which comprised the rituals were highly-structured to a point where they extended over a long

period. For example, the Poro Society whose influence encompassed the West African territories of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, developed a system which covered a four-year period in isolated camps.[89]   During this time, the education offered ranged from moral instruction and laws governing society to practical activities including farming, swimming, wrestling, making tools and military exercises.[90] On completing such training, each graduate was given a name before leaving the camp which symbolized birth into a new society.

Among the Kikuyu of Kenya, similar procedures were followed in preparing young people to play their role in society. To mark the transition from puberty to adulthood, Kikuyu boys and girls went through a period of initiation during which they had to demonstrate their ability to endure pain and hardship.[91] The experience acquired in these rituals often established a bond among the initiates which enhanced their status as a distinct group. In addition to inculcating customs and religious values, the traditional system of education provided knowledge about the various uses of trees and plants available in a particular community.[92]

Even though somewhat varied, when preparing adolescents to assume their responsibilities as guardians of moral and cultural values in Zimbabwe similar practices were adopted in carrying out these activities. From the 16th century onwards, the emperors had

been conscious of the importance of training soldiers to defend their subjects. In the 19th century, Mzilikazi established a professional army[93] to maintain order and stability in the dominions which came under his rule. The extent to which military training was emphasized during this period is revealed by a law which made it mandatory for males to demonstrate proficiency in actual combat before they could be allowed to marry. The rigorous training which usually began at the age of fifteen years, lasted from three to four years[94] - a period during which courage and endurance were tested through exposure to danger. On soldiers who achieved excellence in the art of war, the king and his councillors conferred the prestigious title of induna - the highest military honor accorded to any of his subjects. Acquiring this title virtually guaranteed its holder entry into the council, whose members were the king's closest advisors.

Another aspect of traditional education that was considered to be important among males in Zimbabwe was knowledge of the territory's laws and customs. Although single men were usually not allowed to participate in cases being tried, their attendance at the royal court during such proceedings was encouraged.[95] The purpose was to acquaint them with the formalities and techniques adopted in hearing cases, and in imposing penalties on individuals who were found to have committed offenses. Since there were no formal schools offering instruction in the existing legal system,

the presence of young people at these occasions was seen as the best way of informing them about the law. In regions that were far removed from the royal court, such legal knowledge was acquired by observing similar proceedings conducted by chiefs or headmen[96] in various parts of the country.

As everywhere in precolonial Africa, traditional education made a distinction between skills that were acquired by men and those which were considered appropriate for women. While men were initiated into the more physically-demanding roles such as manufacturing tools and weapons, hunting, trading goods in distant places, mining, or being employed as porters;[97] women were socialized to excel in pottery and household work. Every girl was taught how to prepare meals and to properly conduct herself as a married woman, especially to her husband and his family. These attributes were considered to be important as lack of such qualities reflected poorly on her family.

An interesting aspect of traditional education is how it improvised in the absence of a written script. When paying a dowry, for instance, it was mandatory for families of the bride and the groom to invite observers who acted as witnesses to the marriage contract. This requirement should not be seen as being merely identical to the modern practice: in precolonial Zimbabwe this was a way of keeping records. If the matrimony had to be dissolved, the marriage intermediaries rejoined the families not

only to record the proceedings, but to ensure that terms of the marriage that was ending were not violated by either party.[98] The same approach was followed in recording verdicts of cases tried at various levels of the legal system. The chiefs and kings together with their councillors officiated during court procedures. Besides participating in these procedures, one of the major roles of the councillors was to act as witnesses who kept records of the judgments that were made.

Before concluding this chapter, it is important to comment on the observation made by Blakemore and Cooksey with regard to traditional educational practices which emerged in societies that were unstratified.[99] Although it was concluded earlier that the relationship between foreign trade and social stratification in Zimbabwe was to some degree responsible for the development of new skills and values, the period during which this link was weak did not necessarily see a decline of the territory's cultural heritage. In fact, the period during which the economic ties were reduced often allowed the territory to enhance its values and skills, especially as the shortage of foreign goods created a demand for local products.[100] For example, despite the fact that the 18th century was a period when such ties were weak, it was an era of industrial achievements which included the construction of the Great Wall at the Great Zimbabwe. As well, despite the fact that this period saw a marked decline in the power and prestige of

the Rozvi and Mutapa dynasties, it was a century when the African culture flourished, particularly under the decentralized Rozvi Confederacy.

In concluding this chapter, it is necessary to highlight some of the reasons for the above survey of Zimbabwe before British colonization. In the first place, the social dynamics of that era are important in understanding political developments of the settler period. The conflicts between the African paramountcies and the Portuguese were incidents which partly inspired the nationalist movement. The 1970s alliance formed by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), for instance, was to some extent motivated by a perceived need to join forces in waging a war against foreign domination as exemplified by the Monomotapa dynasty, which once ruled both Zimbabwe and Mozambique as a single empire.

Furthermore, the significance of a survey of the territory before the advent of settler colonialism must not be underrated, as it is crucial in any evaluation of the 'development and underdevelopment' of Zimbabwe; especially since the effect of the economic activities of the period prior to British occupation has been overlooked by most developed economists. The commercial relations between the African paramountcies and foreign traders discussed in this chapter will thus be taken into account in an assessment of the economic performance of the territory that will

be made in the conclusion of this study.

Finally, the survey is important as a background to some of the traditional methods of government later adopted by settler authorities to administer the rural areas largely occupied by Africans.[101] The transfer of education from mission organizations to councils that were administered by chiefs in the 1960s, for instance, was an attempt on the part of the government to hand over responsibilities to the traditional authorities. Apart from the advantage of alleviating its financial responsibilities, the government rationalized that the traditional system of administration was more efficient in stabilizing these areas politically. The period before British occupation is particularly important in that some of the social, political, and economic forces of that era were responsible for the emergence of the values and skills which were incorporated into the curriculum by the Phelps Stokes Commission and settler authorities. The extent to which these values and skills have been articulated in the school system by the African administration will also be assessed. In the next chapter, an examination of the rise and development of nationalism in the territory before and after independence will be made to determine its impact on educational policies.

NOTES

1 Robert Blake, <u>A History of Rhodesia</u> (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1977), p. 8.

2 Ibid.

3 David Chanaiwa, <u>The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial Historiography</u> (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1973), p. 39.

4 Ibid., pp. 40-41.

5 Ibid., p. 31.

6 Ibid., pp. 28-31.

7 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, <u>The African Middle Ages 1400-1800</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 173.

8 For an account of the origin and development of this trade refer to J.D. Fage, <u>A History of Africa</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), pp. 111-140.

9 Oliver and Atmore, <u>The African Middle Ages 1400-1800</u>, p. 177.

10 Ibid., p. 175.

11 This view is not accepted by some experts of precolonial Zimbabwe. For example, S.I. Mudenge, one of the leading scholars of this period, rejects the notion that foreign trade led to the enlargement of the Rozvi empire (1684-1833). For details of this argument refer to his article "The Role of Foreign Trade In The Rozvi Empire," <u>Journal of African History</u>, Vol. XV, No.3 (1974):373-391.

12 Blake, <u>A History of Rhodesia</u>, p. 11.

13 Ibid., p. 12.

14 Neil Parsons, <u>A New History of Southern Africa</u> (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1983), p. 29.

15 Robin Hallett, <u>Africa to 1875: A Modern History</u> (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 215.

16 Parsons, <u>A New History of Southern Africa</u>, pp. 29-30.

17 Mudenge, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire," p. 383.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 The architecture of the Rozvi period is shown by Peter Garlake, one of the authorities of this era in <u>The Making of the Past: The Kingdoms of Africa</u> (Oxford: Elsevier Publishing Projects, 1978), pp. 76-92.

21 Chanaiwa, <u>The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial Historiography</u>, p. 51.

22 Garlake, <u>The Making of the Past: The Kingdom of Africa</u>, p. 78.

23 Chanaiwa, <u>The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial Historiography</u>, p. 35.

24 Ibid., p. 36.

25 Garlake, <u>The Making of the Past: The Kingdoms of Africa</u>, p. 73.

26 Blake, <u>A History of Rhodesia</u>, p. 12.

27 Hallett, <u>Africa to 1875: A Modern History</u>, p. 220.

28 Oliver and Atmore, <u>The African Middle Ages 1400-1800</u>, pp. 179-180.

29 Fage, <u>A History of Africa</u>, p. 290.

30 Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, <u>A Short History of Africa</u> (Middlesex: C. Nicholls & Company Ltd., 1972), p. 135.

31 Parsons, <u>A New History of Southern Africa</u>, p. 29.

32 Chanaiwa, <u>The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial Historiography</u>, p. 57.

33 Robert I. Rotberg, <u>A Political History of Tropical Africa</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), p. 94.

34 Ibid.

35 Nyenyedzi had been groomed as an emperor by the Portuguese at Tete where they educated and converted him to the Christian faith, thereby giving him the name Dom Pedro.

36 Oliver and Fage, A Short History of Africa, p. 35.

37 Robert I. Rotberg, A Political History of Tropical Africa, pp. 154-155.

38 Eric Axelson, "The Portuguese in South-East Africa," in Africa from Early Times to 1800 ed. P.J.M. McEwan (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 242.

39 As vassals of the Changamire, chiefs Makoni and Mangwende are identified by Mudenge in "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire," p. 384. For Chinamhora and Swoswe and their changing of loyalties consult Chanaiwa, The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial Historiography, p. 58.

40 Mudenge, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire," pp. 387-388.

41 Ibid.

42 Fage, A History of Africa, pp. 232-233.

43 Three cultural clusters of Zimbabwe dating from the fourth century AD were identified in the 1950s and 1960s through archaeological, linguistic, and oral evidence which showed that except for the Leopard's Kopje culture, whose origin was not clearly known, the Ziwa and Gokomere clusters were essentially Bantu. For a clear picture of the three cultures refer to Garlake, The Making of the Past, pp. 71-73; and Chanaiwa, The Zimbabwe Controversy, pp. 13-15.

44 Chanaiwa, p. 14.

45 Garlake, p. 72.

46 Both foreign and domestic products involved in the trade by themselves were a unifying force, as they circulated everywhere in the territory, where they were widely accepted.

47 Parsons, A New History of Southern Africa, p. 64.

48 Rotberg, A Political History of Tropical Africa, pp. 170-

171.

49 Ibid.

50 Parsons, A New History of Southern Africa, p. 135.

51 Ibid., p. 65.

52 Richard W. Hull, Southern Africa: Civilizations in Turmoil (New York: New York University, 1981), p. 56.

53 Ibid.

54 Andrew Roberts, A History of Zambia (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 156.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 157. Note however that some estimates of the annual stipend report that Lobengula was to receive 100 pounds rather than the 1,200 pound figure cited by Roberts. For the first amount see text of the Concession released by Stanlake Samkange in Origins of Rhodesia (London: Heinmann Educational Books Ltd., 1968), pp. 78-79.

58 An introduction to the many correspondences between John Smith Moffatt, son of the elder Moffatt; his wife Emily, and brother-in-law David Livingstone and others, mentions the strong friendship that had existed between Mzilikazi and Robert Moffatt. For details see The Matebele Mission: A Selection from the Correspondence of John and Emily Moffatt, David Livingstone and others 1858-1878., ed. J.P.R. Wallis (London: Chatto Windus, 1945), p. XIX.

59 Arthur Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884-1902 (Montreal: McGill-Queens' University Press, 1983), p. 142.

60 Ibid.

61 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 462.

62 Ibid., p. 463.

63 P.E.N.Tindall, A History of Central Africa (London:

Longmans Green and Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 137.

64 Ibid., p. 137.

65 Ibid., pp. 143-144.

66 Roberts, A History of Zambia, p. 157.

67 Tindall, A History of Central Africa, p. 162.

68 Ibid., pp. 169-172.

69 Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action 1750-1850 (Madison : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 303.

70 Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 42-45.

71 Norman R. Bennett, Africa and Europe: From Roman Times to the Present (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975), p. 154.

72 For many years Italy failed to occupy Ethiopia until in 1936 when Benito Mussolini invaded the territory.

73 H.H.Bhila, Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: The Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1575-1902 (Salisbury: Longman Group Limited, 1982), p. 251.

74 From George MacColl Theal, Records of South-Eastern Africa. Printed for the Government of Cape Colony, 1898-1903. Cited by Gertrude Caton-Thompson in The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and Reactions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 197-198.

75 Bhila, Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: The Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1575-1902, p. 34.

76 P.E.N. Tindall, A History of Central Africa, pp. 115-124.

77 Bhila, Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: The Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1575-1902, p. 252.

78 Ibid.

79 Sometimes the systems differed from one state to another; and of course between the sexes. Among the Kikuyu in Kenya and

the Poro Society in West Africa, formal schools existed as secluded societies. For elaborate descriptions of their activities refer to Jomo Kenyatta's Facing Mount Kenya: The Traditional Life of the Gikuyu (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1938), pp. 98-162; and David G. Scanlon in Traditions of African Education (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964), pp. 13-26.

80 Ibid.

81 Ansu Datta, Education and Society: A Sociology of African Education (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1984), p. 2.

82 Elsewhere religions had been effective in transforming the values of some regions as was the case in Nigeria and Tanzania where both mission and Koranic schools were established before colonial rule. For some aspects of these developments refer to Kenneth Blakemore and Brian Cooksey, A Sociology of Education for Africa (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980), pp. 14-15.

83 Ibid., pp. 11-20.

84 Ibid., p. 19.

85 bid., p. 11.

86 Bhila, Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: The Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1572-1902, p. 38.

87 For an inventory of some of the goods found at the Great Zimbabwe following the excavation refer to Caton-Thompson, The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and Reactions, pp. 72-79.

88 Bhila, Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: The Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1572-1902, p. 44.

89 Scanlon, Traditions of African Education, p. 15.

90 For a clear understanding of these activities, refer to Blakemore and Cooksey, A Sociology of Education for Africa, p. 15.

91 E.B. Castle, Growing Up in East Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 43.

92 Jomo Kenyatta outlined the traditional system of education in detail in his classic study, Facing Mount Kenya, pp. 98-129.

93 Datta, Education and Society: A Sociology of African

Education, P. 11.

94 Ibid.

95 A brief description of the procedure followed by Shona chiefs is outlined by Hilda Kuper in "The Shona," in The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia, ed. Daryll Forde (London: International African Institute, 1955), pp. 29-30.

96 Ibid., p. 30.

97 Ibid., p. 27.

98 Although the intermediaries still play a role in many marriages today, their function has been greatly reduced due to the influence of Western legal institutions which handle most matrimonial affairs.

99 Blakemore and Cooksey, A Sociology of Education for Africa, p. 11.

100 This was particularly the case with cloth which was manufactured from local cotton as shown by Kuper in The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia, p. 26.

101 A thorough examination of the council system introduced by the settler administration in the 1960s was made by A.K.H. Weinrich in Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1971).

CHAPTER III

THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM

Formation of African Nationalism

The emergence of African nationalism in Zimbabwe had its origins in the expansion of the British Empire. Contact between Africans and a settler community drawn from various European countries stimulated African political consciousness. The conflict that stemmed from this experience resulted in the war of 1896, in which Africans attempted to recover self-determination. The extent to which Africans cherished autonomy was revealed in that year in the decision to abandon existing ethnic rivalries[1] and direct unified opposition to Europeans who had occupied the territory.

Prior to the war of 1896, Europeans conducted informal trade with Africans in Zimbabwe and during this period, most of the problems that later became dominant in the settler period did not exist. The conflict over segregation of institutions that characterized the settler era, for instance, did not arise previously, for missionaries as well as traders lived and mixed with Africans.[2] This state of affairs explains the absence of hostilities between Africans and Europeans before the occupation. African chiefs were generally hospitable to the traders and missionaries who proselytized in the country. It was through this

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absence of hostilities that some of the missionaries who were on good terms with Lobengula succeeded in persuading him to sign the Rudd Concession - a treaty that granted exclusive mining privileges to the British.[3] The concession eliminated competition from other European powers, such as Germany and Portugal, that had colonial possessions and imperial interests in Southern Africa. On detecting a conspiracy in the treaty, however, Lobengula repudiated the agreement[4] and requested Queen Victoria to reprimand British citizens in Zimbabwe. Despite the apparent consensus between Lobengula and the sovereign on this matter, the settlers continued to behave as if the country was already under British rule. Then, as seen earlier, Britain gave Cecil Rhodes a mandate to occupy Zimbabwe using a military force despatched to Harare, where it occupied Mashonaland in September 1890.

This occupation inaugurated a period of hostilities between Africans and Europeans, beginning with the war in Matebeleland in 1893. The conflict which resulted was provoked by Europeans anxious to consolidate their settlements, for they were convinced that in order to gain control of the territory, it was important to destroy Lobengula's power. Three factors that precipitated the Matebeleland war have been identified. One had to do with sovereignty over Mashonaland, where Europeans had established their most important settlements. Technically, Lobengula regarded this region as falling under his jurisdiction, and therefore until

this period he expected African chiefs in Mashonaland to continue paying tribute[5] to him as the paramount sovereign of Zimbabwe. Maintaining this practice was important for its implied recognition of Lobengula rather than the settlers as the real political force in the territory. In 1891, an incident which fuelled hostilities between Europeans and Lobengula occurred after the king's soldiers sent to collect tribute from chief Lomagundi in Mashonaland were astonished by an apparent shift in the chief's allegiance. The emissaries were particularly surprised to find Lomagundi exchanging gifts with Europeans - a custom that implied the end of Lobengula's sovereignty over Mashonaland,[6] so as a deterrent to other chiefs in the region the emissaries murdered Lomagundi. That incident was viewed by Europeans as justifying their plan of provoking a wider conflict that would establish their authority by demonstrating their military superiority.

Another incident that precipitated the conflict between the settlers and Lobengula was the cutting of telegraph wires by Africans resentful of white rule. At this time also, many Africans resorted to acts of vandalism on European property in an attempt to make it difficult for the settlers to govern them effectively. It was common for them to harass horse-drawn wagons carrying mail for the settlers, or to attack the new settlements established by Europeans. Reacting to these incidents, Starr Jamieson, one of the territory's earliest administrators during the period when the

British South Africa Company ruled Southern Rhodesia (1897-1922), as Zimbabwe was then known, ordered a police force to seize Lobengula's cattle. A third factor that ultimately led Europeans to assemble an army designed to strike Matebeleland was the contention by most of the settlers that Lobengula's soldiers constantly harassed their African employees. In particular, Lobengula's raid on Masvingo in 1893, which brought the infant mining, agricultural and commercial activities to a halt, prompted the settlers to act immediately. During the raid, European farms had been destroyed and looted by Africans, resulting in the loss of cattle, grain and furniture.[7]

By October 1893, Jamieson had assembled a larger army that launched an attack on the province of Matebeleland. At the battle of Shangani, it threw Lobengula's soldiers in retreat. To consolidate its conquest the settler army marched into the king's former headquarters of Bulawayo, expecting to capture the beleaguered sovereign and control a region which Jamieson had often believed to be the nucleus of political instability and economic uncertainty. A further incentive for the pursuit was to seize gold and diamonds from the king and distribute the spoils among the soldiers. On reaching Bulawayo, however, the army was disappointed to find the royal palace destroyed and deserted, the damage being so extensive that little was left for the army to loot. Frustrated by that state of affairs, Jamieson ordered his

soldiers to begin prospecting and carving out farms for Europeans in Matebeleland.[8] Thus Lobengula lost both the war and most of the land he had owned or controlled before the arrival of Europeans. The king's disappearance in 1894 not only closed the first stage of the Matebele War; it also became the basis of a wider conflict culminating in the uprising of 1896 in which Africans desperately sought to end the occupation.

In order to follow clearly the chronology of political developments in the revolt of 1896, it is necessary to explain reasons for the apparent stability in Mashonaland between 1890 and 1896. As stated earlier, Africans living in that region had been accustomed for many years to interact with European traders and missionaries who visited Central Africa. For example, missionaries such as Gonzalo da Silveira, had appeared at the court of Monomotapa,[9] whose dominions encompassed present-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique to obtain permission to proselytize in his vast and scattered empire. In 1572 also, Francisco Barreto, a Portuguese trader, landed at Mazoe after sailing along the Zambezi.[10] In the 17th and 18th centuries adventures to Zimbabwe by Europeans increased, and this was also true of the period prior to signing the Rudd Concession in the 19th century. Regarding these excursions, Basil Davidson[11] reports that the mystery surrounding the Great Zimbabwe Ruins stimulated European interest, and that the country's economic potential, as viewed by contemporary

economists, was another factor motivating European activity.[12]

But when it became obvious toward the end of the 19th century that European motives were political as well, African attitudes towards them changed significantly. The difficult conditions that existed following the war of 1893 further increased hostility toward the settlers, especially after the seizure of the king's possessions such as gold and cattle.[13] But it was the occupation of the Matopo Hills that finally led to armed conflict between Africans and Europeans in 1896, for the hills had been an important centre of worship.

Despite the relatively stable political climate existing in Mashonaland between 1890 and 1896, Africans in this region were sometimes subjected to harsh treatment by Europeans. A new legal system, with penalties imposed on Africans who violated laws that were introduced, was harsh when compared to sentences imposed on European offenders.[14] A case in point involved the robbery of property belonging to a white farmer in the region in 1892. Instead of dealing with individuals who had committed the offenses, the settlers despatched a police-force that indiscriminately killed a chief and twenty-one Africans.[15] The settlers also flogged anyone who violated their laws. Citing the new laws that appeared, Stanlake Samkange declared that:

> The Mashonas were subjected to what is still remembered
> as Charter Law - rough and brutal treatment. This and

> the sjambok have become part of the Mashona oral
> tradition so much so that when one roughs up and
> subjects a man to particularly unfair and brutal
> violence the Mashona say, 'Waita Charter ro' - 'he has
> practiced Charter Company Justice.'[16]

The occupation of Mashonaland in particular brought cultural norms that were alien to Africans. The flogging of adults and the judicial system in general contrasted sharply with traditional approaches to fair treatment. African chiefs especially were overwhelmed by the erosion of their political functions. Before the arrival of Europeans they had granted trading and hunting privileges to European adventurers, but their prerogative to carry out these functions was curtailed by the settlers.

The transformation of Zimbabwe from African rule to white control reveals three distinct phases that are significant in understanding the formation of resistance movements in the 1890s. As shown above, relations between Africans and Europeans before the occupation were excellent, because the settlers had adapted into the mainstream of African society. In that period, Europeans did not attempt to change by force any of the social institutions existing in the country. The second phase, which covered the period between signing the Rudd Concession in 1888 and the occupation in 1890, was characterized by strained relations between the races. After concluding this treaty, Rhodes and the settlers became more militant than before.[17] This became an era of

oubt and suspicion among Africans, and a period of aggressive economic planning among Europeans that culminated in the hoisting of the Union Jack in Harare.[18]

Lastly, the period between 1890 and 1896 saw the beginning of military confrontation between Africans and Europeans that increased dramatically and led to the uprising of 1896. Because the uprising was spontaneous and exhibited resentment to alien rule, it is important to the understanding of African nationalism during its infancy.

That resistance movement can be viewed as the crisis which sowed the seeds of African nationalism in Zimbabwe. In 1896, tensions between Africans and Europeans increased noticeably, and they produced an outbreak of violence throughout the country.[19] In the Mashonaland region, which the settlers had initially believed to be peaceful when compared to Matebeland, sporadic insurrections erupted, leaving many Africans and Europeans dead. Most of the resistance movements in Mashonaland had identical characteristics, so it will be sufficient to examine the political activities coordinated by only two resistance leaders to illustrate the nature of the conflict.

The movement led by Nehanda, an eminent prophetess commanded great support in central Mashonaland. Its political significance arose from the fact that Africans in that part of the country perceived Nehanda to be an incarnation of Chaminuka - a

charismatic and ancestral spiritual leader whose influence greatly inspired the uprising. According to contemporary oral tradition, Nehanda was seen as having acquired Chaminuka's spiritual attributes. Similarly, Chaminuka was viewed as having inherited the spiritual powers of Monomotapa, one of the most powerful emperors of ancient Zimbabwe. It is evident in this regard that Nehanda was an embodiment of the country's religious and political traditions. During the uprising, her importance in eliciting support and motivating Africans to fight the settlers arose from their perception of spiritual leaders as being closely linked to the monarchy,[20] especially the ancient Monomotapa dynasty. It was for this reason that the insurgents viewed the emerging institutions as undermining traditional values. The conservative nature of the movement inspired its revolutionary passion.

Due to their limited view of the traditional culture, which prompted them to view African societies as lacking any religious or political coherence,[21] the settlers underestimated the potential of a major uprising. The uprising of 1896 masterminded by Nehanda however changed their perception. Although Nehanda did not actually direct the military operations, she contributed immensely in planning the strategies for the conflict, since she coordinated the intelligence activities of the war.

A second colorful leader of the uprising was Kaguvi, who was also a spiritual leader of this period. He often received

spiritual counsel from Nehanda, however, who was the senior religious leader. Kaguvi's significance in the conflict stemmed from his role in inaugurating and executing the military campaigns. Terence Ranger, an authority on the uprising, has noted with respect to Kaguvi's role in the civil strife that "The murders were committed by order of Kaguvi."[22]

In Matebeleland also, there emerged two prominent leaders who directed the uprising, but in contrast to the Mashonaland case, the resistance movement of this region was not dominated by religious leaders. Rather, the conflict should be understood in terms of a resurgence of hostilities which the war of 1893 had failed to settle. The loss of land by Africans in this region, and the abolition of the monarchy by the settlers, in addition to the treatment of the indigenous population which followed the arrival of Europeans, gave impetus to the uprising. These factors further determined the type of leadership required in the desperate attempt to reassert African self-determination. For instance, Umlugulu, a veteran of the 1893 uprising, organized the resistance[23] and later combined the military office with his role as a dominant religious leader. Another military commander of the previous war who assisted in the 1896 conflict was Mkwati who was also a great religious leader.[24] During the uprising of 1896, he rose to become the most important military officer in Matebeleland, and that combination of religious and military

offices accounted for his political significance in the province.
In addition, Mkwati's marriage to a wife from the Mashonaland
region, along with the fact that he was the most cosmopolitan
leader, enabled him to enjoy immense popularity. For these
reasons, he was able to conclude a military alliance with Kaguvi[25]
that gave him greater territorial exposure than any other
political figure. The significance of this alliance was that it
fostered national rather than ethnic solidarity among Africans.

Even though the resistance movement attained national
proportions in 1896, the settler army humiliated Africans and this
was due to several factors. The technological superiority of
Europeans enabled them to reinforce their conquests. The improved
transportation system they had established increased the settler's
capacity to move armies and food supplies from one military base
to another with greater efficiency. By contrast, Africans were
handicapped by the lack of horses and wagons necessary to improve
their mobility. Most important, unlike Africans, who relied on a
small number of fire arms acquired from the traders and through
the concession in addition to the simple weapons formerly used in
traditional warfare, Europeans possessed modern sophisticated
weaponry.[26]

Another factor facilitating the conquest was that in the
early stages of the conflict, Africans were afflicted by deep
ethnic animosities. The rivalries accounted for the lack of

organized opposition to white settlement. This was even more evident during the Jamieson Raid on the Transvaal which placed severe limitations on the settler army. During that raid, Africans failed to stage a major uprising which could have humiliated the remainder of the settler force. Finally, the role played by British colonies in South Africa in replenishing the depleting military hardware and basic needs required by the settlers determined the outcome of the conflict. That support was based on their perception of Zimbabwe as an extension of the South African colonies[27] that were part of the British African Empire.

The problem of the forces that evoked political consciousness among Africans during this period continues to puzzle scholars of the uprising. Although rulers of the ancient Monomotapa and Rozvi dynasties had shown similar courage in opposing Portuguese attempts at colonization, their success in checking alien territorial expansion had been largely achieved by their armies. The general population did not participate in the conflicts, as was the case with the crisis of 1896. Furthermore, because the uprising reached the level of proto-nationalism, it is appropriate to examine its development in the light of political theory. Kohn and Solosky, two eminent scholars of nationalism, theorized that the following preconditions must exist before nationalist consciousness can emerge in an African society:

1.   Disruption of the traditional agricultural economy;

2. The emergence of modern labor force in mines, plantations, and processing industries;

3. Mission schools which inculcate the notion of equality in the sight of God;

4. Improved transportation systems that communicate new ideas; and,

5. European Lingua Francas.[28]

A closer examination of the causes of the uprising does not support the assumption that the above factors were responsible for stimulating African resistance in the period under review. Except for the disruption of the traditional mode of agriculture through land alienation, the political turmoil of 1896 was largely motivated by forces that were independent of the above factors.

In the early 1890s, the mode of production in Zimbabwe was still predominantly traditional, due to the absence of a well developed modern economic infrastructure. Contemporary accounts of life given by settlers of this period confirm that the existing industrial labor force was not significant enough to form trade union movements, as they did in some Western industrialized nations such as Britain and Germany. Schools, contrary to the theory advanced by Kohn and Solosky, were also insignificant at this time. In fact, complaints were submitted to Rhodes by many settlers who experienced difficult conditions in the young state due to the scarcity of technical equipment and other basic necessities. As one of them explained this situation, "Each little

syndicate had three months' short rations; a few tools, dynamite, detonators, fuse and trading goods."[29]   Yet in spite of the absence of a politicized industrial labor force, the resistance movement of 1896 became so explosive that it prompted the British Government to deploy an imperial force that backed up the settler army.[30]

The above discussion makes it evident that the uprising had its origins in the social dynamics of pre-settler Zimbabwe. In order to ascertain these latent forces, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the leaders who coordinated the uprising and to identify the major goals of this movement. As seen earlier, all the leaders of this organization were either prominent political or religious authorities recognized beyond their respective ethnic boundaries. With respect to the objective of the uprising, the African leaders clearly stated that they were motivated by a desire to defend land and livestock.[31] The urge to regain control of land and livestock confiscated by Europeans was a constant grievance that was usually expressed in religious terms. The loss of a large number of cattle seized by the settlers should not be underrated in an interpretation of the events that led to the political turmoil of 1896. A decline in the quantity of cattle owned by Africans not only severely weakened the economic base of the traditional society; it also threatened the institution of marriage which greatly depended on livestock as the

basis of the dowry system which persisted in the African community throughout the settler period. Without cattle, it was difficult and often impossible to consummate a marriage capable of gaining legitimacy in African society. Even today when many Africans have entered the money economy, the dowry which one pays in cash is still so structured as to match the value of a given number of cattle required by the bride's family. Reliance on this system of matrimonial ritual is not by coincidence: cattle have traditionally played an important role in African religious practices. Beginning during Monomotapa and Rozvi dynasties, cattle played an important role in the Mwari religion, especially in offering sacrifices to the ancestors. Because marriage played a major part in sustaining and increasing the population of African society, European policies that brought about a decline in the amount of livestock were perceived as an attempt to reduce the African population itself.

The significance of land lay in its importance as a source of life, and in its religious value, since it contained the graves of the ancestors. According to African religious doctrine, the ancestors are viewed as living in both the spiritual and temporal worlds. It is further reasoned that such dual existence empowers the ancestors to acquire spiritual attributes which enhance their ability to communicate with relatives in the temporal world – a religious notion which differs greatly from the Christian view of

the deceased. As one study has explained this phenomenon, "They return to their human families from time to time, and share meals with them, however, symbolically."[32] The ancestors in African religious philosophy are also believed to be capable of protecting their families by warning them of impending danger through visions.[33] The expropriation of the land containing the graves was thus seen as an assault on the spiritual propriety of Africans. In this light, it is concluded here that Africans saw the confiscation of the land containing the graves as having curtailed a vital link between living individuals and their ancestors. It is evident from this point of view that although the uprising was externally induced, it was primarily motivated by indigenous factors. Hence, although the economic aspect of the conflict was dominant, its religious overtones coordinated the movement. Terence Ranger supports this observation when he says:

> The traditional system offered many advantages - an area of normal influence larger than that of any secular authority; the ability to command the support of both Ndebele and Shona; the ability to appeal to a glorious past.[34]

Emergence and Growth of African Nationalism

The defeat of Africans in 1897 was followed by a period of regional industrialization and economic growth.[35] The political stability which followed the war allowed Europeans to focus on developing the colony's economy. By then Africans had no

alternative but to concede defeat and succumb to colonialism. The harsh conditions experienced during the uprising had clearly demonstrated to Africans the immense military capacity of Europeans that far surpassed that of their rivals. For this reason, there emerged a period of 'Reformist Politics' (1900-1945) during which Africans attempted through compromise to correct the injustices they experienced. During this period, Africans did however express discontent through religious sects and trade union movements.

One of the earliest factors that brought political consciousness was the emergence of Christianity, which attempted to change existing values[36] such as polygamy and the traditional religion. In some regions also, the policies of the Dutch Reformed Church,[37] which did not fit into the mainstream of missionary policy, alienated some Africans who subsequently joined Ethiopianism - a quasi-religious movement that was highly political in its ideology.[38]

The rise of Ethiopianism inaugurated a period which saw the growth of the Independent Church movement. Many such churches, which were largely sectarian in scope, mushroomed in regions with large numbers of immigrant workers from other African colonies, particularly in mining centres and urban areas.[39] It was into these high-density areas that some of the immigrants exported sectarian ideas, including those developed by John Chilembwe of

Malawi, who pioneered in criticizing the church very early in the 20th century. Because that movement was partly a reaction against Western culture and colonial domination, it drew its strongest support from conservative Africans who resented conforming to the new ethics, particularly those that called for abstention from polygamy and traditional forms of marriage. These conservative groups further disliked the idea of enrolling their children in colonial schools, since they feared the potential of cultural extinction. Their attitude changed however especially in the 1920s when the advantages of acquiring a formal education became obvious.

During its formative years, Ethiopianism also gained momentum from the ideas of Marcus Garvey and black American activists whose influence permeated deep into the movement.[40] Because of that cross-fertilization of African and international ideologies, the movement became more political than religious in nature. But as in America, where blacks had found it futile to radicalize the civil rights movement, adherents of this organization in Africa were equally cautious to conduct their activities within the limits of the territory's constitutional framework.

Among the major separatist churches that emerged in Zimbabwe was the Watch Tower sect and, much later, the African Independent Church founded by the Reverend E. T. Nemapare to protest against some policies of the Methodist Church. The Watch Tower sect had

been founded by Charles Russell in the United States in 1878. From there its influence had initially spread to South Africa, then to British and French colonies in Central Africa. Besides being introduced by American missionaries, its influence in these regions was due to migrant workers who propagated its doctrine to some of the new industrial settlements established by the Anglo-American Corporation and other major firms which recruited African workers from other colonies. In Zimbabwe, the fundamentalist nature of the Watch Tower sect appealed to Africans, since its theological teachings predicted an imminent overthrow of the Imperial Powers.[41] The sect further claimed that Africans would constitute a large proportion of the few Christians who could gain salvation in the spiritual world.

As Ethiopianism and the Watch Tower movement were asserting their influence firmly in towns and the emerging mining centres, there appeared an explosion of other sects in many rural areas. These organizations were a mixture of African and Christian religions in their philosophical outlook, since all based their doctrines on Judaeo-Christian religious beliefs. The most dominant sects in this category were the Apostolic and Zionist organizations.[43] Because the two movements were similar theologically and in the degree to which they influenced Africans politically, attention will be focused primarily on the Apostolic faith, which was founded by John Maranke early in the 1930s,

mainly to assert the religious independence of Africans from the established church. Politically, it was a movement that was formed in an attempt to discourage Africans from conforming to settler policies. Surprisingly, Maranke claimed that God would reward Africans but punish Europeans for occupying the territory by force.[44] Again that speculation was designed to rally the masses behind the sect and to make the existing political situation acceptable to the indigenous population. Another aspect of this sect was the claim by its leadership to be endowed with supernatural powers which provided them with the ability to perform miracles such as healing the sick. All these claims were to some extent responsible for its temporary ascendancy in the regions where government policies were most unpopular.

In the 1950s, there emerged other types of separatist churches. But unlike the organizations of the previous decades, which were sectarian in nature and had blended a great deal of African religious tradition with Judaeo-Christian doctrines, the secessionist churches of the late settler period were largely Western in theological orientation. With that kind of background, such churches gained official recognition from the state. The most visible indigenous denomination was the 'African Independent Church' founded by Reverend Nemapare,[45] who justified his exodus from the established church on the basis of differences in theological approaches.[46] Because the new denomination's

congregation was exclusively African, the church introduced African songs and incorporated indigenous rituals in its services. Another innovative measure adopted by its congregation was the use of African musical instruments such as the drum. By establishing a church that closely resembled Western denominations and was entirely administered by an indigenous pastorate, the point was to demonstrate that Africans were capable of running their own affairs.

Other factors that gave rise to the separatist religious movements can be established. Before the 1920s, when the sectarian movement thrived, a large number of the members of these churches were veterans with vivid memories of the war of 1896. Most of them had either participated in the conflict or had relatives who were victims of the war. Having grown up in an era when indigenous customs were not challenged by Europeans, these people had difficulty conforming to the laws introduced by the settlers. The extent of the crisis they experienced can be seen in the eschatological emphasis given to the separatist churches by their leaders, an emphasis that provided an emotional outlet which they required to cope with the new political atmosphere. Also, the messianic nature of the religious services permitted the old generation to develop a sense of security and apparent reassurance of political freedom in future, and therefore created tolerance of the new administration. It was partly for this reason that

Africans in Rhodesia often exhibited immense religious devotion. Religion was a refuge to which they could escape from the agony of colonial reality.

The separatist churches were also seen as the only feasible way of protesting against the government, since it was held by many Africans that criticizing the state from a religious perspective provided immunity from political harassment. It was that assumption which was responsible for Bishop Mazorewa's rise to power in the 1970s. The African nationalists who were in detention advocated his appointment as an interim leader on the assumption that any attempt to detain the clergyman could lead to both domestic and international outcry. The separatist churches can further be viewed as an expression of a religious compromise between the traditional system of worship and Christianity. It should be stressed that it was mainly through these independent churches that the rural areas were politicized early in the settler period. It should also be emphasized that the African religion in particular was crucial in sustaining the resistance spirit of 1896.[48]

Besides protesting against the settler establishment through the sects and by leaving the churches, Africans challenged government policies through political associations and trade unions. In 1923, for example, Abraham Twala founded the Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association to promote African advancement.[49] Like

all reformist organizations of the period, the association refrained from attempting to overthrow the government. In keeping with this approach, its constitution pledged to cooperate with colonial administrators by "...consulting the Native Affairs Department, MPs and Missionaries."[50] Its leaders believed that a liberal approach to racial problems was important in securing the cooperation of Europeans, particularly in the appeal for just laws and the expansion of industrial education in African schools.

An organization with similar objectives was the Rhodesia Native Association, established in 1924 by J. S. Mokwile. But in contrast to the Bantu Voters' Association, which was a vehicle for expressing the grievances of the entire African population, Mokwile's organization represented only the interests of intellectuals in Mashonaland. By excluding from its political agenda the vast majority of Africans who had not acquired an advanced formal education, the organization rationalized that the government could be persuaded to assimilate the African elite, especially since the franchise stipulated by the constitution drafted in 1922 was mainly based on academic and property qualifications.

The two associations differed as well in their perception of the role of Europeans in the territory. Whereas Twala believed that Africans could reach parity with Europeans in the foreseeable future as far as political and economic achievements were

concerned, Mokwile accepted the status quo. This accounted for the government support which Mokwile's organization enjoyed and the harsh treatment accorded to Twala and his supporters.[51] The organizations further differed in their bases of regional and ethnic support: the Bantu Voters' Association was strong in the Matebeleland province, whereas the Native Association was most popular in the Mashonaland region.

In the 1930s, however, both associations became insignificant after Aaron Jacha founded the Bantu Congress[52] to defend the interests of African farmers. In an attempt to improve its national posture, the congress first attacked Parliamentary Acts which prevented Africans from practicing certain professions or establishing businesses in urban communities.[53] Jacha particularly criticized the Industrial Conciliation Act - a law that barred African journeymen from practicing their trades in towns.[54] In the same decade, he expressed his dislike of the Maize Control Act that placed restrictions on the marketing of corn produced by African farmers. The support which the congress enjoyed was due to the fact that over 90 percent of the African population at this time depended on the cultivation of crops for its livelihood. Thus, with most agricultural activities still of a subsistence nature, the introduction of a law that made it difficult for Africans to sell surplus grain rallied most of them behind the congress.

The rise of African trade union organizations marked the beginning of a resurgence of political instability in Zimbabwe. The first organization of this type was the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU) established in 1927 by Charles Mzingeli.[55] Its emergence was an expression of the rise of an industrial working class resulting from the nascent capitalist mode of production. Since commercial and industrial activities were mainly concentrated in towns, the trade union movement was primarily an urban organization.[56] Consequently, the country's major cities of Harare and Bulawayo rose to be important centres for the movement. Initially, the RICU organization was created to achieve three objectives. One was to lobby for an improvement in wages. Another was to improve working conditions, since Africans complained about poor housing and harassment by employers.[57] Lastly, RICU was formed to improve social conditions for Africans living in urban areas. In the 1930s this became more urgent after the government introduced the Land Apportionment Act that tightened the policy of racial segregation. The legislation stipulated that Africans could not be classified as permanent residents in towns and mining centres. Accordingly, it gave police officers wider powers such as that of conducting night raids to check or arrest the illegal residents.

After the Second World War, RICU's popularity declined sharply, for the organization had moved far to the right in its

ideology whereas the political climate of this period required radical approaches to the social conflict. As one study has succinctly noted, Mzingeli's shift to the right alienated his supporters, especially his decision to join the governing United Party that was unpopular with the working class.[58] That change in strategy regarding labor conflicts led to a split in the organization, which culminated in the founding of the African Workers' Voice Association in 1947 by Benjamin Burombo. This Association differed from RICU in that it was more vigilant and highly political in scope,[59] as was made clear by the following themes discussed at its inaugural meeting:

1. Freedom and Liberty;
2. Democracy and Freedom from Fear; and
3. Southern Rhodesia's Undemocratic Native Policy.[60]

The appearance of Burombo on the trade union scene signalled the transformation of the labor movement from a workers' union into a pseudo-national political organization. Under his directive, a strike that paralyzed the country's transportation system was organized in 1948.[61] After that crisis, Burombo organized opposition to the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which had reduced the number of cattle and the amount of land owned by Africans.[62] He broadened the scope of the movement by spreading the crisis into African boarding schools, where students were

encouraged to boycott meals and residential facilities offered by missions. The unrest that erupted culminated in the closing of many schools during this period.

Various conclusions can be made about the characteristics of trade unionism in that period. One is that the organizations were vibrant because of the social background of their founders. As men of humble origins, both Mzingeli and Burombo were familiar with the difficulties experienced by the working class. Another distinctive feature of the trade union leaders of this period was that they were cosmopolitan individuals who borrowed labor organization ideas from other countries, and were usually radicalized by their contact with leaders outside the territory. In addition, the presence of large numbers of immigrant workers in the territory's major industrial cities required the leaders to gain proficiency in both official and metropolitan languages. Lastly, a distinction should be made between a highly politicized trade union movements and those whose objectives are purely economic. In Zimbabwe, the trade unions established before 1945 resembled the present United Food and Commercial Workers organization in Alberta, in that they mainly addressed economic issues. To illustrate, whereas RICU had emphasized improvement in wages and working conditions, the African Workers' Voice was militant and overtly political.

The period following the Second World War saw the

articulation of black nationalism throughout the British African colonies.[63] In Rhodesia, many factors were responsible for this unprecedented political awakening. One was the influence of Western-educated Africans who imported Pan-Africanist ideas from Britain and the United States,[64] ideas which stressed the significance of proclaiming the continent as a homeland of people of African ancestry. In the United States, the same doctrine had prompted Marcus Garvey to encourage the repatriation of West Indians and black Americans to Africa. Racial conflict in Western nations thus fuelled independence movements in the colonies since it was argued that only self-determination could liberate Africans. As a result, the independence of European colonies on the continent was eagerly sought, since the birth of African nation-states was conceived as the first logical step toward achieving the goals of diaspora nationalism. Aside from that political ideal, Pan-Africanism was a cultural movement that sought to rediscover and define characteristics and values unique to people of African descent. The 'African Renaissance' of this period elicited nationalist rather than ethnic solidarity as before. It further revived appreciation of a cultural heritage that was beginning to vanish as the result of colonial rule. As the movement gained strength, Africans in the territory became more abrasive in their search for independence and cultural identity.

Among some of the prominent African students who introduced Pan-Africanism on the continent were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Hastings Banda of Malawi.[65] Banda's long residence in the United States and Britain (1926-1953) had brought him into contact with nationalist ideas of the black diaspora. As will be seen below when dealing with political developments in Zimbabwe during the period when the territory was part of the Central African Federation comprising also the territorial Governments of Zambia and Malawi itself, Banda's influence among Africans in the region was immense. His importance to black nationalism was due to the fact that, unlike his African colleagues whose knowledge of the foreign policies of Britain and the United States was limited, he knew how to relate to these polities, nations which could influence constitutional change in Africa. As a result, it is not surprising that it was Banda who led the movement that destroyed the federation.

Nationalist Movements During the Central African Federation (1953-1963)

Before discussing the activities of African nationalists in Zimbabwe during this period, it is necessary to give a brief account of the factors that led to the formation of the federal state and of its constitution, which was responsible for increasing African opposition to settler policies. Beginning in 1949, a conference of representatives of Europeans from Malawi,

Southern Africa: Highlighting Railway Networks
and the Central African Federation

Zambia and Zimbabwe was held at the Victoria Falls, where they explored the possibility of uniting the three territories under a single government. Both Sir Godfrey Huggins, who was Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, and Sir Roy Welensky - a spokesman for Europeans in Zambia, called for the amalgamation of the territories. But although the Tory Government which was elected in Britain in 1951 was eager to create the federal state for economic reasons, some of its officials were reluctant to commit these territories into a political union that could sacrifice the interests of Africans in Zambia and Malawi. As a result the British proposed the formation of a federation, which had the advantage of preserving the different constitutional structures of the territories. One writer summarizes the main features of the document which formed the basis of the federal constitution thus:

> The essence of it was that the three territories
> retained their own constitutions, their control over
> African affairs and their relationship with the British
> Government, but there would henceforth be a federal
> legislature and cabinet to which certain specific fields
> of government would be allocated - defense, economic
> policy, currency, federal taxation and borrowing,
> customs excise, European primary and secondary
> education, all higher education, external trade,
> railways, aviation, trunk roads, posts and telegraphs,
> electricity supply and a long list of others....[66]

The Parliament which met in Harare - the federal capital- initially consisted of 35 members:17 from Zimbabwe, 11 from Zambia, and 7 from Malawi. When the federal Assembly was increased

to 59 members in 1957, a total of 12 seats were allocated to Africans in the three territories[67] while the rest were reserved for Europeans. As can be concluded from the uneven distribution of seats, the appearance of the constitution which came into effect in 1953 was directly responsible for the emergence of nationalist organizations that were established to prevent the increase of federal powers which were undermining the aspirations of Africans in the territorial governments. For although the principle of partnership, which appeared as the slogan of the federal state, did indeed improve relations between Europeans and the African middle class, most Africans were apprehensive that this new policy was intended to reduce the momentum of the nationalist movement.

These fears were justified. Besides exploiting the vast amounts of copper from Zambia, whose revenue was used to build the Kariba Dam and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Harare, the objective for creating the federation was to strengthen the position of Zimbabwe as a future home for Europeans in Zambia and Malawi, in the event of the emergence of African rule in those countries. As one study has clearly explained this policy, "...Europeans in the two Northern territories saw greater security coming from associating with the higher percentage of Europeans south of the Zambezi River."[68]

The economic motive which had influenced Europeans in Zimbabwe to voice their support for the federation was evident in

the original plan, which sought to amalgamate Zambia and Zimbabwe. Even after amalgamation was rejected by the British, the settlers demanded a federation that excluded the British Protectorate of Malawi, which they saw as an economic liability to the two Rhodesias because of the absence of major mineral resources in the territory. Among British officials, the growing support for the federal state was due to both economic and political reasons. To begin with, some officials believed that the emergence of the federation was beneficial insofar as it could extricate the United Kingdom from the burden of administering Malawi, which did not yield economic benefits to Her Majesty's Government. Also important was the feeling among some diplomats, including Sir Andrew Cohen, that the emergence of a multiracial state of this nature in the region could prevent Europeans in the three territories from gravitating into the South African ideological orbit.[69]

In Zimbabwe, these internal and external developments ultimately led to the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1957,[70] under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, the first black political organization of this nature in the territory. ANC leaders believed that it was possible to achieve democratic rule through persuading the territorial government to change the constitution, and accordingly they established branches in rural areas to recruit the party's members. But because the government

was adamant in its rejection of African rule, it promptly banned the party. That action however magnified support for the ANC.

In 1960 Michael Mawema, a trade unionist by training, formed the National Democratic Party (NDP) with the same objectives as the ANC to fill the political vacuum.[71] During his term of office the party's popularity increased dramatically, mainly because it was seen as an organization representing the views of all the social classes. Entrepreneurs in all sections of society supported it, seeing the importance of coming to terms with an organization that appeared to have the potential of forming the first national government. A further reason for its popularity was the fact that its president, as seen above, had acquired training in labor organization methods and could therefore easily sell his ideas to both professional and working classes. For instance, Mawema's emphasis on the fair distribution of land was responsible for the party's growing support among people experiencing land shortages in rural areas.[72] His ardent stand on the improvement of workers' rights in urban and industrial areas further elevated the NDP to national status. In an era when the demand for wage parity between Africans and Europeans was viewed by settler authorities as economic heresy, Mawema did not hesitate to appeal for salary structures based on academic credentials and competence rather than an ascriptive formula. But despite all his efforts, wage policies remained unchanged during his term of office, which

covered the period between 1960 and 1961.

The rise of the NDP into political dominance prompted the government of Sir Edgar Whitehead to terminate its political activities in 1961. This was due to the fact that the United Federal Party (UFP), the party that governed the territory between 1957 and 1963, was highly antagonistic to the idea of African political expediency as it was committed to a policy of maintaining white privileges. At the federal level of government the UFP was led by Sir Roy Welensky, who even attempted to pull the Central African Federation out of the Commonwealth; but since both Malawi and Zambia were British protectorates having constitutions that had provisions for Africans to achieve self-determination once they had attained a more advanced stage of development, his actions energized African nationalism. Both Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda became more determined than before to scuttle Sir Roy Welensky's plan.

Banda's anti-federation activities resulted in the outbreak of violence and in his imprisonment in Zimbabwe, where he spent a year (1959-1960) jailed at Gweru. In this territory, Africans responded to the banning of the NDP by forming the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. Like all political organizations of this period, the party demanded from the government an acceptable timetable for self-determination. In some ways, the nationalists were prompted to

make these demands because of their sense of failure in making progress, particularly after the former British colonies of Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda had gained independence.[73] That sense of failure even compelled some of them to make impractical predictions about the imminence of African rule in Zimbabwe. As one writer has observed, these politicians acted as if they would form the next government.[74]

Unexpectedly, a nationalist split occurred in 1963 when the party's leaders were in exile in Tanzania. The political defections resulted in many senior ZAPU officials leaving the party to join the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) founded by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, an American-educated clergyman. Although some scholars have attempted to emphasize ethnic hostilities as having been responsible for the division, the real motive for creating ZANU was to give the nationalist movement a sense of direction.[75] Many observers, including those who had engineered the split, were disillusioned by Nkomo's strategy of compromising with the British and the settlers: tactics which they believed were unlikely to yield positive results. Besides accusing Nkomo of playing into the hands of the British and other Western Powers, they believed that his organization had become bankrupt of ideas which could steer the territory towards independence. In the midst of these developments, Nkomo attempted to improve his sagging image by

constantly appearing before the United Nations General Assembly, which he persuaded to intervene in the constitutional crisis. That strategy temporarily worked, because in the 1960s most Africans believed that the United Nations could influence the settlers to accept constitutional change.

In fairness to Nkomo, the crisis which plagued his party in the early 1960s was a product of many factors that were beyond his control. His moderate approach to the constitutional stalemate during the formative stages of the nationalist movement was understandably based on a genuine desire to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. Another problem was that from 1957, when Nkomo appeared on the political scene, to 1963 when his leadership was challenged by some of his colleagues, it was difficult for him to approach the crisis from a revolutionary point of view, as the country was the second major military power on the continent, after South Africa. Thus, the black states which had gained self-determination in that period were initially reluctant to offer any form of military assistance before their own independence was secure.

By contrast, the new party pledged to abandon ZAPU's approach of seeking a political solution to the stalemate by promising to gain independence through a revolution.[76] Although this change in strategy was initially viewed as being ambitious and anarchist by moderates in Zimbabwe and on the international scene, the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Prime Minister Ian Smith in 1965 gave credibility to the radicals, since it became obvious that diplomacy would indeed not work in persuading the government to change its position. Henceforth ZANU officials began smuggling young Africans from Zimbabwe to China where they acquired military training.[77] By 1966, most of them were already inside the territory striking European farms and government property. Guerilla activities conducted by these insurgents boosted the party's morale and eventually its national popularity. Such dramatic increase in ZANU's standing was a remarkable achievement, considering the fact that prior to conducting these military operations, the organization had only a modest following because the government, which controlled the press following UDI, often portrayed it as a terrorist organization. The creation of this nationalist liberation force marked a shift from 'Reformist' to 'Confrontationist' nationalism.

Crystallization and Growth of Settler Nationalism

Although settler nationalism was somewhat less spectacular than its African counterpart, it was nonetheless an important feature of political development in Rhodesia, and even in Zambia and Malawi which were, as seen earlier, parts of the Central African Federation. An examination of the characteristics of the European population that first occupied the colony is necessary in order to determine the origins and development of settler

nationalism. Existing evidence shows that the first settler community of 1890 comprised two hundred Europeans.[78] According to Marshall Hole, who was a member of the pioneer column and wrote extensively on its political and economic activities, the settlers were recruited from South Africa.[79] Hole's assertion should be accepted with caution, however, because a considerable number of South Africans were recent immigrants who had been lured there during and after the gold rush. Some of these immigrants were still more European than South African in their cultural identity, having relocated primarily for economic reasons. Even though most of them had declared their intention to live in South Africa permanently, there remained vestiges of their European cultural outlook which were not erased even after many years of living on the African continent. Retention of the cultural bond to one's native country was aptly described by Carr et al, who said:

> Whenever immigrants from an established community settle permanently in a different land, they carry with them traditions, customs, and habits of life which they are inclined to maintain and which link them in feeling not only to one another but also to their original country.[80]

Such conflict of cultural identity among Europeans had important ramifications for the development of settler nationalism. In South Africa itself, rivalries between descendants of Dutch and English settlers had prevented the creation of a single government.[81] At the time of the colonization of Zimbabwe,

Anglo-Dutch hostilities that had hindered political unity were still profound, and they later resulted in the Boer War. Ethnic divisions in South African society also arose partly from the heterogeneous nature of its white population, with immigrant groups that could trace their origins to French and German connections[82] apart from the Dutch and English who formed the dominant white communities.

Most of the Europeans who settled in Zimbabwe were of British stock, some of them having relocated from South Africa and others coming directly from the United Kingdom.[83] The colony also contained many Afrikaners who constituted the second major white group.[84] Lastly, there were Greek and Jewish immigrants who were officially classified as Europeans.[85] This diversity of the settler community gave rise to a frontier culture with peculiar values and political orientations. At the beginning of colonization, however, the political allegiance of Europeans was to their respective countries of origin. Such divided loyalties accounted for a tendency toward ethnic solidarity that encouraged parochialism in political affiliations.

An analysis of rivalries among the major European powers of the period is necessary in order to appreciate the extent to which they influenced ethnic relations among the settlers. The rise of modern nation-states in some European countries in the 19th century had led to the emergence of political and economic

nationalism stemming from the industrial revolution which prompted the leading European states to establish overseas markets for the manufactured goods. In addition to the prospects of exploiting mineral resources and precious metals, the economic potential overseas gave impetus to colonization. Hobson aptly observed this motive when he noted that imperialism was in part a desperate effort by "...the controllers of industry to broaden the flow of their surplus markets by seeking foreign markets...."[86] In that period, national rivalries in Europe and the competition to acquire colonies in Africa strained relations among the imperial powers.

By the end of the century, colonial rivalries had become so sharp that European powers convened the Berlin Conference in 1884 to settle disputes over spheres of influence in Africa. Among Dutch and English settlers in Rhodesia, these conflicts revived memories of hostilities between Holland and Britain over control of the Cape Colony. One observer has remarked, with respect to the manifestation of this phenomenon in Zimbabwe, that preoccupation with ethnic origin was so important that even Afrikaners who had become completely anglicized were viewed with suspicion.[87] For their part, the Afrikaners were equally antagonistic to the English settlers because of the Boer War, which was fought to settle territorial disputes and language laws imposed by the English to restrict the use of Afrikaans, and which partly

contributed to the exodus of the Dutch from the Cape Colony. These incidents prompted the Afrikaners to resist conscription during the First World War.[88]

In time, however, ethnic dissensions among the settlers gradually began to disappear, especially after the referendum of 1922, which asked Europeans to decide if they preferred the colony to amalgamate with South Africa as its fifth province or acquire Responsible Government status. The majority of Europeans opted for Responsible Government[89] status--a rejection of political union with the Dominion of South Africa. Britain had hoped that a positive vote could result in the formation of a strong federal state in the subcontinent comprising the Dominion and Southern Rhodesia. It rationalized that in addition to the economic buoyancy of the region resulting from such a political union, the existence of a state of this nature had the potential of overshadowing the colonies carved out by its imperial rivals on the continent. Another motive for attempting to incorporate Rhodesia into the Dominion, as viewed by some British diplomats, was to neutralize the Dutch population in South Africa, where Afrikaners vastly outnumbered the English settlers.

Britain retained suzerainty over the territory through constitutional clauses which gave powers to Her Majesty's Government to conduct some aspects of the territory's external relations, and vested authority in the British to defend Zimbabwe

in the event of an attack from the Germans or Portuguese. Nevertheless, its influence there diminished significantly after 1922.[90] By achieving Responsible Government status, the territory became a self-governing colony with a Prime Minister rather than a Governor, as was the case in more dependent colonies. In the former British Empire, only Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had passed through that stage as these states had been established primarily as colonies for permanent white settlement. South African and Rhodesian climatic conditions, which are generally cool due to the high veld existing in both countries, contrasted sharply with most regions on the continent, where the conditions were not favorable to European settlement. Some colonies in the West African regions, for instance, had been dubbed 'the white man's grave' by British and French explorers - a description born of European casualties stemming from a malaria epidemic which plagued white settlers. In the late 19th century Ronald Ross, a Scottish physician from the School of Tropical Medicine at Edinburgh University, resolved this problem by discovering quinine - a drug that was able to control the disease and therefore encourage white immigration. Besides the more favorable climatic conditions, the subcontinent's vast mineral resources and economic potential as estimated by contemporary explorers, were other factors responsible for the concentration of white population in South Africa and Zimbabwe. These countries

today have the highest number of Europeans on the continent.

Various factors which gave rise to settler nationalism can be discerned. To most Europeans, the British South Africa Company (BSA Co.) which governed the colony from 1890 to 1923 was perceived as an obstacle to personal economic advancement. According to individuals who criticized the company's policies, it was difficult to achieve political freedom and economic advancement in a country possessing a constitution representing both British and South African commercial interests. Hostility to company rule was strongest among small businessmen, artisans, and farmers, whereas mining conglomerates and mercantile classes, as well as high income earners, favored political union with South Africa. Evidently these conflicting attitudes reflected the degree to which disparities in financial security dictated political behavior. Whereas the more prosperous classes were eager to establish strong political links with South Africa, the working class and farmers became even more vocal in their demand for a constitution which could assert the colony's economic independence. It was rationalized by opponents of amalgamation that reducing economic ties with the Dominion could improve their condition by stimulating domestic manufacturing industries.

If there is one major factor that accounted for the negative response among the working class supporters who cast their votes against amalgamation, it was the potential of a massive northward

migration of poor white settlers from South Africa, an event that could have sharpened competition for the few jobs available in the young colony's small labor market. Dutch and English farmers in the colony were equally united in their opposition to political union with the Dominion for economic reasons; for the proposed amalgamation could have exposed the Rhodesian agricultural market to the more sophisticated South African farmers. These would probably have inundated it with high quality produce and advanced implements, as tariffs were to be eliminated under the proposed federated territory's trade regulations. In this sense, economic considerations played an important role in welding the various European ethnic groups into a single community anxious to protect its economic interests.

On the other hand, the more prosperous classes viewed the prospects of joining the Dominion as an opportunity that had to be seized, as it had the perceived advantage of strengthening the Rhodesian economy, besides allowing them access to the more developed South African technology. A general feeling among members of these groups was that the colony's entry into the Dominion could benefit them because it had all the elements of a sound economic decision.

Besides economics, British imperial ambitions contributed significantly to early settler nationalism,[91] especially among colonial British citizens who believed the creation of a strong

state would fulfil Britain's mission in Africa for the spreading
of Western civilization. This idea was especially popular since
German and Portuguese ambitions to gain control of the territory
were still very much alive, despite agreements reached at the
Berlin Conference. Regarding this brand of nationalism and its
popularity among the settlers, one study has noted that "Rhodes
himself had committed to paper, the belief in racial and national
destiny to spread order and enlightenment...."[92]

Finally, the prospect of the colony becoming part of the
Dominion was resented by those English settlers who feared that
amalgamating with South Africa could mean being forced to speak
Afrikaans, for the Dutch constituted the majority of the white
population in the Dominion. In addition to the fear of thus having
their culture drowned in bilingual South Africa, contemporary
hostility existing between the two ethnic groups was another
factor that made it impossible for Rhodesian settlers to accept
amalgamation. Ethel Jollie, one of the colony's prominent anti-
union leaders who advocated its self-determination, expressed
these fears during the campaign for the referendum when she said:

> All the rest of the sub-continent has a history of
> strife between the two white races, a legacy of
> bitterness which generations to come must endure.[93]

Constitutional Changes Arising from Attainment
of Responsible Government

After the Responsible Government Association had defeated

organizations that had campaigned in favor of political union with South Africa in the referendum of 1922, Charles Coughlan founder of the association in 1917, formed the first government under the new constitution in 1923. Although the settlers gained more power to legislate laws under the terms of the constitution, the territory remained a self-governing colony - a status which was responsible for the continuation of some form of British constitutional influence in Rhodesia, especially in the two major areas of the territory's external relations and the rights of Africans. The need for that unique feature of the country's constitutional structure had prompted human rights groups in England to lobby against Rhodesia's entry into the Dominion where the settlers had greater control of the constitution. Explaining the fears expressed by one of these groups, one writer has noted that:

> The Aborigines Protection Society also opposed Rhodesia's entry into the Union because Rhodesia outside the Union would still, theoretically at least, be answerable to Britain for her African policy.[94]

The period following the attainment of Responsible Government status signified a new phase in the development of white nationalism. The power to legislate laws had been transferred from the BSA Co. to the settlers, and whereas during the period of company rule they had elected four out of nine members of the territory's Legislative Council, they were now in control of the

territory. Accordingly, they became more conscious of their status as a group whose privileges were entrenched in the constitution. One of the laws that protected these privileges was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 that ordered Africans to be moved out of rich farmland and urban areas designated for Europeans.[95] The legislation had many ramifications for the economic policies that were later formulated such as preventing Africans from prospecting minerals and selling agricultural products in certain areas.

During this period also, the Maize Control Act gave monopoly to settler access to national agricultural markets in various parts of the territory where they controlled the prices. White farmers who had lobbied for the legislation were apprehensive that failure to regulate access of Africans to agricultural markets could result in loss of revenue.[96] Also, if grain and other cash crops produced by Africans were given equal value at the domestic markets, it could have seriously undermined the source of labor on white farms, since Africans would have had an incentive to intensify their agricultural activities.

Another piece of legislation that was clearly an expression of settler nationalism was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, which excluded Africans from being classified as employees in certain trades.[97] The Act placed severe restrictions on Africans aspiring to apprenticeship in core technical and commercial skills. Because European trade unions were duly

empowered by this law to file suits against industrialists who hired Africans instead of members of their organization, the legislation was partly responsible for the growth of unemployment among Africans. As will become evident in chapter five, this law had important implications for access to technical and educational institutions that later emerged in the territory. The degree to which the Industrial Conciliation Act articulated settler nationalism in the educational sphere was clearly stated by Colin Leys when he said:

> The effect of this policy is to preserve an artificial scarcity of labor which has to be imported from outside rather than recruited and trained from among the indigenous population....[98]

After examining the political and economic developments in Zimbabwe, one is compelled to conclude that the Land Apportionment Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act were crucial in regulating the social structure and economic system. To make this point clearer, the objectives of these laws should be brought into perspective.

The Land Apportionment Act was stipulated mainly to serve the following objectives. First, to remove Africans from land which soil scientists had found to be excellent for commercial farming,[199] and second, to control their political activities by restricting their movement from one region to another. For instance, the Act resulted in the implementation of a pass law

that required all Africans in urban areas to carry valid documents confirming their privilege to live there. The legislation further placed restrictions on cultural exchanges between Africans and Europeans in addition to preventing Africans from studying in educational institutions in areas classified as European. Indeed, in the 1950s, a special Act of Parliament had to be passed to enable Africans to study at the territory's university.[100]

The Industrial Conciliation Act was designed primarily to regulate the supply of African labor. By denying legal status to African employees, this legislation gave the job monopoly to Europeans, with the result that Africans accepted poor wages because of their lack of bargaining power. In addition, by excluding Africans from its definition of an employee, the Act gave white unions and employers absolute power to control the training and marketing of technical and commercial skills. This situation did not improve even after Africans were legally recognized as employees in 1959. In order to be recognized as a journeyman after that year, for example, one had to be indentured to a registered employer for five years--a period during which the employer was required to provide training to the apprentice at work and enroll him at an approved technical institution for two years.[101] The high costs incurred by employers in this process, and their apprehension that Africans could translate economic success into political power, accounted for their reluctance to

train and recruit African journeymen.

To sum up, although the two pieces of legislation appeared to deal exclusively with land and labor issues, they actually complemented each other. Their overall objective was to safeguard the economic privileges enjoyed by Europeans, for it was the pursuit of better economic opportunities that had neutralized ethnicity among Europeans and led to the attainment of Responsible Government. This objective is confirmed by the fact that the settlers who were economically insecure were the most anti-African and ultra-nationalistic, whereas those in the upper echelons of society, though antagonistic as well, were less threatened by the prospect of African rule. As Franck succinctly put it:

> The typical lower class attitude...is one of fear and insecurity, a feeling that a gradual broadening of the central African social base will pull them to the bottom of it, where many of them were before they came to Africa.[102]

Declaration of Independence and Legal Reform

Although the period following the attainment of Responsible Government had seen the articulation of settler nationalism through innovation of the constitution, the changes made were liberal when compared to the legal structure which emerged after independence was achieved unilaterally in 1965. To gain insight as to why such extreme legal measures were introduced into the constitution, it will be helpful here to discuss some of the major

forces responsible for the reforms that appeared in this period. The Draft Constitution of 1922 - a document produced by the British Government to provide the basis of the legal framework of the government formed in 1923 - had not stated categorically that the settlers would govern the territory as an independent state. The reserved powers which Britain retained were constant reminders to Europeans that Southern Rhodesia did not have the clout which the other settler states such as Australia or New Zealand had acquired.

Another reason for the appearance of a legal structure representing the interests of right wing politicians after independence was declared unilaterally, was Britain's failure to satisfy the demands of Europeans at the Constitutional Review Conference of 1961, where they had lobbied for the country's independence. Thus, instead of caving in to their demands, Britain introduced two blocking mechanisms that made it impossible for Europeans to achieve independence through evolution. One such mechanism adopted in the document stipulated that in order to change the constitution, the government had to obtain the approval in a national referendum of all Africans over twenty-one who had completed primary education. Because many of Africans were in that category, the settlers could have lost the referendum.

Another clause stated that there should be unimpeded progress towards majority rule. Consequently, while the 1961 constitution

did not satisfy the demands of nationalists to reach parity with Europeans, it also frustrated the settlers, as they could never hope to gain independence under its conditions. The settlers interpreted the impasse as implying Britain's tacit support of African nationalists. What further eroded their confidence in the future of the territory was the fact that Britain could not settle the constitutional dispute without discussing the future of Zambia and Malawi, parts of the Central African Federation. Because the constitutions of these two crown colonies were explicit as far as African self-determination was concerned, the political developments arising from the constitutional conference radicalized white settlers in Zimbabwe. In fact, the failure of that conference to satisfy their demands broadened the scope of white nationalism, as Europeans in Zambia and Malawi threw their support behind the interests of their neighbors living south of the Zambezi River. The typical reaction to political trends in the region was epitomized by Ian Smith, who protested against these developments by resigning from the UFP, where he had acted as the party's whip, to join those who opposed the erosion of white privileges in the territory.[103]

The breakup of the Central African Federation in 1963 was a further incident which radicalized policymakers after the declaration of independence. Again these extremists saw the need of drafting a constitution which could not only guarantee the

future of the Rhodesian settlers, but would also offer hope to Europeans wishing to leave Zambia and Malawi after the two territories had gained independence. These concerns appeared to be genuine to the extremists, particularly because it was Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda, rather than African nationalists in Zimbabwe, who chiefly destablized the federation. As a result, the emergence of independence in the territories governed by these leaders signalled the need of creating a durable legal framework.

Beginning in 1965, the government modified aspects of the 1961 Constitution which were seen as caving in to the demands of Africans while impeding the aspirations of Europeans. The most unpopular features were conditions dealing with amendments of the Declaration of Rights and franchise qualifications. The constitution had also stipulated that in order to change conditions governing these important areas, it was necessary to secure the approval of the British Government or consent of all racial groups in the territory.[104] These requirements were based on Britain's estimation that if these terms were respected by the settlers, Africans could achieve independence within fifteen years of the constitution's implementation.

The first task of the government, therefore, was to remove the features which it saw as having the potential of accelerating African progress. This was done by severing ties with Britain, which had often stood in its way to govern the territory

independently. To make this possible, the Governor representing the Queen was replaced by Clifford Dupont as head of state, who immediately assumed the title of Officer Administering the government, which was later changed to President. All the powers once held by the Governor were thus conferred on the new head of state. Having terminated the authority of the Governor, the government had removed one of the main obstacles to its future policies, since major changes to the constitution had often required royal assent to have legal effect. To further remove Rhodesia's dependence on British legal institutions, appeals to the Privy Council - the highest court in the Commonwealth[105] to which transcripts of unresolved cases were forwarded to determine, among other things, if initial verdicts had respected accepted procedural ethics and other points of law - were curtailed. That move made it easier for Rhodesian courts to violate proper rules of evidence, especially when prosecuting individuals charged with inciting political unrest.

In this period, further legal changes were introduced as the government grew more eager to swiftly move the country toward a republic. The Municipal Act of 1967 was one such piece of legislation. It heralded the changes that were to occur as a result of the territory's new status. As an interim device intended to alert the nation to changes to be implemented after Rhodesia had become a republic, this law allowed authorities to

segregate public amenities such as swimming pools, hotel bars, restaurants and cinemas.[106]

It was the Republican Constitution of 1969 itself, however, which established absolute control of the territory by Europeans, since unlike the constitutions of 1923 and 1961, it was drafted without external assistance. For this reason, the document reflected what the majority of the settlers had hoped to see as the final settlement of the old political question. Since the 1969 Constitution was a comprehensive document designed also to reflect the desires of Europeans in Southern Africa, it will be sufficient to highlight two major developments that occurred directly as a result of its implementation.

One was the scrapping of the Land Apportionment Act that had existed since its appearance in 1934, and its replacement by the Land Tenure Act, which was to act as an instrument of social reform. For example, whereas the 1934 legislation had for many years failed to redistribute unassigned land to individuals requiring it, the new law divided it equally between Africans and Europeans. Another development arising from this legislation was that it created local councils in rural areas whose administrative powers were transferred to the chiefs. As will be shown in chapters five and six, these arrangements gave rise to clinics, schools and other community projects run by the emergent organizations.

In urban areas, the Land Tenure Act was responsible for radical changes that supplemented the Municipal Act of 1967. Whereas the older legislation had concentrated mainly on segregating public facilities in areas that were administered by the local Government, the Land Tenure Act of 1969 was introduced to deal with the problem of Africans living in all areas occupied by Europeans, especially domestic servants who worked in white suburbs. The exceptions were African students at the University of Rhodesia, where attempts to remove them had provoked hostility from the University of London, which threatened to stop granting its degrees to the institution if such policy was implemented. Even so, the university's non-academic African staff were not permitted to live there after the law came into effect. The overall impact of this Act was that many employees in the two categories were forced to commute from African to white residential areas where they worked. The Act also provoked the hostility of mission organizations with churches that offered services to both Africans and Europeans in these areas, since its adoption resulted in a decline of church attendance. Describing the effect of this legislation on controlling the African population in white residential areas, Martin Meredith said:

> It regulated the employment of Africans in urban areas and their use of schools, hospitals and hotels and provided for the eradication of 'black spots' in white areas.[107]

The second major development arising from the constitution was that it established, for the first time, a voting system whereby Africans and Europeans were to elect separate members to the sixty-six seat Legislature. Under the new voting regulations there were fifteen seats reserved for Africans, of which eight were set aside for chiefs.[108] Clearly, this unbalanced distribution of seats reflected the new power structure in Rhodesia.

Before identifying another distinctive feature of the 1969 Constitution, it is necessary to examine the underlying motive of the voting structure that appeared as a result of the changes introduced by the government. Unlike the constitutions drafted in 1923 and 1961, which could have made it possible for educated Africans to strengthen their voice in the Legislative Assembly, the new system destroyed any mechanism that had the potential of sustaining unimpeded progress toward majority rule. Also, by allocating eight of the fifteen seats reserved for Africans to the traditional authorities, the constitution left the remainder of the indigenous population's seats open for contest between the educated and the emergent African middle class. In actual terms, this severely limited the political influence of educated Africans who constituted the only group that was capable of opposing the strategies of the republican administration.

To further enhance the status of the chiefs both locally and

internationally, and it was on the international stage that they were portrayed as the only legitimate group representing the interests of Africans, other measures were taken that subsequently gave rise to a strong alliance between these traditional leaders and the government. To begin with, such a relationship was initiated by the government when it authorized the chiefs to preside over both civil and criminal cases in the Tribal Trust Lands.[109] Thus, while the previous administration had given the traditional authorities limited scope to supervise local schemes such as water development projects, roads, taxation and education; the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith greatly expanded their powers, to the point where they acted as a bulwark against African nationalists. These developments then prompted the government to pass another Act, one that allowed chiefs to banish their political adversaries.

In trying to determine which strategy adopted by the various Rhodesian administrations was most effective in achieving its desired objective, it is difficult to do so with any degree of certainty. Establishing an alliance with the African middle class as a means of containing black nationalism, the policy adopted by the territorial and Federal Governments in the 1950s and 1960s, was fairly successful because of the favorable conditions under which it was implemented. The economic boom which the territory enjoyed in this period drove salaries up, thereby improving the

standard of living among Africans in this category. The healthy economic conditions, together with the policy of partnership adopted by the various governments in that era, had temporarily diverted the attention of the high income group from resorting to radical politics. The middle class also rejected violence as a means of achieving political objectives because the general feeling among them was that the official policy of partnership had the potential of resolving the constitutional crisis.

On the other hand, the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith could not be successful in winning the support of the middle class through this approach, particularly after having curtailed most of the privileges they had enjoyed under the federal state. To say the least, the sweeping constitutional reforms which followed Prime Minister Ian Smith's rise to power drove moderates towards the extremes, which saw confrontation as the only feasible way of achieving political expediency. While the status of ordinary Africans had improved by acquiring a Western education, the position of the chiefs had been weakened with the advent of colonial rule, which curtailed most of their political functions. Therefore, by restoring some chiefly privileges, such as the right to arrest individuals, collect fines and allocate land; the state was able to frustrate the nationalist movement for quite some time. Perhaps the most effective strategy adopted by the government in its drive to crush the influence of the African

elite in rural areas was the imposition of a massive reduction in the subsidy of teachers' salaries to mission organizations.[110] That forced many denominations to hand over schools to local councils that were actually controlled by the chiefs. By placing teachers and their support staff, such as paramedics and agricultural demonstrators, under the council system, the government had succeeded not only in isolating a large section of the African middle class; but also in increasing the power of the chiefs to control the source of income of individuals in this category.

Conflict Between African and Settler Nationalism

A survey of plural societies reveals that it is often difficult to maintain peaceful co-existence among social groups with diverse cultural traditions.[111] The Anglo-Boer conflicts in South Africa which have been discussed exemplify how many societies experience social conflict that may cause political instability. In a mature democracy like Canada, for instance, cultural conflict between the two ethnic groups in Quebec prompted the Federal Government to impose the War Measures Act that suspended civil liberties during the October Crisis of 1970.[112] One of the major factors that gave rise to open revolt in this case was an economic structure perceived by Francophones to be largely controlled by Anglophones.[113] In Zimbabwe also, conflict between Africans and Europeans was accentuated by an economic

structure considered by Africans to be dominated by the settlers.

To pinpoint the origins of conflict between African and settler nationalism, one must clearly identify the two ideologies and assess their impact on some of the territory's major institutions, particularly during those turbulent stages which saw the articulation of dominant themes by the organizations. As pointed out before, African nationalism emerged primarily to restore self-determination. More specifically, Africans were attempting to re-establish the traditional mode of existence. Thus although superficially African nationalism appeared to be a largely political movement in the 1890s, it was basically motivated by cultural and economic incentives.

After the government had declared independence unilaterally in 1965, the nationalists were forced to define precisely the ideology of liberation required to overthrow the settler regime and the mode of development to be adopted thereafter. As president of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo was initially dedicated to achieving constitutional change through negotiations. Justifying his preference for this approach, Nkomo stressed the advantage of inheriting an economic infrastructure that had not been ruined by civil war.[114] Upholding this view for a long period, he attended many constitutional conferences sponsored by Britain and the United States in an attempt to resolve the territory's constitutional stalemate. Although Nkomo's liberal stance had

often prompted him to seek a political solution to the stalemate,
the split among African nationalists transformed him into a
radical because of ZANU's ascent as the party perceived by
Africans to be the only organization capable of terminating white
rule. The successful military campaigns launched by its guerillas
in this period improved its image considerably;[115] the most
dramatic incident occurring in 1966 when ZANU insurgents clashed
with government forces at Chinhoi. Accordingly, ZAPU stepped up
its conscription program in an attempt to recover its prestige as
the most dominant political organization. Within a year, its
soldiers were harassing white farmers in the Matebeleland
region.[116] In the 1970s, the party's insurgents, mostly trained in
the Soviet Union, were indeed a force to reckon with on the
political scene. During this period also, the organization pledged
to adopt a socialist mode of development in independent Zimbabwe.

Other reasons for the shift in ZAPU's ideological stance can
be identified. The reluctance of Western governments to implement
change by force in the territory's constitution was strongly
resented by moderate Africans, who drew comparisons between
Britain's liberal approach to white rebels in Zimbabwe and its
swift invasion of the West Indian island of Anguilla, which had
also declared independence unilaterally in 1966. Nkomo and his
supporters were convinced at this point that only the Soviet Union
and its allies could supply them with the military hardware and

international support they needed to achieve their political goals.

Nkomo's conversion to the Marxist ideology is nonetheless difficult to verify, since most Western governments, and at some point Prime Minister Ian Smith, preferred him to the more radical nationalists as a future leader of independent Zimbabwe.[117] Such preference eroded Nkomo's credibility among some Africans, as did support he later gained from multinational corporations in Zimbabwe that saw him as a pragmatic nationalist having the potential of forming the first national government. It was this kind of support, coming from financial magnates and individuals who were unpopular with the vast majority of Africans, that made it difficult for Nkomo to score a major political victory in the late 1970s, even after ZAPU guerillas had shot down a large government aircraft carrying weapons and miliary personnel. In this writer's opinion, that incident should have been judged as a very significant contribution to the nationalist cause, in that besides dealing a crushing blow to the tourist industry, it destroyed the morale of the Rhodesian air force.

To many governments and conglomerates having investments in Southern Africa, the prospect of Nkomo's leadership on the political scene was viewed as crucial to the stability of the region. In recent years, the problem of the security of these investments has played an important role in shaping their foreign

policies in the subcontinent, as the Commonwealth Conferences held in the Bahamas and Canada have shown.

All these economic concerns should be seen as being partly responsible for the intense diplomatic activity that both Britain and the United States forged in the 1970s in an attempt to resolve the constitutional stalemate. In 1975, for instance, the two nations organized the Victoria Falls Conference which Nkomo and other nationalists attended.[118] A year after representatives of the Front Line States had failed to reach agreement with Prime Minister Ian Smith, Britain organized another conference that was held in Geneva.[119] Again Nkomo was the most visible nationalist in the diplomatic initiative.

Although most of the formal alliances established by the ZAPU organization during the struggle for independence were mainly with Warsaw Pact nations and their satellites, subsequent political developments in Zimbabwe, along with Nkomo's reaction to them, revealed his inner ideological beliefs. Conflict between the nationalist and the government in 1983, for instance, resulted in his flight to Britain rather than the Soviet Union, though the latter was a state whose ideology he had greatly espoused during the struggle for independence. Then instead of taking refuge in African socialist countries such as Angola and Tanzania, Nkomo attempted to settle in Botswana, a pro-Western nation practising a mixed economy.

In contrast to ZAPU, ZANU's ideology was less obscure because of the unique circumstances that had given rise to its formation. Whereas ZAPU had evolved from a reformist nationalist movement into a revolutionary organization, ZANU's charter at its inception was to achieve African self-determination through a revolution. That mandate was given unanimous support in the party's policy statement, which stressed the need to rekindle the fighting spirit of the 1890s which began with opposition to colonial rule.[120] As such, this organization largely recruited individuals who were prepared to execute its military campaigns. But unlike the spontaneous uprising of 1896, ZANU's manifesto pledged to end white rule through the application of Marxist-Leninist principles of revolution.[121]

Two stages in the development of ZANU's ideology before independence have been ascertained from a survey of the party's documents. Initially, there was a campaign to revive the revolutionary fervor of the 1890s. This had the advantage of appealing to a wide audience including peasants, due to the conservatism of its ideology and heroes who had staunchly declined to adopt Western values, which were seen as symbols of oppression. An examination of Sithole's political writings at this point clearly shows that the guerillas who joined the ZANU organization and executed its military campaigns did so because of their disapproval of the British occupation of 1890[122] which

continued to erode African values. Again, Sithole linked the nationalist movement to the Marxist ideology that was adopted by Mao Tse-tung during the revolution that culminated in the overthrow of nationalist China in 1949. That link was important in mobilizing Africans, as they were influenced to follow the example of Red China that declared war on alien values during the Cultural Revolution of 1966. It was partly for this reason that ZANU had been reluctant to establish relations with the Soviet Union; for although that state had equally established a socialist mode of development, its government had almost left the cultural aspect of the revolution unchanged. Thus, the objectives of the Chinese Revolution were without doubt closer to the ideals of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe than those of its Soviet counterpart, and accordingly the ZANU organization moved closer to the People's Republic of China. This alliance improved immensely after the Soviet Union openly declared its support for ZAPU.

In 1975, the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Southern Africa, which had stemmed from political instability in Portugal during this period, gave the organization the opportunity to increase its pressure on the Rhodesian regime. This was particularly so as the independence of Mozambique greatly exposed the Rhodesian border to guerilla attacks. In addition, although the former Portuguese territory of Angola did not have a direct impact on the conflict in Zimbabwe, the departure of the

Portuguese was a blow to the settlers, as it weakened the morale of Europeans in Southern Africa.

The effect of these developments was felt in the mid-1970s when the ZANU army under President Mugabe articulated the revolution from Mozambique. During this period the doctrine of class struggle gained prominence, especially in the campaign for political education for the masses that was broadcast from bases in Mozambique. Later, its cadres infiltrated these areas and conducted intelligence activities that were crucial to the army's logistics. They also politicized peasants and students in primary and secondary schools in order to gain their support. In keeping with the organization's faith in the effectiveness of a Marxist revolutionary strategy, informal political campaigns geared toward conscientizing peasants about the settler economy, and the socially unjust occupational structure[123] which had emerged from it, were organized. The party pledged to eliminate the existing inequalities once it had come to power by implementing the following reforms:

1. Public ownership of the means of production;
2. Redistribution of alienated land;
3. Extermination of racial discrimination;
4. Restoration of African culture;
5. Eliminating inequalities in access to education; and
6. Emphasis on utilitarian rather than an academic education.[124]

Before determining the extent to which the nationalists were

loyal to the Marxist ideology, it is important to identify the major features of the Lancaster House accord, which led to the transitional arrangements and the independence constitution approved by the African leaders. The importance of doing so is that, besides revealing the nature of institutions that emerged under black rule, the accord also gives a picture of the problems confronted by the new government. In a study that dealt with the procedure and outcome of the Lancaster House Conference, Miles Hudson identified the following components of the constitution which were endorsed by Africans and Europeans:

1. Separate voting rolls for Africans and Europeans with 20 seats reserved for Europeans in a legislature of 100;
2. Bill of rights which protected white farmers against arbitrary seizure of land;
3. The appointment of a constitutional head of state and an executive Prime Minister; and
4. The dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of a Governor to administer the territory.[125]

Apart from leading the territory towards independence, the accord had several ramifications for immediate political and economic developments in Zimbabwe and in Southern Africa generally. First, the agreement meant suspension of the Republican Constitution and restoration of British rule under Lord Soames, Sir Winston Churchill's son-in-law, who had been a commissioner of the European Economic Community and British ambassador in Paris. Another development was that the agreement resulted in the

immediate lifting of the sanctions. This was a major development for Zambia and Mozambique, whose economies had been shattered by the war. Finally, the agreement also meant that a cease-fire was to come into effect which would see the end of hostilities between Africans and Europeans.

From this survey of nationalist ideologies, it is evident that in general African nationalists adopted the Marxist ideology mainly to mobilize the masses. A more detailed analysis of their political and diplomatic activities has, however, revealed that these nationalists differed significantly in the degree to which they adopted the Marxist ideology. Unlike Nkomo, who appeared to be conservative in his approach to Marxism and tentative in utilizing the ideology to overthrow the settler regime; President Mugabe believed in radical application of the Marxist ideology to end white rule.

A closer examination of both leaders nonetheless reveals that during the periods when they saw the prospect of achieving self-determination through peaceful means, they became ideologically conservative, as was evident when both attended the various conferences organized by Britain and the United States in an attempt to resolve the conflict. Their willingness to do so implied some degree of submission to imperial diplomacy, and indeed a softening of their ideological position; for the typical Marxist desires to see a revolution run its full course. More

dramatic in the shift towards the centre of the political spectrum was their approval of direct British control of the territory from 1979 to 1980;[126] and their acceptance of the deployment of armed forces from pro-Western nations in Zimbabwe, including detachments from Australia, New Zealand and Kenya. All of this implied compromising Marxism with the free enterprise ideology. Most important was the conspicuous absence during the interim period of forces from Warsaw Pact states or other socialist nations that had given military assistance to the revolution. That was indeed a clue as to which social institutions were likely to survive settler policies. These political concessions contradicted the ideals of the revolution, particularly in light of the reputation of settler authorities in manipulating elections. Finally, the terms of the political settlement to which the nationalists were signatories were clearly antagonistic to the Marxist ideology; especially clauses that dealt with protecting private ownership of property and special status for Europeans in the independence Legislature.[127]

In making such concessions, however, it is possible that the nationalists decided to moderate their demands because of the increasing suffering which the war inflicted on Zimbabwe and the Front Line States. Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that nationalists were compelled to soften their ideological stance in an attempt to explore the prospects of achieving African

rule without causing further distress.

In summary, it is noted that the conflict between African and settler nationalism that culminated in the war of independence was motivated by intense struggle to control the country's economy. Enormous disparities in the distribution of wealth between the races[128] sparked African discontent that was expressed in the political instability and racial contest to control social institutions. In the next chapter, an investigation of settler education policies will be made to determine the role of political developments in shaping the system.

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CHAPTER IV

MANIFESTATION OF NATIONALISM IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The Origins of Educational Policy

Many theoretical models having relevance for the development of educational policies in Zimbabwe have been formulated by social scientists. What may be called the 'consensus model' in curriculum theorizing, for example, asserts that in a democratic society the views of all the various social classes, in addition to those of subject specialists, should be represented when deciding the subject matter to be taught in schools. This approach is expounded by Lawrence Fish who maintains that "The school must be a model of democratic process in action."[1] In societies that have decentralized educational systems, this approach is often adopted. However, the consulting of representatives of these various groups alone does not guarantee that the values of the less powerful groups will be incorporated in the curriculum. As phenomenologists have aptly suggested, dominant groups in a society may continue to influence the nature of instruction offered in schools. Thus, since knowledge is socially constructed as phenomenologists maintain, the involvement of the less powerful groups may in fact give legitimacy to the views of the dominant classes.

In analyzing the development of education in Zimbabwe, it is imperative to do so using what shall be called the 'conflict

model' developed by Archer and Vaughan, because settler

administrations did not govern by consensus. The major thesis

advanced in their work is that educational institutions change due

to the struggle among social groups competing to make their ideas

dominant.[2] They identify four developmental stages that recur in

the struggle for control of educational systems by antagonistic

social groups. Below is a modified version of a table illustrating

the interplay of such groups and ideas in a typical social system.

TABLE II

Phases of Process from Assertion T1 to Assertion T2

Assertion T1	Transition	Domination	Assertion T2
Status Group A and its ideas compete with other groups and their ideas	Status Group A gains power and seeks to institutionalize its ideas	Status Group A becomes dominant and makes its ideas universal	Status Group B and its ideas challenge Dominant Group A and its ideas

SOURCE: M. Archer and M. Michaline, "Dominion and Assertion in Education Systems," in Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems, ed. Earl Hopper (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 60.

As will become evident later, the table shows that social conflict

is an ongoing process, as demonstrated in the ideological rivalry

between settler governments and African nationalists, as well as

political dissension in the independence era.

The above framework clearly shows how the struggle between

Africans and Europeans for political and economic control of the territory was also a contest to determine the world view that was to be paramount. One important outcome of that conflict was the heightening of cultural consciousness and its articulation by Europeans in the new social institutions they had established. During the transitional period corresponding to the table, Europeans reinforced their conquest through creating institutions that consolidated their control of Zimbabwe. Most dramatic was the recruiting of schools to enhance political gains. After subduing the territory then, attempts were made by the government to institutionalize Western values in the various sectors of society. At that stage, the educational system played an important role in transforming the cultural outlook of Africans. Lastly, a point was reached when the settler ideology triumphed and became almost universal.

Prior to colonization, missionaries had depended largely on chiefs in conducting religious activities. The emergence of white rule terminated the power of chiefs and relieved missionaries of the burden of consulting the traditional authorities before a new educational centre could be established.[3] The government also gained substantially from missionary activity in the territory since the heavy doses of Christianity that were administered to the politically vocal Africans neutralized their revolutionary zeal. The benefits that accrued from the cooperation between

government and missionaries were crucial to both the stability of the new state and the growth of Christianity; therefore any survey of educational development in Zimbabwe should consider the intimate relationship between government and missionary organizations. For although the policies of both exhibit differences, their common goal was to capture the minds of Africans by transforming the existing social and cultural milieu. Thus, whereas the state was useful to missionaries through its maintenance of social and political order which was indispensable to effective proselytizing, the government similarly benefited from missionary enterprise that pacified its new subjects. The extent to which missionary and settler educational policies complemented each other and subscribed to the consolidation of the state, however, requires more than a hypothetical assessment.

As noted in chapter three, missionary interest in Zimbabwe began in the 16th century,[4] with the abortive attempt to establish a mission in Mashonaland by Gonzalo da Silveira. From then up to the 19th century, missionary endeavour, though persistent, attained limited success in the sense that very few permanent mission stations were established. One such accomplishment was the setting up of the first mission station at Inyati in 1859, by Robert Moffatt of the London Missionary Society. The Catholics subsequently matched that feat by establishing a mission station at Empandeni just before the beginning of colonial rule. However,

efforts by both denominations to develop formal education failed utterly,[5] partly because of African resentment of Western culture, so mission work remained limited to the conversion of Africans and the development of a healing ministry. Failure by missionaries to develop a full-fledged educational system can be attributed to the African political system that was clearly antagonistic to imperial motives.

It is also possible in this light that Lobengula feared that expansion of Western education could erode his political influence. Conversely, missionaries viewed the existence of African self-determination as an obstacle to the growth of Christianity. These conflicting motives suggest that the educational system that emerged at the onset of colonialism was prone to be highly politicized since its major objective was to change the existing African social structure. Under such a system, which conceived Christianity to be synonymous with many aspects of Western civilization, there emerged a strong alliance between missionaries and the settlers.

The political orientation of the missionaries becomes evident when one examines the development of missions in the colony. Because early missionaries were not satisfied to proselytize under African rule, they encouraged diplomatic activity that led to British rule. Most significant was the absence of criticism by missionaries of the violence against Africans committed by

Europeans in the 1890s. Their sympathy with the settlers was evident in the period following the creation of white rule. Denominations that had been reluctant to establish mission stations inundated the colony.[6] Three origins of the mission organizations can be discerned. British missionaries consisting of such major denominations as Anglicans, Methodists, the Salvation Army, and Catholics featured prominently in this respect. American denominations were comprised of the Methodists and the American Board of Missions. Though less numerous than their British rivals, American denominations made remarkable contributions to a degree unmatched by other mission organizations in Zimbabwe. Finally, South Africa produced mission organizations that earned a reputation for espousing separate development because of their doctrine of predestination that justified racial discrimination on the basis of Biblical prophecy. Most prominent in this category was the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) - an ultra Calvinistic denomination which defended segregation of public institutions.

Before shifting attention to the formulation of a unified missionary educational policy, it is important to examine the diversity of orientations to social conflict among the three dominant mission organizations. For although the literature on missions examined for this study suggests uniformity in policy orientations, the missions generally mirrored the societies from which they had originated - more so in the formative stage of

white settlement before colonial policies had obscured the divergent denominational practices. Rather than examine the policies of every religious group, however, it is adequate to focus on some of the denominations that closely reflected the national character of the countries from which they had originated. The rationale for adopting this approach, for example, is that the policies typical of the British clergy can be fairly grasped by investigating the activities of the major denominations. Similarly, the ideologies of South African and American denominations can be characterized by evaluating practices of the DRC and the American Board of Missions respectively. Readers are cautioned however that this approach to an interpretation of missionary posture in Zimbabwe is arbitrary, since it overlooks sharp theological differences among denominations from the same country, let alone their territorial disputes in Zimbabwe. In 19th century England, for example, conflict between the Anglican Church and the Dissenters had resulted in the Religious Difficulty[7] in English schools, thereby retarding the development of a national system of education.

Despite its distinguished service in providing education for the poor classes in England, the Anglican Church could only afford to give a basic education to the masses which in turn was intended to provide instruction that could enable its converts to read the Scriptures. Education provided by the church was therefore to some

extent elitist; allowing the masses to acquire the rudiments of numeracy and literacy, while permitting only a minority to reach the educational pinnacle. These Anglican elites studied at Cambridge and Oxford - the two prestigious universities that trained the country's ruling class. Defending the elitist nature of Anglican education, one clergyman warned against the dangers of introducing a school system that could "...cultivate the mind too much and the heart too little."[8] Besides limiting access to higher education to a small number of its converts, the church imposed conditions that sometimes made it difficult for nonconformists to gain entry into the universities it controlled. The degree to which it imposed some form of control in admission policy which existed before 1854 was cited by Saunderson when he said that "...dissenters were cut off from the universities, being forbidden to matriculate at Oxford or graduate at Cambridge."[9]

Parochial emphasis in admission policy partly contributed to the Oxford Movement, which was largely conservative in scope, as it opposed both religious and political liberalism of that period. Some of the academic staff who joined this movement did so to prevent what they saw as the growing erosion of Anglican traditions. As the movement gained strength as the decade progressed, it also reacted strongly against the extension of the vote which had arisen from the English Reform Act of 1832 - a legislation which had enfranchised the emergent industrial middle

class. Understandably, the church feared that such extension of the vote could weaken its financial independence.[10] But despite its opposition, relations between this denomination and the state were maintained with the British monarch continuing as head of the church.

Opposition to the Reform Act was further voiced by individuals who called for the preservation of the political structure spelled out in the English Constitution. For example, Walter Bagehot, an acclaimed constitutional expert of this era, expressed disapproval of the Reform Act when he suggested that the legislation destroyed intellectual constituencies in large numbers without creating new ones.[11] Another outcome of the Act was that, having won the franchise, the middle class deserted its working class allies. This was demonstrated by the creation of elite public schools in the 1840s - schools that were supported by funds from the middle class. The new institutions were fashioned after the old foundations such as Eton and Harrow and were an expression of middle class anxiety to gain admission into the upper classes. These institutions further reveal a determination on the part of the middle class to establish connections between their children and British aristocrats.

The Anglican Church thus despatched its missionaries to Zimbabwe apparently from an elitist position. And as a denomination that had strong links with the most powerful monarch

in Europe, and had originated from the most advanced industrial nation of the day, it ranked Africans below the English lower classes. Thus, British economic leadership in the world further led to a belief in a civilizing mission.

In contrast to British religious organizations, South African missions in the territory were extensions of an old colonial society. Since an account of South African racial policy has been given in chapter three, it is sufficient only to examine the religious stance adopted by its white citizenry since unlike Britain, its population was racially heterogeneous. Apart from the African population, the country contained a significant white population in addition to other immigrant groups which included indentured Orientals.

Like the Anglican Church with its status of Britain's national church, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) was South Africa's dominant religious organization. National support for that church arose from the fact that South Africa's French and Dutch population had migrated from Europe due to religious persecution. The English population in South Africa supported Calvinism for the economic privileges and social status it conferred on them. That faith was thus important as a unifying force of the various white groups.[12] Another reason accounting for the dominant position of the DRC was its claim that Africans were created to serve Europeans.[13] One South African scholar explained

this doctrine when he said:

> The negative aspects of the Calvinistic creed, its
> doctrine of predestination, its emphasis on the
> community of the elect, the exclusive twist that could
> be given to its teachings were all perfectly adapted to
> the interracial situation of the frontier.[14]

Lastly, the DRC in South Africa evolved into a national
church partly because its missionaries experienced problems
different from those confronting other missions. Unlike the clergy
of other denominations who were supported by grants from overseas,
the DRC missionaries were funded by white settlers[15] who
constantly fought with Africans. The settlers, who were the major
source of financial assistance of that clergy, strongly opposed
racial integration.

Despite the existence of many studies on South African
missions, there is a dearth of literature on the diversity of
racial policies formulated by mission organizations in the region.
The conclusion drawn here is that extremism in the DRC arose in
part from the fact that members of its South African congregation
had been sheltered from liberal ideas which had emerged in Europe
during the 18th and 19th centuries. This contrasts sharply with
the background of British missionaries that included exposure to
the progressive ideas of philanthropism and the Reform Act of 1867
that had extended the franchise to working class males. American
missionaries had also been exposed to some degree of liberalism,

particularly in the period following independence and emancipation.

What this shows is that British and American denominations originated from societies that were at least beginning to question conservative racial attitudes. While these developments were taking place in the Western world, social attitudes in the South African colonies and churches were moving in the opposite direction. As Regehr, a writer who has observed this phenomenon with respect to the entrenchment of segregation in religious circles notes, the DRC established a policy of rigid racial separations in 1910.[16] The extent to which this philosophy had spread into the political arena is revealed by the election in 1948 of D.F. Malan as Prime Minister, who formed the first nationalist government which entrenched apartheid in the constitution.[17]

The racial philosophy of the church was extended to educational policies.[18] In keeping with its notion of the world as consisting of the elect and the condemned, the South African state created a dual educational system intended to train 'leaders' and 'followers.' This policy shows that two principles were involved in this practice. One was the desire to maintain racial integrity perceived by the church to be consistent with "Divine Plan."[19] The degree to which this principle is valued in South African political and educational circles is shown by its manifestation in

society. Besides racial restrictions arising from the Bantu
Education Act of 1953, mixed marriages and cultural exchanges
between races are outlawed by the Immorality and Group Areas
Acts.[20]

The second principle that is held pertains to a belief in
cognitive limitations among Africans that is used to justify the
provision of a vocational rather than an academic education for
them. Due to this view, the church and state emphasize practical
education in African schools.[21] It would be misleading to assume
that all South African denominations accept these assumptions,
however. Some of the churches are highly critical of such
policies. For example, drawing from its experience in supporting
the political aspirations of lower classes in England, the
Anglican Church in South Africa registered its opposition to the
Bantu Education, Immorality, and Group Areas Acts.[22] This was also
the case with moderate Calvinists who disapproved of this
legislation. Such Calvinists were prompted to side with Africans
due to the poor level to which human rights had deteriorated.[23]

In contrast to the liberal political climate from which
British missionaries had originated, the DRC clergy emerged from a
highly ascriptive society.[24] A further difference was in the
degree of ethnic diversity in South Africa, which contrasted
greatly with that of England. For although Britain had descendants
of African slaves, their population had diminished significantly

after emancipation since a considerable proportion of them were repatriated to Sierra Leone.[25] Accordingly, what may be called the 'African factor' in South African society made it easier for Europeans to climb up the social ladder than was the case in England. It should not be concluded from this that South African society lacked a class system. What is being emphasized here is that unlike British citizens who worked their way up the social system, Europeans in South Africa were 'born' into a class far above Africans, who could not aspire to middle class status in the dominion.

It is clear from these considerations that British and South African missionaries in Rhodesia originated from different societies that influenced their attitudes. British clergymen in the territory strongly believed that the existing economic conditions of Africans could be improved mainly due to the fact that most of them had seen the industrialization of Britain transforming the plight of the poor. Emerging from a society increasingly influenced by liberalism, their attitudes were not as rigid as those of their South African counterparts. By contrast, the DRC clergy openly socialized Africans to believe that their status under colonial governments was sanctioned by Divine purpose.[26]

American missionaries had emerged from a society holding similar views. By 1834 when American denominations began setting

up missions in Africa,[27] racial attitudes were beginning to change
in some regions except in the Southern States. In 1860, conflict
between the abolitionists and Americans who wanted to retain
slavery resulted in the Civil War.[28] The war had important
ramifications in the development of educational policies in
Southern Rhodesia because it had influenced the nature of
instruction for black Americans which the missionaries later
transferred to the colony.

After the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862, black leaders
held conflicting views on the nature of education to be offered in
schools. Contemporary literature reveals two distinct approaches
to the educational debate. Booker T. Washington proposed a diverse
system of instruction with a distinct industrial emphasis.[29] He
believed that the black community in America could improve itself
through an industrial rather than academic education - a belief
which led to the setting up of Tuskegee, one of the major
industrial institutions in the state of Alabama. Education at that
centre featured general instruction comprising moral, intellectual
and industrial training.[30] Washington ridiculed the existing
academic education for failing to improve the lives of black
Americans. For example, he cited the limitations of the study of
Geography in assisting individuals to improve their lives.
Referring to the observations he made among students who studied
this discipline in Tuskegee he argued that

> While they could locate the Desert of Sahara on an
> artificial globe, I found that the girls could not
> locate the proper places for the knives and forks on an
> actual dinner table, or the places on which the bread
> and meat should be set.[31]

A conflicting view on education for black Americans was later
advanced by W.E.B. DuBois, who argued that education for blacks
should be highly academic so as to make students enter the
mainstream of American society. DuBois' demand for a
universalistic curriculum in black schools contrasted sharply with
Washington's parochial approach that sought to redirect its
graduates into rural areas. DuBois rationalized that by
emphasizing industrial education, black leaders were supporting an
international conspiracy planned by northern entrepreneurs.
According to this argument, the industrialists were believed to be
funding black Colleges in order to maximize the output of
technical workers required to inundate international markets with
goods produced by cheap black labor.[32] More recently, this
argument has been advanced by the neo-Marxist school as shown in a
study conducted by Bowles and Gintis in 1976.[33] Both writers
claimed that "Starting in 1866, northern capitalists exerted their
influence directly through early educational foundations...."[34]
Supporting this view, DuBois suggested that Washington's policies
placed blacks in an inferior position because by creating the
vocational colleges, they gave whites monopoly of academic

education.

Thus, like their South African counterparts, American missionaries in Rhodesia had emerged from a society with a segregated school system. American education however was different in that it was a highly decentralized system since it was the various states rather than the Federal Government as in South Africa that coordinated education. A further difference was that American educators did not justify segregation on religious grounds as did their South African counterparts. Rather, segregation was based on the policy of preserving racial integrity. But there was also the objective of protecting white control of jobs through educational policies that prevented blacks from securing managerial and elite positions in the economy. Yet in spite of this state of affairs, racial policies in America were liberal when compared to South African conditions. Consequently, American clergy in the colony were more liberal than their South African counterparts.

The Missions and the Development of Education in the Colony

As seen in the above discussion of the nations from which most missionaries in the colony had originated, their countries of origin had diverse national policies which determined the nature of education they provided. Foreign missions in Zimbabwe thus imported the educational models existing in countries from which they had originated. Thus American denominations introduced

progressive school systems based on pragmatism.[35] Their missions

consequently stressed vocational and technical instruction

designed to improve rural conditions. That type of education was

supplemented by programs similar to those existing at Tuskegee.

This was an attractive policy to the missions since Washington had

approved a segregated education in American society.

Although American denominations established various mission

stations that contributed to the development of the territory, it

is convenient to focus on one mission that was typical of their

educational activities in Rhodesia. Mount Selinda Mission,

established in 1893 in the south eastern part of the colony,[36] had

most characteristics of American denominations. Located in rich

farmland that is excellent for agriculture, this region was

initially occupied by Dutch settlers. Later, however, Rhodes

granted the 24,000 acres of this land to the missionaries. Apart

from the fertility of this land, its topographical features

permitted mechanization of agriculture. The terrain further

allowed missionaries to implement pragmatic educational policies

comparable to those adopted in American schools.

Some aspects of the progressive element in education offered

at Mount Selinda Mission were evident during the first two decades

of the mission's inception. One was the emphasis on the various

branches of industrial training. This denomination established one

of the colony's top agricultural schools at Chikore which was

rivalled only by the government's agricultural college at Domboshawa. The denomination's objective in providing such training was to produce a large number of agricultural extension officers who could influence unskilled farmers to abandon the traditional farming practices and adopt modern methods of land management and animal husbandry. The extent to which the mission's agricultural programs and graduates transformed the African community was revealed by the fact that African farmers in this region were among the most advanced in Zimbabwe. The Phelps-Stokes Commission, conducting a survey of African education in the territory in 1924, was prompted to remark, with respect to the quality of the denomination's education program, that:

> The industrial and agricultural training at Mount Selinda, the central station, ranks with the best-possibly it is the best in the colony.[37]

In addition to the agricultural training provided, the mission trained paramedics at its hospital whose services in helping to combat diseases in rural areas contributed to national development. The pragmatic instruction was also articulated in the mission's building and carpentry training programs,[38] which attracted students from various parts of the colony.

Like Mount Selinda whose educational programs resembled those adopted in American schools, the British clergy at St. Augustine Mission established near Penhalonga in 1897 followed pedagogical

methods existing in English schools. Unlike American education, however, which was becoming increasingly pragmatic, English education remained academic,[39] emphasizing the Three Rs at the primary level, and maintaining the classical curriculum comprising Greek, Latin and Mathematics in secondary schools. Even though this mission offered agricultural and practical skills necessary to secure jobs in the territory's economy, its focus was on providing a sound academic education.[40] Further evidence of the academic aspect of education at this station was shown by an attempt to socialize Africans into elite culture which became evident to the Phelps-Stokes Commission studying the territory's educational system in 1924. The commission observed that the denomination's students exhibited an usually high sense of Western values that was shown in orderly display of vases of flowers in dining rooms and performance of English plays.[41] The inculcation of such values however was not limited to Anglican schools. Indeed, all mission organizations in the colony encouraged their converts to adopt Western culture as a mark of having acquired Christian civilization.

The structure of DRC missions in Zimbabwe was not much different from those it had established in South Africa. This was to be expected, since the denomination's activities were everywhere guided by the tenets of orthodox Calvinism. In order to determine the extent to which Calvinism penetrated into DRC

educational policy in the colony, it is important to identify some of the main features of its doctrine. Calvin suggested that the Church and State were inseparable.[42] Hence he stressed the significance of maintaining submission to secular governments since both church and state were seen as having drawn their authority from Divine sanction.[43] In education, Calvinists in the colony experimented on a policy of creating a single system rather than various schools.

At Morgenster Mission, established by the DRC organization in 1891, some aspects of this creed were adopted in the code of ethics drawn for students such as insisting on a strict conduct of behavior. As one graduate of that mission has observed, the clergy ordered its converts to refrain from criticizing settler policies.[44] What should be observed is that in stressing loyalty to the state, the DRC clergy were conforming to Calvin's doctrine of submission to governments and not formulating a new policy of their own as some critics have asserted. This was also true of the mission's segregationist policy of maintaining separate seats for Africans and Europeans in its church,[45] which stemmed from Calvin's view of the world as consisting of the elected and the condemned arising from the doctrine of predestination.

In education, this church adopted policies that were identical to ones implemented by Calvin. Particularly evident was the integration of African families into the mission community

which was fashioned after Calvin's Academy established in Geneva in the 16th century. The mission became a centre for Home Craft courses for girls taught alongside industrial arts programs for boys. Regarding such organization of the religious community at Morgenster Mission, an American education commission visiting the territory observed that "The church and school form the centre of all the activities of the station."[46] Accordingly, the DRC extended educational services to the deaf, whose welfare was generally neglected by other denominations.

Another aspect of Calvinist theology that was evident in education provided by the DRC was the orientation toward inculcating the norms of enterprise which the church viewed as part of an individual's fulfillment of the Divine Plan. This gave rise to the development of low-cost technical programs designed to provide students with basic skills. The large mission farm near Masvingo served this purpose well, particularly in the provision of modern methods of farming.

In this survey of the origins and development of missionary education policies, several factors that determined the structure of education in the colony prior to the emergence of a common mission policy in the 1920s are evident. One is that the dominant educational policies existing in the countries from which the missions had originated were replicated in the colony. For example, the Anglican tradition which determined the scope of the

educational system in 19th century England,[47] was a model that generally guided British missionaries in the colony, mainly due to their admiration of its quality.

Similarly, American missionaries in the territory followed policies that were applied in American public schools. Because the American school, unlike its English counterpart whose main objective was to train English gentlemen, had emerged primarily to promote national cohesion as well as to integrate its graduates into the growing American economy, its focus was on providing utilitarian education based on the Protestant work ethic. The need to make instruction more appropriate to economic needs became urgent during the Reconstruction period, when practical skills needed to reorganize the economy were in great demand. Furthermore, the commercial and industrial growth that enabled the United States to overtake many countries economically forced the education system to impart skills that were needed in the economy. Also, Washington's educational system with its distinct industrial emphasis added another dimension to utilitarianism in black American schools. From this inventory of American education characteristics, the missionaries chose to adopt the Tuskegee model. It was for this reason that American Board missionaries at Mount Selinda were initially concerned with emphasizing industrial rather than academic instruction. A direct result of this policy was that the denomination despatched Emory Alvord to Mount Selinda

as the first agricultural missionary in Africa. Because of his outstanding work there, the government appointed him director of its agricultural education programs in Zimbabwe.

Despite the problems existing in American society, there is little evidence suggesting that the majority of the American clergy supported the racial policies of colonial governments. In fact, some of them were harassed by the state after criticizing the territory's racial policies. Bishop Ralph Dodge of the American Methodist mission, for instance, was deported from the country after declaring that:

> ...there is a time for the Christian to stand up and proclaim justice from the tree tops, even though he knows his residence permit may be revoked.[48]

Deporting insubordinate missionaries became a common practice, especially during the period of political unrest in the 1960s. While studying in Rhodesia this author recalls that Reverend Abbot, another American missionary teaching at Chikore Mission, was expelled from the territory for supporting African nationalists. This mission was closely watched by the state since some of its clergymen often challenged many aspects of the existing constitution. The decision by some missionaries to enroll their children at Chikore secondary school provoked government hostility. What can be concluded about the attitude of American missionaries, therefore, is that the society from which they had

originated failed to influence their attitudes towards Africans.

Like other denominations that had imported educational practices existing in their countries of origin, the DRC missions implemented policies which the South African Government had introduced in African schools. A major difference existed, however, in relationships between the church and state in the two countries. Whereas relations between the government and the DRC in South Africa were intimate, its links with settler governments in the territory were insignificant. This weakened the denomination's influence on national educational policies. The existence of more powerful and wealthy denominations was a major factor responsible for eclipsing Calvinism. Another reason for the failure by this denomination to assert its influence nationally was the fact that people of Dutch ancestry were outnumbered by English settlers, who also despised their culture. Besides, there was no single denomination in Zimbabwe that could claim to influence national policies directly, because the white population had originated from various European communities.

Finally, judged by Calvin's conception of Protestant education, DRC missions in the territory failed to implement his model which was primarily intended to weld the church, the state and every household into a single community.[49] In fact, Africans in regions that came under the DRC influence were among the most politically vocal groups in the colony.

A second factor that was responsible for the existence of a loose denominational educational system in this period was the struggle among missionaries to control Africans through religious instruction. Through it, Catholics and Protestants articulated religious ideologies in curricula to enhance their respective positions. Finally, the transfer of external educational systems into the territory led to interdenominational conflicts that produced a fairly decentralized education structure. Such transfer of European school systems often produced educational systems identical to those of the colonizing power. German missionaries in Tanzania, for instance, introduced a pragmatic school system that was identical to one created by Chancellor Bismarck. As a result the German Lutherans in colonial Tanzania focused on training artisans, technicians and community social workers.[50] Conversely, British missionaries phased out the pragmatic curriculum and introduced an academic system after the Germans were defeated in 1918.

British and Settler Educational Policies in the Territory

While the various missions were competing to establish schools that could assist in attracting Africans to their respective denominations, the British South Africa Company, during its 1890 to 1923 administration of the colony, formulated educational policies designed to enhance its control of the new territory. Other motives which influenced its educational policies

in that era were the commercial and industrial requirements of the settler economy, which dictated the nature of instruction offered in schools. In order to gain insight into the origins of these educational policies, it is necessary to examine the social structure which resulted from European settlement.

The transformation of Zimbabwe from a traditional society to a colony undergoing modernization can be analyzed using functional theory, because builders of the new state succeeded in creating an orderly social system. This was more so during the period of reformist politics that was characterized by the absence of armed confrontation. Though less comprehensive than other functional theorists, such as Talcott Parsons or Robert Merton, Hoogvelt's analysis of social change in developing nations is appropriate in investigating the formation of the modern social structure in the colony. The four functions of a typical social system that Hoogvelt identified[51] are relevant in examining the rise of the territory's primary, secondary and tertiary economic sectors.

According to Hoogvelt, social systems are coordinated by a common national heritage corresponding to the colonial political system through which Africans were socialized to perceive reality.[52] Western education and institutions introduced by Europeans helped to articulate the manner in which Africans made sense of the social, cultural and physical environment. A second function identified by Hoogvelt is that of social integration

which is characterized by the rise of various institutions. One outcome of the growth of integrative institutions in the colony was the emergence of a dual economy consisting of a modern industrial sector and a predominantly rural agricultural sector. Thirdly, Hoogvelt asserted that social systems have common goals[53] which they strive to achieve, goals such as national defence or the need to curb inflationary economies. Lastly, functional theory asserts that having acquired the above characteristics, societies constantly strive to maintain their existence.[54] Today many countries, as social systems, prevent political and economic demise through innovative programs structured to cope with new social demands. In Rhodesia, it was imperative for Europeans to introduce modern technology in order to enhance the colony's adaptive capacity, especially in the extractive and manufacturing industries.

Following this model, the social structure which emerged from British colonization of the territory was regulated by the various organs of government such as the army and the print and electronic media, as well as the new political culture. Below the nascent political system, were the supportive institutions, notably the educational system that played an important role in consolidating settler colonialism. Finally, the adaptive function was carried out by the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of the economy.

For the purpose of examining settler educational policies, it is important to focus on the economic sectors that were relevant in sustaining the colonial social system. The mining industry is important in this respect since Europeans had settled in the colony primarily to extract precious minerals.[55] Since the BSA Co. which administered the colony before relinquishing its jurisdiction in 1923 owned mines, it is appropriate to examine its policies and the extent to which they determined formal education for Africans. The company adopted two approaches in mobilizing African labor. One was what Onselen has called the 'proletarian method' - a strategy which adopted a policy of settling African workers with their spouses in mining communities.[56] This approach was based on the assumption that creating a positive family environment for workers had the potential of maximizing their productivity. Another approach preferred the migrant worker whose family lived in rural areas.[57] The rationale for advocating this method was to reduce food and residential costs incurred by maintaining families on mining centres.

An important result of the growth of the mining industry was its confirmation of what the functional paradigm has termed 'structural differentiation'[58] in explaining the rise of modern institutions in traditional societies. In the colony, for example, the development of this industry led to a demand for specialized institutions such as the police force, health services, and

religious denominations which served mining communities.

Two types of educational systems emerged to serve the mining industry. Nonformal education designed to improve health conditions for workers was emphasized. Provision of such education arose from the Company's desire to combat high death rates that were affecting its profits and mineral output. Regarding the impact of such casualties on the establishment of community education in mines, Onselen wrote:

> The enquiry into the death rate of workers from Northern Rhodesia contributed to the promulgation of Government Notice Number 447 of 1914, which enforced fortnightly medical inspections in the compounds....[59]

Although the BSA Co. did not establish many African schools during its term of office, it laid the foundation which later formed the basis of missionary educational policies. Based on its experience with Africans employed in the South African mining industry, the company sought to accomplish certain behavioral objectives. For example, its policymakers insisted on inculcating the norms of order, discipline, and obedience.[60] The objective was to control its employees, especially in the light of racial hostilities existing during the company's term of office. In particular, the need to produce a compliant labor force dictated its educational policies. However, the company was forced to establish schools in some of its forestry and mining areas in order to sustain its African employees who could have left the

conglomerate to attend mission schools.

Like the BSA Co., which was determined to achieve economic objectives through a well-planned educational strategy, European employers believed that their economic goals could be well-served by an educational system directed towards the requirements of the colonial economy. A contemporary employer expressed typical settler opinion on this matter when he said that education must produce an honest, clean and submissive African worker.[61] A further requirement was that schools should produce physically well-developed Africans capable of communicating in the official language of work.[62] Employers also preferred hiring docile Africans who demonstrated a sense of punctuality and the ability to make simple mathematical calculations.[63]

Although many Africans were later employed in the manufacturing industry as the colony's economy grew and became more vibrant, the quality of education which they had obtained prevented them from securing posts requiring proficiency in modern technology. Since their training had largely prepared them for supportive roles, both the government and European employers offered them low status jobs. For political reasons, the government was equally reluctant to establish advanced technical schools for Africans, for provision of such instruction was seen as political suicide since the graduates of such schools could inundate the high status labor market in the secondary industry,

and compete with Europeans on an equal basis. Settler educational policy was thus designed to impede African progress, especially in gaining access to advanced technical skills.

An important advantage to employers of this policy was that it justified low wages for Africans. At the same time, settler monopoly of the manufacturing sector was partly responsible for the abundance of cheap African labor. The depressing of wages for Africans, and protectionism in the distribution of technical skills eventually gave rise to the Trade Union Movement.[64] But more subtle factors also influenced the rise of this organization. The Depression of the 1930s, for instance, contributed to labor unrest in the territory. Even in mature democracies such as Canada and the United States, the harsh economic conditions prompted governments to adopt nationalistic fiscal policies.[65]

The situation in colonial Zimbabwe was even worse, since the settlers had participated in four major wars in less than thirty years. A general principle that can be established in this regard is that governments and educational institutions often respond defensively in periods of political and economic hardships. Thus, in evaluating the attitudes of white settlers in this period, it is important to remember that their educational policies were formulated when memories of the 1896 uprising and bitter experiences of the Boer War were still fresh. When the colony appeared to recuperate from the physical and psychological

exhaustion arising from these conflicts, the world plunged into another war in which a considerable number of settlers rendered services. After this war came the Great Depression. All these conflicts adversely affected the colony's economy and thus influenced its educational policies towards repression. In this context, it may be reasonable to conclude that the colony's administrators and directors of leading industries, believed that they could resuscitate the economy by exploiting Africans through providing them an inferior education.

Unlike the settler government that had developed interest in education for Africans following colonization, the British Government did not show immediate concern in providing instruction to its new subjects. As indicated above, Britain delegated its educational responsibilities to the missionaries. As a result British policy in Africa until 1923 was largely influenced by its imperial ambitions, which were tied to economic motives. But as the issue of whether the territory should continue to be administered by the BSA Co. under a royal charter, or amalgamate with the Dominion of South Africa as its fifth province, became more popular on both sides of the Atlantic, British interest in resolving the constitutional crisis increased. Since the procedure which gave the colony both a high degree of internal self-determination and Responsible Government status in 1923 has been discussed elsewhere in this study, it is sufficient to point out

that the new political developments forced Britain to provide guidelines that influenced the structure of education for Africans.

Mainly through recognizing the importance of education as a force that could weld its vast and scattered African Empire, Britain appointed an Advisory Committee in 1923 to extensively examine the state of education in the colonies, and by 1925 it produced a White Paper that recommended providing education which could establish order and stability in the empire. In addition, Britain wanted education to induce African allegiance to the imperial government. Consequently, the document was circulated to all governments in British African dependencies.[66] Among its important suggestions were the following recommendations, which were later incorporated into the existing educational structure by the settler administration:

1. That education for Africans should focus on character development;

2. The articulation of Religious Instruction as a means of civilizing Africans;

3. That Boy Scout and Girl Guide movements be effectively introduced in African schools;

4. The development of Community Education for adult males and women; and

5. That education for Africans should be adapted to local conditions.[67]

The proposals contained in the White Paper appear to have had

good intentions. There is no government, for example, that can criticize an educational system which strives to build a law-abiding nation or whose purpose is to produce an intelligent citizenry. This is also true of the committee's appeal to colonial governments that they seriously consider the importance of community education for the entire adult African population. Even more impressive were suggestions for the establishment of technical schools for Africans, which were to provide instruction in mechanical skills needed to manipulate heavy industrial machinery.[68] Also, an impressive catalogue of vocational skills required to modernize the developing societies, such as medical, forestry, and veterinary training, was submitted to the colonial administrations.[69] Finally, the White Paper strongly urged that education for Africans should be adapted to local conditions in order to be more useful. Today this is the position taken by many critics of colonial education who charge that settler education was divorced from the African environment which it was intended to improve.

Because some of the skills which the White Paper had recommended to be acquired by Africans would have resulted in parity between the races in the acquisition of commercial expertise and technical know-how, the Rhodesian authorities opted for their exclusion in African schools. Therefore it was mainly the white institutions which produced the technical and

administrative personnel required to fill such crucial posts in the economy as motor mechanics, artisans, electricians, civil and mining engineers. The negative reaction given to the committee's proposal regarding higher technical and vocational education for Africans gives an indication of the political significance attached to such skills by Europeans in the territory.

The settler government responded positively, however, to the suggestion that schools in the colonies should help to refine the character of Africans. According to the settler and British governments, character development meant the inculcation of Western values. It was partly for this reason that the committee encouraged Boy Scout and Girl Guide movements because the recruits of both organizations were required to acknowledge the sovereignty of any incumbent British monarch over the empire. On the colonial scene, this meant teaching Africans to obey employers and exercise loyalty to the state.

Whereas the political motives of British educational policy for Africans contained in the White Paper were expressed rather philosophically, those of the document circulated to colonial governments during the Second World War were crudely stated. The tense military and political atmosphere prevailing when the document was prepared, just as in the earlier case of the BSA Co.'s policies in the colony, determined its mood of panic and sense of urgency. Despatched at the time when Britain and the

Allied Powers were deeply involved in a fierce military confrontation with Germany, that report exhorted colonial governments to expand education for Africans as a measure of preparing them for the anticipated post-war social and political change.[70] In Britain itself, preparations for improving mass political and economic participation through expansion of education were under way. In Africa, the British were more interested in persuading settler administrations to educate whole communities[71] and potential leaders of independent African states. This was seen as a precaution for preventing the emergence of another international confrontation on the continent in the post-war period. The official view in Britain was that a major shift in white attitudes toward Africans could produce moderate political elites capable of adopting the 'Westminster Model' of government in independent Africa.[72] The growing fear of losing the African Empire both ideologically and economically, compelled Britain to despatch an emergent and even more comprehensive educational directive to minority white governments in Africa. In the 1948 directive which followed, Britain drew a plan strongly urging these governments to implement the new proposals.

Having contained Germany's militaristic government in association with the Allied Powers, Britain sensed that Africans were becoming impatient with its existence on the continent, a presence that included political domination and economic

exploitation - both of which were beginning to spark nationalism.[73] There was concern that Africans could resort to violence or acquire military assistance from socialist governments in order to terminate British suzerainty in Africa. Consequently, the directive cautioned that "We must bear in mind that the aim is to place the political experience of the West at the disposal of the colonial peoples....[74]

This examination of the evolution of British policy shows that it passed through two unique phases. In the 1920s, Britain saw the importance of unifying the empire through coordinating educational practices and creating an identical school system throughout the colonies. For this reason, the British proposed the adoption of the Cambridge School Certificate syllabus by high schools in the colonies. In Rhodesia, most of the British proposals were implemented in the curriculum, with some changes made to suit local political and economic conditions. The settler government abandoned the South African Joint Matriculation Examinations system as part of its response to British initiatives. As will be seen later, high schools in the territory became replicas of English Grammar Schools. It was partly for this reason that schools in Africa produced an elite with an identical colonial mindset.

To some extent, British policy was based on a genuine concern to improve the standard of living for Africans. The proposal to

educate women, for example, was based on the concern to maximize African development. However, the failure of the White Paper to address the problem of the existence of a dual educational system for the races gave rise to discontent in some of Britain's dependencies. The existence of a segregated educational system in Zimbabwe, for instance, was indeed the source of the country's economic constraints and political conflict. Enormous inequalities in the funding of segregated schools produced disparities in the quality of teachers and the physical plants of schools for Africans and Europeans. Such differences in the educational resources had a profound impact on the performance of students. Likewise, Britain's proposal for the provision of technical and vocational training for Africans, though commendable, reinforced rather than altered the low social stratum occupied by Africans as long as the principle of maintaining the different systems was not abandoned. In fact, even if the settlers had agreed to desegregate education, such a move could not have immediately eliminated the rigid class structure which in some ways was responsible for determining cognitive development and distribution of intelligence in the territory.[75]

Britain's emphasis on the provision of technical and vocational education for Africans gave a precedent for settler governments to establish inferior industrial schools that propelled their graduates into lower levels of the economy.

Graduates from Domboshawa and Tjolotjo industrial schools, for example, were dispersed into the rural economy. Moreover, technical and industrial education itself did not propel Europeans into the territory's elite class either, as it was the possession of university degrees or wealth that enabled individuals to move up the social ladder. Thus, the White Paper should have focused on the possibility of establishing integrated technical schools and universities in order to provide equal opportunities to Africans and Europeans. As well, the document overlooked the significance of establishing that economic parity among the races which could have allowed Africans to give financial assistance to their children wishing to enroll in post-secondary educational institutions.

During the second phase, which covered much of the 1940s and 1950s, British policy was unquestionably influenced by a sense of insecurity due to the international community that disapproved its control of the colonies in the post-war era. Such pressure increased, especially in light of the fact that Britain and the Allied Powers had declared war on Germany to preserve their independence: the very same demand that the African nationalist voiced. As a result, the British designed a plan that could allow them to retain the empire by consent. Thus, this period saw the training of a comprador class whose policies could not be antagonistic to British economic interests in independent

Africa.[76]

Accordingly, British educational policy became more directed toward supporting the growing political consciousness of African students. Regarding the origins of the political socialization that stirred anti-colonial movements among the students, the British asserted that, "They sometimes hear politics discussed at home; they certainly read the violent political articles and letters in the newspapers."[77] The growth of a young nationalist generation likely to govern the new nations prompted the change in British African policy; for in addition to the traditional emphasis placed on academic instruction, the British urged colonial governments to expand literacy programs and civic education in rural areas.

The Influence of the Phelps-Stokes Commission

While the missionaries, the settler administration, and the British Government were searching for a permanent solution to education for Africans in the 1920s, the Phelps-Stokes Commission was conducting a study of education for Africans in the colonies. Before focusing on the commission's recommendations and the degree to which they were actually adopted in Rhodesian schools, it is important to examine the factors which gave rise to the formation of this commission.

As seen earlier in this chapter, the period following emancipation in the United States saw the conflict between

Washington and DuBois. The animosity stemmed from their conflicting philosophies about the scope of education for the freed men and women. The pragmatic option that Washington popularized contradicted DuBois' strategy of stressing an academic education as a means of assimilating blacks into the mainstream of American social, political, and economic life.

At the height of this controversy, two developments took place. One was the rise of Pan-Africanism - a radical movement that refused to countenance Washington's liberal outlook.[78] Its views on American and African education were based on the ideas of DuBois. Pan-Africanism internationalized its ideology through political conferences for black students held in London, New York, and Paris. Despite the fact that Washington sometimes attended these conferences, it was DuBois who planned their agenda and the strategy of Pan-Africanism. An important development that stemmed from the growth of the Pan-African movement was the formation of the Phelps-Stokes Commission by DuBois' adversaries. Its terms of reference were to conduct a survey of Education for Africans, and submit recommendations to governments and philanthropic organizations on the type of instruction appropriate for African development.[79]

Apprehensive that Pan-African radicalism could hinder its plan by alienating liberal whites from supporting education for Africans, or by funding social programs for blacks in the United

States, the commission despatched its representatives to the African colonies. Nevertheless, its formation should be viewed as the result of genuine philanthropic endeavor to sponsor African development. Since this study is primarily concerned with the educational policies implemented in Zimbabwe, most attention will be focused on the commission's influence in the colony.[80] As observed when evaluating the activities of mission organizations, the commission's itinerary covered a wide range of the colony's major schools. After that extensive survey, it is clear that the commission's recommendations to the government were based on a sound knowledge of the territory's political beliefs.

An examination of the commission's report compiled after its tour of the colony has revealed that the taskforce was highly critical of the type of instruction provided in African schools. In its view, education for Africans had to be guided by the principle of Adaptation.[81] More concisely this meant relating the curriculum to the actual social and economic needs of rural communities. In particular, the commission placed more emphasis on the significance of industrial and agricultural training for Africans than any organization examined so far in this study. In the commission's opinion, education for Africans had to be designed to assert their economic independence, since the government had legalized discrimination just as in the United States. With respect to the importance of orienting instruction

for Africans toward rural development in the colony and the obstacles imposed by the dearth of trained manpower in this area, the commission surmised:

> The urgent need for the services of Native workers, trained in hygiene and sanitation, agricultural and industrial activities and in teaching, related to the life of Natives in the Reserves, suggests the importance of a government extension plan...for such Native workers throughout the Native Reserves. This would enable those who have profited by instruction to return to their people rather than to seek employment among Europeans.[82]

The degree to which the commission succeeded in influencing educational change in the African colonies has erroneously been regarded as if the impact of its policies was the same everywhere. This stems from a tendency among scholars to view the colonies as if their political and economic structures were identical in absolute terms. Yet the colonies differed markedly in their internal dynamics in addition to their status within the British Empire. In the case of Rhodesia, the territory had gained Responsible Government status: a first logical step toward independent statehood leading to permanent white settlement as had been the case with Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. Accordingly, after attaining that status, the country was ruled by an elected Prime Minister rather than an appointed Governor, the head of state common to all British African colonies.

Such a high degree of internal self government enhanced

settler confidence in achieving greater control of the state. The resulting economic structure which was created reflected the political scenarios advanced by the hegemonic group. These political and economic projections were in turn translated into educational policies. Thus, by the time the Phelps-Stokes Commission arrived in the colony, the government had already established a solid educational policy for Africans identical to the one the commission was attempting to popularize. This policy had been formulated much earlier by H.S. Keigwin. Passmore wrote with respect to its adoption:

> This was followed by the opening under his direction on the 26th May, 1920, of the earliest government agricultural and industrial training institution for Africans in Rhodesia, the Domboshawa School.... A sister institution was set up in 1921, at Tjolotjo....[83]

In this light, it is evident that the commission's influence in the territory was not in introducing a new educational ideology but in endorsing a policy that had already been fixed. For example, unlike Africans who opposed the practice of providing them with low-level industrial training while establishing advanced technical schools for Europeans, the commission accepted the segregated system. This was consistent with its approach to racial problems in American education.[84] What is surprising, however, is that whereas the commission could have used its racial mixture as evidence of the feasibility of an integrated

educational system, it encouraged Africans to adapt to the existing discriminatory practices. This is an indication that its mission was to articulate Booker T. Washington's policies in the colony.

The Basis of Settler Educational Policy

Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that since settler administrations did not govern by consensus, the educational system which they established reflected an attempt to curb African dissension. It was particularly argued that the structure of education in the territory was the outcome of conflicts among the various social groups. So far, this examination of the development of the educational policies has shown that the distribution of skills was designed to protect white monopoly of the lucrative and prestigious careers. All this supports the contention made by Archer and Vaughan concerning the important role of conflicting social dynamics in determining the formation of educational policies. For indeed, the educational policies had their origins in the conquest of Africans by Europeans in the late 19th century.

During the transition from assertion to domination, which covered the period from the conquest to the expiry of the BSA Co.'s charter to govern the colony in 1923, it was the government that formulated policies which formed the basis of educational practices. Its dominant motive in directing the course of education was to protect the political interests of Europeans

through schools. The government unquestionably saw the importance of neutralizing African hostility through the institutions. This was achieved in a number of ways, including an assault on African culture by depicting it in textbooks as consisting of primitive values in every respect. Another method used to consolidate white rule was through training a class of Africans who became loyal to the state.

Needless to say, the political goals of education actually arose from the economic motives of the BSA Co. and the settlers. Both saw the importance of a national educational policy that could distribute skills acquired by the racial groups. Evidence supporting this practice has been found in the data assembled for this study. For example, the government suppressed the indigenous technology that Europeans found in Rhodesia, such as iron casting and leather tanning.[85] The state replaced these skills by articulating an inferior industrial educational system for Africans under the semblance of Community Development. No attempt whatsoever was made to encourage Africans to modernize these skills. In a country that had the largest shoe factory in Central Africa, and manufactured hoes and knives for the domestic market, Africans were not given the opportunity to improve their skills in order to produce goods for the domestic market. As will be seen in the next chapter, the state embarked on a policy of eliminating whatever technical skills Africans possessed prior to colonization

so that their dependency on European skills could be assured.

In cases where Africans were employed in the BSA Co.'s mining industry, their training consisted of basic operations such as blasting rocks containing minerals with dynamite. Such tasks were first taught in orientation sessions on the surface that explained to recruits the actual conditions existing in the mines. These sessions also offered instruction in pidgin English - a mining lingua franca through which the recruits communicated. But as the schools improved the efficiency of Africans to speak English, that medium of communication disappeared.

Besides the political and economic conflicts between Africans and the settlers, there was a conflict between some aspects of traditional African life and the missionaries. Though the confrontation was not physical in nature, it was nonetheless dramatic. Because the missionaries professed the Christian faith, they viewed the colony as a virgin territory to be conquered in order to establish Christian values. Thus, unlike the secular administration that had conquered Africans to create a political entity, the missionaries intended to establish a Christian Empire. What becomes evident is that in contrast to the political confrontation, whose outcome was no longer in doubt after the war of 1896, the cultural conflict was just entering its second phase, taking into account the activities of missionaries in the precolonial era. In this sense, the growth of mission schools

should be seen as an extension of the political conflict under the auspices of the various denominations. In some ways, missionaries in fact exhibited more aggression than the state in their determination to change the existing African cultural heritage. Their desire to establish a Christian Empire capable of eradicating the indigenous customs even led them to accept land which Rhodes had wrested from Africans.

Interdenominational solidarity against African culture, though less formal, was demonstrated by the creation of educational systems with identical structures. A case in point was the boarding school institution that could be found at every denomination's central station. Boarding schools were charged with the task of training the nucleus of an indigenous 'cultural clientele' that was influential in combating African customs. Students from these residential institutions were socialized to despise African customs such as traditional marriages, the consumption of African alcohol, and even African names which were regarded by missionaries as a symbol of primitiveness. It was for this reason that all their converts were encouraged to abandon African names, and replace them with the sort of Western ones perceived by missionaries to be synonymous with Christianity. In addition, the mere presence of these schools in a predominantly traditional society had a profound impact on transforming African values since their graduates constituted a powerful reference

group. It was for this reason that some chiefs enrolled their sons in mission schools,to ensure that their status could not be eroded by the emerging African elites.

In contrast to the sharp denominational rivalry of the early colonial period, there later emerged some degree of cooperation among the missions. This was demonstrated by the convention of a national conference of missionaries in Harare in 1924 that passed a resolution opposing the setting up of large government schools that had the potential of reducing mission influence among Africans.[86] The government acceded to this demand by promising to limit its role in African education.

In conclusion, this chapter has revealed that despite the denominational rivalry which was common in the early colonial period, the motive of all mission organizations and the government was to control Africans. Thus, like the missionaries whose desire to introduce new religious values on Africans led them on a crusade of transforming the indigenous culture, the settlers resorted to a political solution in order to dominate Africans and exploit the natural resources. Rhodes succinctly explained this alliance between the missions and the state when he said, "One missionary is worth fifty policemen."[87] It was this intensity of political and cultural pressure exerted on Africans that prompted them to succumb easily. Furthermore, the fact that the indigenous culture was attacked on both religious and secular fronts severely

weakened its resistance and hurried its capitulation to the intrusion of colonial institutions.

Finally, the development of education in settler Zimbabwe reveals conflicts among the various groups competing to impose antagonistic ideologies in schools. The crisis in the Pan-African movement illustrates this clearly. Differences between black educators preferring either an academic or a vocational education led directly to the formation of the Phelps-Stokes Commission. Hence, the American task force should be seen as representing the views of a moderate black nationalist group whose objective was to train self-supporting Africans who were not politically active. The commission's abhorrence of confrontationist approaches to racial problems also stemmed from its strong links with the church in addition to the liberal tradition established by Washington. The conclusion arrived at here, therefore, is that in the settler society that had attained the status of a permanent settlement for Europeans, the commission did not introduce any new policy as most writers have claimed. What it did achieve was the legitimization and articulation of an educational ideology which settler nationalism had already established before the commission's arrival. This is confirmed by evidence showing that thirteen years before the commission arrived in the colony, the government already possessed an educational scheme for Africans that was a blueprint of the commission's report.[88]

This being so, there was no real conflict between the settlers and the brand of black nationalism that Booker T. Washington had exported to the colony. The conflict existed between the settlers and Africans in Zimbabwe. As shown in the previous chapter, although Africans had abandoned military solutions in resisting colonial rule in the 1920s, they persisted in demanding the reform of repressive laws through peaceful means including participating in religious activities of the indigenous churches. These churches were a vehicle for expressing resentment to Western culture. Later, however, it was not this culture that most Africans resented but the inequality which schools helped to reinforce.

To summarize, the educational system which emerged in Zimbabwe crowned the triumph of settler nationalism, whose main objective was to influence Africans politically and economically. The significance of schools in articulating this nationalism is shown by the fact that whereas it had required many centuries for mature democracies such as Britain and Germany to create national systems of education, it took less than twenty years for the colonial government to do so. The objective was evidently to police the social, political, and economic activities of schools in the interest of the settlers.

However, British nationalism also contributed to the structure of education, particularly at the secondary level where

the Cambridge School Certificate was adopted. In both cases the missions acted as catalysts of settler nationalism through their influence in education.

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83 Gloria C. Passmore, The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia (Salisbury: University of Rhodesia, 1972), pp. 14-17.

84 Contrast the views of Thomas Jesse Jones, Chairman of the Commission, in Negro Education Vol. 1 (New York: Negro University Press, 1969) with the Commission's approach to African Education.

85 The existence of these skills prior to colonization is cited by Passmore in The National Policy of Native Development in Rhodesia, p. 15.

86 Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, 30 May to 4 June 1924 (Salisbury: Southern Rhodesia, 1924), Appendix VII, passim.

87 Cited by Franklin Parker in "Education of Africans in Southern Rhodesia," Comparative Education Review Vol. III, No. 2 (1959):28.

88 This similarity is revealed by contrasting the two approaches to community education. For government policy established in 1910 see Passmore, The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia, p. 14. For the Phelps-Stokes Commission's recommendation of the same approach submitted in 1925 refer to Jones, Education in East Africa, chapter two, passim.

CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES UNDER SETTLER AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

The Notion of Development

It is important to specify the concept of development
envisaged in this study before analyzing the strategies of settler
and African governments. This is necessary since various notions
of development have been advanced. Some economists, for instance,
view development in terms of growth in per capita number of
automobiles, television sets, radio receivers, and even daily
intake of calories. Also, the consumption of energy and steel are
sometimes seen as important indicators of the level of
sophistication attained by the various national economies in the
world. But it is inadequate to rely entirely on these indices when
evaluating the performance of developing economies such as that of
Zimbabwe. For they ignore such factors as the country's
geographical location in the tropics, which accounts for its
modest energy and steel consumption. Temperate climates, by way of
contrast, have produced economies which are highly dependent on
vast amounts of the fossil fuels which make life comfortable in
the harsh winters. Large quantities of iron and steel are also
required to manufacture vehicles, domestic and industrial
appliances for similar purposes. These factors make it imperative
for scholars to modify the notion of development adopted when

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evaluating economies of emergent nations.

   Moreover, the notion of development is an evolving one. In
the post-industrial society, development will be construed from a
different perspective than is the case today. When the notion was
conceived in the 1950s,[1] the focus was on the economic stagnation
of the emergent nations. Development was seen as increasing the
Gross National Product (GNP) of developing countries following the
models of the affluent Western nations. Arthur Lewis viewed
development in this way. His assertion was that due to the
existence of both the modern and subsistence sectors in developing
nations, the industrial sector must be the nucleus of capital
formation.[2] On this basis, he predicted that expansion of the
modern sector would result in the demise of the traditional
sector. In the 1960s, a similar approach to development was highly
popularized by Rostow in his linear growth model.[3] Convinced that
his development strategy was a panacea which could improve the
emergent economies, Rostow advocated maintaining throughout the
developing nations the free-enterprise model based on investing
between 5 percent and 10 percent of national income.[4] According to
this argument, the impact of sustained investment would eventually
become evident in the growth of the per capita GNP. Development
according to this view is measured in quantitative growth based on
national and per capita incomes. Also central to the thesis was
Rostow's assertion that all societies lie within the five stages

of development through which the Western nations had passed before
achieving industrialization.[5] Hence he suggested that developing
nations must pass through these stages before attaining
industrialization. Rostow's thesis had a profound influence among
policymakers in developing nations, particularly in the 1960s when
the emergent nations were searching for solutions to economic
stagnation. Economists in developing nations actively pursued the
policies adopted in the industrialized world. The economic
structures which had been established by colonial governments were
thus maintained and even the new transportation networks built by
the emergent independence administrations were blueprints of those
established in industrialized nations. These networks enhanced the
priority formerly accorded to development in the urban areas as
commercial and trade centres and neglected rural areas.

As these economists were advocating free-enterprise
approaches to economic planning, there emerged dissenting views of
development. The neo-Marxist school was the most prominent group
to propose an alternative. Its fundamental premise was that a
dependency relationship existed between the industrialized and the
less developed nations (LDCs). Neo-Marxist economists of that era
asserted that underdevelopment was the result of historical
relations existing between the poor and affluent nations. Paul
Baran, one of the earliest neo-Marxist theorists, outlined many
assumptions to support the dependency thesis. One was that

mercantile capitalism had drained raw materials from the LDCs.[6] Another argument advanced by this school was that unemployment in the emergent nations was caused by the flow of manufactured goods from the industrialized to developing countries.[7] The point was that manufacturing these goods in the LDCs could reduce unemployment by engaging large proportions of their labor force in productive industrial activities. According to Baran, this further affected foreign exchange earnings in the domestic market. Furthermore, the new paradigm asserted that this dependency relationship was responsible for the transfer of economic surpluses from developing nations to the industrialized world.[8] The dependency paradigm later gained international status through Gunder Frank who claimed that the historical links between the central and peripheral nations accentuated underdevelopment. Frank's main thesis was that there existed an international economic stratification[9] and division of labor that had to be discarded in the LDCs if they were to achieve development.

What can be said about the evolution of development thought in this period is that around the concept of economic development there emerged conflicting interpretations based on ideological orientations. On the one hand, free-enterprise economists believed that political stability was an important condition for achieving economic development. Above all, they suggested that the LDCs could industrialize only by following economic models of the most

industrial nations. The coherence of this position is evident in the theories formulated by Lewis and Rostow, the two prominent post-war economists who espoused the traditional role of entrepreneurial classes in providing economic leadership under the free-enterprise system. Equally significant was this school's manifesto for exporting economic structures that had served the Western industrialized nations successfully; especially the institutions responsible for human and physical capital formation. By contrast, the neo-Marxist school criticized the development strategies which appeared to enhance the existing international political and economic structure. Baran and Frank in particular advocated radical political change as a prerequisite for restructuring financial and economic institutions that had been established by colonial powers in the Third World.

Whatever their political stripes, development economists of the 1960s measured economic progress as growth in overall and per capita GNP. Development was particularly viewed as improvement in social conditions such as gains in literacy, schooling, health services and provision of housing.[10] Although such indices are indeed significant in gauging the general performance of economies in the developed nations, they sometimes distort the assessment of the state of economies in the LDCs. The propensity of high incomes and wealth to be concentrated in a small elite, for instance, accounts for the inefficiency of the overall and per capita GNP

indices. A further problem arises from the fact that the GNP by itself does not give an accurate picture of the quality of life enjoyed by a nation's entire population as it assumes that the total value of goods and services expressed in gross wages filters into the subsistence sector. Similarly, although various national data showing the provision of education and social services are often statistically significant, such data should not be viewed as presenting a true picture of a nation's economic progress. For instance, the data often released by most emergent governments on progress made in education rarely show daily attendance averages, the calibre of the teaching staff and the physical plant, or the quality of instruction offered by a nations's school system.

The difficulties presented by the above indices surfaced in the 1970s when it became evident that the large investments made in national economies and the remarkable expansion of education, all of which resulted in an increase in the per capita GNP, did not reflect a corresponding improvement in the quality of life for a high proportion of individuals in the LDCs. To illustrate, although the per capita GNP of Kuwait rose to $11,000 as compared to $810 for Taiwan in the 1976 fiscal year,[11] Taiwan had achieved a much greater improvement in providing basic necessities for its citizenry. This paradox prompted some economists to establish a more accurate model for measuring and defining development in the emergent nations. Consequently, Sewell et al devised the Physical

Quality of Life Index (PQLI) which rates average life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy levels on a scale of 100. Combined with the GNP, this index provides a better assessment of the cumulative effect of social policies on the average standard of living in a given nation. As this approach clearly illustrates the real policy outcome of the two nations, the PQLI achievement of Kuwait was 76 as compared to 88 for Taiwan in the same year.[12] The difference in infant mortality per 1,000 live births in the same period was even greater - 44 in Kuwait and only 26 in Taiwan.

However, the PQLI also has some limitations of its own since it does not encompass political and psychological dimensions of development. A case in point is the fact that the index does not show that economic development may accentuate crime and political repression which are important aspects of human capital formation. Nor does the index caution that economic growth may produce an ascriptive-oriented civil service which often stifles political participation in the LDCs.[13] Viewed from this perspective, political entities characterized by instability and crime may be considered underdeveloped even when they have acquired a high degree of economic sophistication. Many such cases are common in the newly industrialized nations including South Korea and Taiwan itself.

It follows that in examining the development strategies adopted in both settler-controlled and independent Zimbabwe, it

will be necessary to adapt the notion of development appropriate to the country's political and economic requirements. For this reason development in this study will be evaluated using three major categories. First, due to the significance of racial and ethnic tensions in the country's political experience, it is important to measure development in the light of political participation and the extent to which political dissent has been tolerated both in the economic and educational institutions. The assumption being made here is that open political unrest is an expression of economic stagnation arising from political repression. Secondly, it will be necessary to examine the distribution of incomes across the nation's population in order to determine the degree to which the gross national wealth was allowed to filter into the various regions of the country. And finally, development in Zimbabwe should be measured in terms of the degree to which the economic policies pursued by various governments were able to reduce inequalities in access to employment in the wage sector.

Employment training and the dispersal of a nation's labor force in its economic sectors are viewed in this study as having important ramifications for raising its PQLI achievement. The hypothesis advanced in this proposition is that a high proportion of a developing nation's population must be engaged in economic activities capable of yielding financial rewards which are

indispensable in purchasing life-sustaining goods and services such as food, shelter and medicare. Political repression and legislation also reflect a nation's economic performance. Governments which erect barriers to prevent some groups from political advancement certainly encourage underdevelopment, especially since political power usually influences the distribution of incomes and access to prestigious careers. Due to these considerations this study will focus on examining political and labor policies that were crucial in sustaining economic growth.

The Settler Development Policies

Prior to examining the development strategies of the respective settler governments in Zimbabwe, it is important to identify structural characteristics of the settler economy. Before occupation of the territory, the indigenous economy was characterized by the absence of that high degree of structural differentiation typical of developed societies. The creation of a peripheral capitalist economy which followed European settlement resulted in the emergence of a dual economy comprising a modern and the subsistence sector. In contrast to the homogeneity of the rural areas, the emergent modern economy consisted of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.

Of all the primary industrial activities, mineral extraction

Legend:

Railroad
International boundary

Au Gold **Cr** Chromite
Asb Asbestos **Cu** Copper
C✗ Coal

MOZAMBIQUE

ZAMBIA

Lake Kariba

Mhangura ● **Cu**

Harare
Au

Kadoma
● **Au**

Hwange
C✗

Z I M B A B W E

Kwekwe ● **Au**
Au
Gweru ●
Cr Shurugwi

Masvingo
● **Au**

Bulawayo ●
Au

Asb
Zvishavane

GREAT DIKE

BOTSWANA

Au ● Gwanda

MOZAMBIQUE

0 50 100 150 Km

SOUTH AFRICA

Map of Zimbabwe Showing the Great Dyke Mining Strip

was given top priority since high expectations of the existence of vast amounts of gold deposits had lured Europeans into Zimbabwe. Mining activities were largely carried out on the Great Dyke which is part of a rich geological structure running from South Africa and extending into both Zaire and the Zambian Copperbelt. The towns of Hwange, Kadoma and Gwanda grew to be chief mining centres attracting a high proportion of expatriate and domestic work-force. Apart from gold and other minerals, asbestos fibre extracted from mines at Zvishavane and Mashaba ranked second in recruiting indigenous and foreign labor, and as a source for generating the scarce foreign exchange revenue. Mineral output increased steadily as political conditions improved, particularly between 1925 and 1959.[15]

Besides mining, commercial farming was the territory's second major primary industry. Its development however initially progressed slowly for several reasons. Between 1890 and 1910, the industry was afflicted by the scarcity of indigenous labor due to the resentment to white rule. And unlike mining conglomerates that had resolved the labor problem by recruiting workers from Zambia, Malawi and even Ethiopia, European farmers relied on a squatter system as a source of labor. Arrighi has estimated that up to 1922 about 68 percent of wage-earners in the extraterritorial labor category were from Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique.[16] Another delaying factor in the development of commercial agriculture was

the growth of lucrative markets for African produce in the mines where it fetched high prices. Consequently, Africans were reluctant to work for wages that were far below what their produce could earn in the new markets.[17]

As will be seen later, the government passed various pieces of legislation to protect white farmers. The creation of an Agricultural Bank for Europeans was typical of this policy. The bank often subsidized white farmers, making it difficult for Africans to compete with Europeans on equal terms. Needless to say, that policy marked the emergence of an agricultural sector distinct from the traditional mode of land management. The policy further led to the formation of an advanced system of animal husbandry in the young state partly because Europeans could afford to import improved livestock from overseas. Most significant in the years that followed was the law which sanctioned a massive tax increase in order to force Africans to enter the money economy.[18] As will become clearer when the labor policies that were introduced are examined in greater detail, this law drove large numbers of Africans into mining and agricultural industries.

The growth of secondary industries was to a great extent motivated by improvements in mining and agriculture. The food processing industry, accounting for one third of manufactured goods, expanded dramatically at a time when primary industries were experiencing an economic boom. This was also the case with

expansion in the manufacture of materials required in the construction industry which followed the discovery of asbestos and lime deposits. Another example of this relationship was the growth of the textile industry which resulted from the cultivation of cotton, and the footwear industry which depended on hides supplied by cattle ranches. Most significant was the impact of manufacturing industries on transforming social tastes of the African community. The construction industry, for instance, led to a demand for modern housing. Likewise, new fabrics inaugurated an era of change in clothing fashions. All these developments demonstrate how industrial growth led to the emergence of a complex economic structure in a society that was initially insulated from European influence.

The tertiary sector illustrates this still more clearly, since its growth originated from expansion in extractive and processing industries. Because of the broad nature of the public service, it will be necessary to limit this discussion to transportation and the civil service. The development of railways shows the forces which gave rise to other forms of communication systems. In general the development of the transportation system progressed in four stages.[19] Initially the seaports of Beira in Mozambique and Cape Town in South Africa, functioned as bases from which inland expeditions were despatched to explore the territory. Porters and caravans were at first the most common mode of

transportation. In 1897 they were both replaced by the construction of national railways which linked the ports to strategic regions in the interior. Due to political instability in Zimbabwe during the early years, the new structure served as an important link connecting administrative centres and the coastal regions. Also significant in this respect was the need to establish military bases and forts to defend the British Empire in Central Africa.

Further examination of the railway structure shows that the infant mining and agricultural industries also dictated the distribution of communication networks. Branch and trunk lines, for example, were largely confined to the highveld and the Great Dyke regions containing rich soils and minerals.[20] After the poll tax was introduced for adult males, these areas became major centres of economic activity which drew large numbers of Africans from rural areas. The influx of workers in turn gave rise to a demand for specialized institutions responsible for organizing labor and maintaining law and order. The third stage in the development of transportation saw the construction of branch lines linking the new industrial and residential areas with farming communities. A final phase saw both rail and road networks coordinated to enhance the system's efficiency. But as the territory's economy became more diversified, the demand grew for air transportation, and this in turn relieved the ports of Beira

and Cape Town, which were highly congested with trade goods and human traffic.

As transportation became more diversified, it was evident that labor management had to be specialized as well. The African and European Railway Workers' Unions which emerged were thus administered by full time organizers, as was the National Farmers' Union. These organizations had one thing in common: to act as pressure groups for negotiating wages and improving working conditions. Leaders of the various labor organizations in most of the African territories often rose to national prominence by acquiring prestigious political careers such as Tom Mboya of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. In Zimbabwe, Sir Roy Welensky - a former Prime Minister of the defunct Central African Federation, and Joshua Nkomo, the African nationalist, were once leaders of the Railway Workers' Union in the territory.

Under settler administrations land and industrial legislation were the twin pillars supporting the development strategies established by Europeans. The significance of the land question to many facets of social and economic life prompted the government to appoint a series of land commissions in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1925, for instance, the Carter Commission established to determine the land question submitted proposals that were codified in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.[21] The Act was a landmark in the territory's development policy in that it imposed strict

geographical segregation of Africans and Europeans. Before the legislation was enforced, the allocation of land had been determined by military conquest and was thus subject to legal arguments, especially in the pre-1923 period when Britain's consitutional authority was still very dominant.

The significance of the Land Apportionment Act is made clear through an evaluation of its economic impact on the advancement of both Africans and Europeans. As shown above, the colony's geographical structure was fairly diverse. On the highveld, the soil was relatively rich in a topography that was excellent for mechanization of agriculture on a large scale. The abundance of minerals on the veld further added to prospects of a robust economy. The economic potential of Zimbabwe which to some degree was overestimated no doubt inspired the scope of the Land Apportionment Act. As a result the government divided the land into three categories: African, European and undetermined. The land allocated to Europeans was suitable for agriculture and commercial purposes such as manufacturing and transportation. Because of the need to reduce costs of transporting raw minerals and fossil fuels from mines to industrial and residential areas where they could be processed, urban and regional development schemes were strategically established. These economic considerations compelled the government to resettle Africans in less productive regions. In the light of these considerations,

suggestions by some writers[22] that Africans endorsed those recommendations of the Carter Commission which assigned to them insufficient and poor land are difficult to confirm.

It is doubtful indeed that Africans could have accepted a scheme that drove them into dry and rocky land where it was sometimes impossible to engage in meaningful agricultural activities, particularly in the light of ethnic conflicts which had often stemmed from land disputes before the arrival of Europeans. In fact, there is evidence to show that attempts to modify this Act provoked political unrest. A case in point is the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 which was designed to consolidate the status of rural areas as regions for permanent African settlement. This Act spurred political unrest which destablized the government. One aspect of it which Africans opposed was the termination of communal ownership of land. Another was destocking, which saw the government reducing and redistributing livestock to every household. However, it should not be assumed that all aspects of this Act were repressive as nationalist protests during that period might suggest. Indeed, some of the measures taken to promote soil fertility and land conservation were positive. Also the government should be commended for organizing regional seminars on basic crop science which were often conducted by its Land Development Officers who stressed the importance of crop rotation and the use of commercial fertilizers to enrich poor

soil.[5] What obscured such good intentions were the political motives surrounding them. These pieces of legislation were thus viewed with suspicion since they were tied to the policy of concentrating political power and economic privilege in industrial and urban communities that were largely settled by Europeans. In this light, it is clear that the Land Husbandry Act was designed to stabilize labor mobility in the territory since it stipulated that in order to own land in rural areas, Africans must live on it. Clearly, this policy was intended to curb the migration of Africans into the modern sector, for those who did migrate forfeited their right to own land in rural areas. Conversely, the Act reduced the exodus of Africans from urban areas by creating a home ownership scheme whereby tenants in some residential areas administered by the government could acquire houses after leasing them for ninety-five years. This scheme excluded married couples leasing houses in municipal areas administered by the local government. Even so, the scheme offered few advantages to an African population with a life-span generally below forty-nine years.

Under the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith, more radical land policies were formulated and entrenched in the Republican Constitution of 1969 to reaffirm the ideals of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. In that year, the new land policies were even given legal expression by the Land Tenure Act

which consolidated the principles of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. However, the new legislation stipulated more stringent reforms since its objective was to uphold the goals of the new constitution. Some aspects of this piece of legislation should be examined in order to gain insights into its political and economic implications.

The Land Tenure Act stipulated that Africans and Europeans could not own land outside their respective spheres of economic activity.[23] The intention was to eliminate those loopholes existing in the Land Apportionment Act which sometimes permitted Europeans to conduct economic activities in African areas. The new Act curtailed such privileges by prohibiting Europeans from owning shops in rural areas or operating public transportation in areas designated for Africans. Up to 1969, for instance, the Salisbury United Bus Company offered transportation services in rural areas. The new Act terminated this practice by proclaiming these regions to be areas for permanent African settlement. As seen in chapter three where policies arising from the Republican Constitution were examined in some detail, Africans were equally prohibited from using recreational facilities in urban areas. The constitution curtailed the privileges formerly accorded domestic servants working in European suburbs.

Although studies of settler economic policies often suggest that the various governments adopted a free-enterprise approach to

economic development, a closer examination of the strategies shows that these administrations did not permit the economy to evolve uncontrolled. In a classic study of the territory's economy, for instance, James Barber concluded that the Rhodesian economy developed under the free-enterprise[24] conditions advocated by Arthur Lewis in his growth model discussed earlier. In order to evaluate that interpretation of Zimbabwe's economic evolution, it is necessary to examine the impact of both the Land Apportionment and the Industrial Conciliation Acts, the twin pillars of the policies that were implemented.

As noted before, these Acts were designed to prevent the emergence of an integrated economic system. As a matter of fact, the Land Tenure Act brought in by the 1969 Republican Constitution enhanced European privileges by introducing stricter geographical segregation of the races. That Act further gave provision for chiefs rather than educated Africans to be appointed to the senate--a move that was intended to entrench political power in the traditional leaders. By taking this action, the government was also stressing the significance of rural areas as regions for permanent African settlement. Evidently this policy moved the territory closer to an apartheid state, especially after the introduction of rural councils that were in many respects Zimbabwe's version of the South African homelands system. For example, the African Councils Act of 1957 delegated limited

judicial powers to the chiefs. In the 1960s, its revised version accorded them the responsibility of coordinating rural programs such as agricultural, roads and water development projects.[25]

In common with the lands Acts which segregated the various racial groups, the Industrial Conciliation Act gave rise to the division of skills acquired by Africans and Europeans. In particular, it regulated racial segregation both in the private and public sectors of the economy. In addition, it stipulated high wages for Europeans and prevented Africans from gaining access to prestigious careers. An important aspect of this legislation was the restriction it imposed on African labor unions to prevent them from acquiring legal status. As a result, the unions could not bargain for wages or improved working conditions.

Several economic implications arising from the Industrial Conciliation Act can be discerned. One is that it prevented educational institutions from offering advanced technical and commercial skills to Africans, since these would have enabled them to compete for jobs with Europeans on an equal basis. As seen in chapter four, this policy gave rise to the Junior Secondary Schools for Africans established in 1962, schools which were inferior to the grammar and technical institutions that were largely reserved for Europeans. The distribution of skills according to official policy was thereby assured. Another outcome was that the legislation depreciated the value of skills acquired

by Africans outside Zimbabwe, since they were prevented by law from utilizing their expertise in the middle and higher levels of the modern economy. It was common for African artisans trained abroad to practice their trades in segregated areas where the quality of physical plants and the level of technology were inferior. Also, the Act created an artificial scarcity of labor since the government preferred to recruit expatriates from European countries rather than train Africans to fill the vacant posts. In this regard, it can be said with a reasonable degree of certainty that the Industrial Conciliation Act encouraged European immigration into Zimbabwe. Clearly, this policy was intended to retard African advancement by attracting expatriate labor. In the territory's major cities, this legislation led to the introduction of a pass law which confined Africans to rural areas.

Development Policies Under African Administration

The development strategy of the first African government should be examined in the light of the events which led to the attainment of independence in 1980. For although nationalist manifestos had constantly pledged to centralize the economy of independent Zimbabwe, evidence from official documents examined for this purpose reveals that only a few sectors of the economy were actually brought directly under state control by the African administration. Thus, rather than establishing an outright Marxist state as the ruling party had pledged during the struggle for

self-rule, the government introduced what may be said to be a mild form of socialism which so far has been only a minor irritant to entrepreneurs who adhere to the free enterprise system.

In order to understand the nature of reforms implemented in the independence period, it is necessary to examine the official policy documents. Following independence, the government issued the first Development Plan containing a national economic statement. Contrary to many observers' predictions of a shift toward a highly centralized Marxian economic system under the African adminstration, the plan shows a tentative approach to economic planning. In a broad sense, the document outlined some of the major principles that later regulated the economic policies. One of these dealt with the administration's commitment to preserve and expand the existing sectors.[26] Paradoxically, the government encouraged private investment by both local and international business communities. It is evident from such a move that the state was determined to maintain the dominant role of the private sector. During the struggle for independence, there had occurred structural changes in the economy that made it difficult for the new government to stimulate the growth and employment which were crucial in sustaining political stability without the assistance of the established business community. Thus, the need to secure the confidence of the entrepreneurs inspired the scope of the plan. The commitment of the government to honor the

Lancaster House Accord was another major factor influencing its
moderate stance. The accord, to which African nationalists and the
settlers were signatories, stipulated that in order to suspend the
independence constitution it was necessary to secure the consent
of twenty Europeans in the national Legislature consisting of one
hundred members. Also, the international business community could
only be encouraged to invest in a country showing real signs of
political stability.

In spite of these facts the first Development Plan should not
be viewed as having been designed primarily to maintain the status
quo of the economic structure inherited from the settlers. Rather,
the document was influenced by the mood of compromise prevailing
in top government circles and as such it set the climate for
social change, particularly in the light of the impending land
reforms and new wage policies. The creation of rural councils
illustrates this policy more clearly as the areas formerly
reserved for Europeans by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 were
bought by the state and brought under the resettlement scheme.
This transfer to Africans of some of the land formerly owned by
Europeans was carried out under the auspices of the Rural Councils
Act which vested powers in the Minister of Local Government to
exercise jurisdiction over white farms and any land formerly
reserved for Europeans, all of which fell into this category.[27]
The procedure followed in electing the councillors in the period

after independence reveals the moderate nature of the new government. In contrast to the Land Apportionment Act that had discriminated against Africans, the new legislation did not prevent Europeans from contesting the council's elections. As the Act clearly states, even the councillors who held government posts under white rule were permitted to retain their current positions.[28] Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the real political atmosphere prevailing in the independence period required the settlers to cooperate with the African administration. Many Europeans who secured posts therefore opted for conformity rather than dissension. The Act left little doubt about the intention of the government to exercise control over all the land that was previously allotted to the settlers. Referring to the impending move to expropriate the land it stated that:

> ...A council may, with the consent of the Minister acquire land or any right over land with or without buildings, whether within or outside the Council area, for the purpose of executing any work or undertaking authorized by this Act which is necessary in the interests of public health or town and country planning or the development or utilization of the property concerned....[29]

In contrast to the Rural Councils Act, which brought to an end the exclusive ownership of rich farmland by Europeans in Zimbabwe, the District Council Act of 1980[30] dealt with the former Tribal Trust Lands that had been assigned to Africans by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and similar pieces of legislation. In

fact, it was these regions that were often classified as rural areas before African rule. In dealing with the District Councils Act, therefore, it should be noted that the legislation refers specifically to those areas that are predominantly occupied by Africans. It is also important to recognize that African Councils as such were first created by an Act of Parliament in 1937. Under the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith in the 1960s, this Act was amended in order to balkanize the country's separate development policy. As shown before, the councils were charged with many responsibilities including road construction and organizing labor to build schools. As well, the 200 councils of that period owned clinics or carried out joint agricultural projects, though these functions were marginally achieved due mainly to the lack of government funding and poor organization by the chiefs who administered them.

After independence, the African Government terminated the councils system as it had existed and passed the District Councils Act that created fifty-five new councils different in size and function from the previous institutions. Rather than retaining the simplicity of the old system, these councils are larger, more complex, and more autonomous than those established by the settler government. In addition, in contrast to the pre-independence institutions which were not supported financially by the government, the new councils enjoy substantial assistance from the

Ministry of Education and Culture. But it should be noted that despite receiving such aid, the councils and the Government complement each other since, like the chiefs under white rule, the local authorities levy taxes to finance some of their educational and agricultural schemes. Another difference between the old and new systems is that whereas the settler administrations had coerced chiefs and local authorities to establish councils, the African government emphasized consensus in a community to justify creating a council.[31] In this respect it should be added that as institutions that emerged from local initiative, these councils are administered by more competent personnel. This is a great departure from the European policy of appointing chiefs to run African councils. However, although the power of the chiefs has been severely eroded since independence, they still retain their traditional role as advisors to elected councillors as well as the right to reprimand individuals who stir political unrest in rural areas. They continue to play an important role as mediators in settling disputes as well, although more difficult cases are now usually handled by district courts. But while in the past the chiefs represented the government in rural areas, this role is now played by Provincial Governors who supervise political developments on behalf of the ruling party.

A further difference between the old system and the post-independence councils concerns their degree of expansion. Under

white rule the African councils though numerous were less
diversified in terms of the programs they offered. Whatever
programs existed were limited in the sense that they catered to
regions that provided political advantages to the government.
Regions that had the potential of becoming politically explosive,
for instance, were served with more efficient programs than those
enjoying tranquility. It should be stressed however that sometimes
genuine economic considerations motivated the settler
administrations to establish the rural councils. This was often
the case with areas where malaria and other tropical diseases
posed health hazards. In such areas, council clinics were
established and supplemented by community education programs
designed to combat the epidemics. Government policy towards the
council system in this case was sometimes determined by potential
threats to national health. This will become more evident in the
next chapter where an analysis of the educational systems that
emerged from the respective ideologies of development is made.
Lastly, in contrast to the Euporean-instituted African councils
which were appendages of the Ministry of Local Government, the
District Councils of the 1980s enjoy a high degree of
independence. The Act of Parliament that created them empowers the
councils to make by-laws governing their activities,[32] whereas the
African councils of the previous era were not given such a
mandate. Nonetheless, that delegation of power should not be

viewed as suggesting a policy of government non-intervention in the political and economic life of the rural areas. The new councils are expected to conform to the legal framework of the constitution and the Act of Parliament under which they operate.

Economic Transformation of Zimbabwe

The foregoing survey of settler and post-independence development strategies make it evident that the ideologies of development adopted by the respective governments show stark differences. Under settler governments, for instance, economic policies were motivated by an ascriptive ideology exemplified by the Land Apportionment Act which allocated the least productive land to Africans. This enabled national policy to focus on developing the regions mostly occupied by Europeans. The government accordingly channeled a substantial amount of tax revenue to these regions - a policy which augmented both racial and regional inequalities. This practice further led to an imbalance in the degree to which the various regions responded to economic inputs. In this regard, any settler policy, such as the free enterprise that appears to have been marginally adopted, was primarily inspired by the aim of protecting European interests. These circumstances have encouraged the view that the settlers plundered most of Rhodesia's wealth, but the assumption is not accurate since much wealth was transferred to investors outside the country by companies such as the Anglo-American Corporation

which bought large shares of the mining industry. The British and American conglomerates also held shares in agricultural and forestry industries, through which a significant amount of national revenue filtered into foreign markets and financial houses. Later, it will be necessary to estimate the effects of such flight of national capital on the undertraining of African labor and the retarding of social change in general.

The fact that before UDI much of the capital that left the country could not be reinvested in the territory's economy meant growth in unemployment. Futhermore, because the Industrial Conciliation Act legally prevented Africans from acquiring high level technical skills, the rate of economic expansion progressed at a limited pace. This further imposed restrictions on the impact of educational initiatives on the Rhodesian economy. In a 1979 study conducted to estimate the country's manpower needs in the independence era, Colclough and Murray predicted that due to the dearth of Africans possessing the middle and high level technical skills, the anticipated exodus of Europeans after independence would adversely affect the economy because of critical shortages of technical personnel.[33] Between 1977 and 1979, the economy was already beginning to show symptoms of the impending decline as about 10 percent of the white population left the country. Since this emigration was highly correlated to white employment, some estimates suggest that nearly 12,000 middle and high level

personnel vacated the skilled occupations.[34] Besides affecting the rate of economic growth, the exodus also dislocated the economic structure.

Because of the disruption of the economy caused by the exodus, it is necessary to discuss in some detail the major characteristics of the white labor force in Zimbabwe. The majority of European workers were descendants of the settlers who had lived in the African territory for almost a century. The Rhodesians, as these descendants were sometimes called, seldom relocated in other countries because of their emotional attachment to Zimbabwe. On the other hand, expatriates from the Western nations worked primarily to attain financial security and return to their respective countries of origin. Hence it is important to make a distinction between expatriates of the settler period and their post-independence counterparts. The extent to which each contributed to economic transformation differed greatly because of the different motives that had prompted them to work in Zimbabwe. Settler expatriates often transferred their savings abroad where they could retire once their contracts had expired, for what had influenced them to leave their countries were salaries much higher than they could earn at home. Attractive salaries were the reason that most expatriates declared solidarity with settler governments, despite these administrations' undemocratic constitutions. In addition, the privileges accorded to them while

working in Rhodesia far exceeded those available in their countries of origin, for it was possible for expatriates to acquire a free house and a car as rewards for their willingness to relocate. In addition, their families were often entitled to free medical services and education; all of which were used as incentives to lure immigrants from Europe and North America. These expatriates clearly understood their political significance, which was to boost the white population in order to neutralize the growing African population.

Unlike the single-minded settler expatriates, post-independence expatriates differ immensely in their motives and psychological makeup. For the purpose of comparison, two types in this category have been selected. One group consists of top level experts whose skills are in short supply in Zimbabwe. As guests of the government, these people are often committed to maximizing their productive capacity. The second group comprises individuals whose motive for migrating is largely a desire for adventure. In general both types of expatriates are not motivated by profit, although chronic unemployment in their countries of origin may be an important factor influencing migration to Zimbabwe. The Western values these people dispense may inhibit the effectiveness of social programs by influencing a high proportion of Africans to emulate their life styles, but otherwise expatriates of the independence era are a national asset. Their contribution to

national development is evidently more valuable than that of their predecessors since they do not enjoy the priviliges that made earlier expatriates an economic liability to African tax payers. The fact that post-independence expatriates are willing to accept appointments in rural areas, which their predecessors shunned as dull, explains the difference in attitudes. By accepting such postings, the expatriates set a valuable example and encourage Zimbabwean citizens to appreciate rural life.

The economic ramifications of settler and post-independence labor policies are not difficult to estimate, particularly in the public service, which reproduced the educational structure. As previously noted, one outcome of introducing Western education was an increase in the internal differentiation of African society and the rise of new social classes. Although the nascent economy was mainly responsible for the structural changes, the type of education established played a significant role in restructuring society, since it was a highly selective system that accentuated regional and rural inequalities. Regional uniformity that had characterized the traditional society disappeared after white settlement. The rural areas, European farming communities, the mines, and urban areas represented the colony's new economic structure and hierarchical distribution of incomes. And since recruitment for posts in the public service was not determined by open competition alone, ascriptive factors played a major role in

stratifying society. This had been spelled out by the Public
Service Act of 1931 that gave Europeans monopoly of certain posts.
Under conditions set by this Act, Africans could not apply for
senior administrative positions in the army, the police force, or
government departments. In conforming to this policy, the
government instituted two separate salary structures for Africans
and Europeans. The same conditions were established in allocating
pension funds for Africans and Europeans in the civil service.

The economic performance of settler and African governments
should further be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which
they reduced inequalities and achieved political participation or
fair distribution of incomes. The record of settler governments in
reducing inequality is not an impressive one, especially since
every administration was elected on a mandate of protecting white
privileges. The inequalities arose from the country's pieces of
legislation such as the Land Apportionment Act that unfairly
distributed land in the territory.[35] By allocating the least
productive land to Africans, the government in this case prevented
a large section of its citizens from maximizing food production.
Exclusion of Africans from access to funds of the Agricultural
Bank further stifled African development. The lack of funds and
over-crowding in rural areas also led to a deterioration of soil
fertility. Similarly, the Industrial Conciliation Act was created
to encourage racial disparity in the distribution of technical

skills. Viewed from these perspectives, it was not by coincidence that Europeans constituted only 15 percent of the country's population, yet they controlled most sectors of the economy.

The concentration of wealth in a tiny minority also produced inequalities in the educational system, where students from the upper classes sometimes performed better than their cohorts from poor families. The economy which emerged also produced elitist incomes that in turn gave rise to a highly selective educational system, due to the ability of certain classes to pay for higher education. This ability was supported by disparities in the allocation of grants for African and European education which shows an astonishing imbalance in official policy. In the period extending from 1967 to 1976, for example, the state spent $20.7 million for European education as compared to $11.2 million allocated for African schools,[36] despite the fact that Africans constituted over 80 percent of the population.

In strong contrast the independence government, though elected on a platform of establishing African self-determination, did not stipulate laws that discriminated against Europeans. On the contrary, the administration's priority has been to remove discriminatory legislation in all aspects of political and economic life. Consequently, although some of its policies have an African bias, Europeans are not legally prevented from holding posts in the Public Service. The University Act of 1982 endorsed

this policy when it steadfastly condemned racial discrimination in all facets of the academic community. Although the Act was initially intended to end all forms of prejudice at the national institutions, its focus became the protection of the European academic staff from African harassment as the University of Rhodesia was one of the major centres of tension between Africans and Europeans in the settler period. This was particularly so in the 1960s when the wave of student unrest that had destablized institutions of higher learning throughout the world also brought chaos there. In particular, the enrollment of a sizable number of students who had left the territory for political reasons or to further their education abroad, in addition to the unprecedented hiring of African academic staff, threatened to revive the old tensions. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Africans who joined the staff in the 1980s often differed from their European counterparts in that, while most of the Europeans had been educated at the national institution, most of the Africans had received their training in Western countries. In an attempt to minimize the potential of renewed unrest, therefore, the Act said:

> No test of religious or political belief, race, ethnic origin, nationality or sex shall be imposed upon or required of any person in order to entitle him to be admitted as a member of the academic or administrative staff, employee or student of the University or to hold any office therein or privilege thereof.[37]

It was argued earlier that for a country to sustain

development, a high proportion of its citizens must be employed. The rationale for this argument is that in order to improve a nation's standard of living in terms of its PQLI achievement, most of its citizens must be able to purchase food, clothing and health services besides owning decent accommodation. Another advantage of maximizing employment is that earnings permit individuals to make the choices that are an important aspect of democracy. In the extended family system that is still dominant in the LDCs, a member of the family employed in the modern sector assumes a higher status at home. This rank tends to inhibit both the intellectual and emotional development of individuals who depend on him for existence. In the workplace, national wage policies under settler regimes conferred such status on whites since the higher wages stipulated for Europeans elevated their social rank in the territory. To illustrate, whereas the basic salary for African male teachers in 1976 was $645 per annum, their European counterparts earned $3,825.[38] Such sharp differences in salary scales had important ramifications for the ability of Africans and Europeans to improve their quality of life. For instance, since medicine in Zimbabwe was formerly not socialized as it is today, only Europeans could afford expensive surgery. The higher incomes for Europeans further enabled them to provide their families with well-balanced meals, and other examples of the differences that income disparities make on the lives of individuals could be

cited.

At independence the government scrapped the ascriptive formula that had governed wage policies for almost a century. In spite of the persistence of enormous gaps between the salaries of elites and the masses today, the progressive tax structure introduced by the government permits national wealth to be fairly distributed. However, it would be premature to assume a precise determination of the impact of the new tax policy on the territory's economy, since its effect will be known only after a much longer period. What may be concluded with some accuracy is that the concentration of higher incomes in a white minority in the settler period, scuttled African development. The uneven distribution of salaries shows that in colonial Zimbabwe and other societies where high wages are concentrated in a small elite, the per capita GNP index is not a reliable device for measuring development.

The disparities in the degree of political participation in the two periods are less obscure than those in other areas compared. As clearly demonstrated, the settler regime was a political entity established primarily to shelter white privileges. As a result, obstacles designed to exclude Africans from participating in the political system were introduced in the constitution. It should be pointed out, however, that despite the remarkable efforts of the African administration to promote

economic development for all the races, there is still room for improvement in the political domain. The dissident problem in Zimbabwe shows clearly that a section of the country's population is in search of political accommodation which it believes does not currently exist. National instability arising from political dissension inhibits both political stability and economic development, since those who agitate opposition to the established government are reluctant to support its national programs.

Finally, the development strategies of both settler and African governments have revealed strong nationalist motives. Successive white administrations imposed many pieces of legislation that segregated Africans in order to assert settler nationalism. As time progressed, Europeans developed a stronger sense of nationhood through shared economic motives and resistance to the growing African hostility, all of which welded them into a cohesive settler community. Likewise, the economic policies adopted after independence reflect more than a desire to replace an oppressive regime with democratic government. The war for self-determination drew its strongest inspiration from the urge to recover white farmland, with which Africans had the strong religious links discussed in chapter three. During the Lancaster House Conference in 1979, the peace talks stalled and almost collapsed when African nationalists sternly rejected a British plan urging them to compensate white farmers should they lose

their land. In the opinion of nationalists that land was priceless because of the religious significance attached to it and the fact that the settlers had acquired it by force. The Rural Councils Act of 1980 echoed this stance by making it possible for Africans to recover some of the land by resettling in it the former guerillas who had fought the government to attain this goal. The next chapter will examine the educational systems that grew out of the development strategies of the settler and African governments.

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CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER SETTLER AND AFRICAN RULE

National Conflict and Educational Change in Other Countries

In the previous chapter it was found that the development strategies adopted by the settler and African governments were influenced by nationalist forces. Before examining the educational systems that emerged from the policies of the various administrations in Zimbabwe, it will be helpful to discuss how nationalism transformed education in the United States of America, Quebec and Tanzania. The significance of a preliminary survey of this nature is that it provides a broader scope within which to contrast Zimbabwean education with that of other nations.

In the United States, Dewey's pragmatic philosophy had dominated educational practice up to the 1950s. But due to a dramatic shift in the international balance of power in that decade there occurred some visible changes in education policy in the 1960s. In particular, Soviet progress in space exploration led to a critical assessment of the existing American education system. Distinguished American educators conferred as a result to explore ways of reforming instruction so as to match or even overtake Soviet space supremacy. Most alarming to American educators was the launching of Soviet astronauts into space. That feat inaugurated an era of Cold War politics in education that

prompted American scholars to scrutinize the quality of
instruction offered in the nation's schools. Commenting on the
'Sputnik Scare', a report of the proceedings of a conference of
leading American educators resolved that:

> The new spirit perhaps reflects the profound scientific
> revolution of our times as well. The trend is
> accentuated by what is almost certain to be a long-range
> crisis in national security, a crisis whose resolutions
> will depend upon a well educated citizenry.[1]

Although the conference was highly critical of the state of
American education in general, its focus was on what was perceived
to be the poor quality of content and the outdated pedagogical
methods, particularly in secondary schools. These schools were
believed to be responsible for the failure of American education.
Some educators even suggested that the comprehensive nature of the
schools should be given less emphasis in order to enable students
possessing a high degree of intellectual distinction to receive
special training. In concrete terms, the conference made several
suggestions which were expected to improve American education.[2]
One was that there should be a shift from the tradition of
teaching facts to emphasis on making students grasp what one
expert called 'the structure of a discipline'. The rationale for
adopting this approach was prompted by the belief that acquiring
the general principles of a discipline had the potential of
improving one's ability to transfer acquired knowledge when

solving problems confronted in real life situations. A further advantage that is observed here is that the acquisition of the general principles of a discipline represents a form of mental shorthand. Given the current explosion of knowledge, this method of processing and storing information has enormous advantages to both students and teachers. Today, the influence of this approach has a profound impact, particularly in the emphasis that is now placed on developing and mastering theoretical models or concepts.

Another suggestion concerned the importance of science and mathematics in fostering technological advancement required in the space exploration race. The experts believed that the lack of a strong foundation in these subjects in primary schools contributed to deficiencies in American scientific achievement. A third resolution dealt with the significance of intuition in fostering independent thinking. It was held that guessing constituted an important part of discovery, especially when dealing with problems confronted outside the school. Lastly, greater emphasis was placed on maximizing the motivation of American students. The delegates who attended the conference speculated that American students were the least motivated when compared with their counterparts elsewhere in the industrialized nations. It was concluded, therefore, that there existed a decline in the pursuit of excellence in American schools.

While the search for an educational panacea in America was

reaching a high point, Francophone educators in Quebec were equally searching for ways of creating a school system that could foster French economic and cultural dominance in the province. Because of the struggle for linguistic and economic paramountcy between French and English Canadians there, education was viewed by some nationalists as being responsible for the existing inequalities. Since an account of the conflict that resulted from these developments has already been dealt with elsewhere, it is sufficient here to examine the degree to which French nationalism heightened in the 1960s and 1970s, changing the structure of education as it gathered momentum.

Before the rise of nationalism in Quebec in the 1960s, French education was largely classical[3], emphasizing an academic curriculum leading to Law, Medicine, and Philosophy. English education by contrast emphasized modern disciplines and produced sufficient scientists and technicians required by the growing commercial and industrial sectors of the economy. The diversity of orientations in French and English education had led to an imbalance in the dispersal of French and English technocrats in the economy. While the French generally exhibited a propensity for gravitating towards the traditional disciplines, the English were mostly attracted to modern occupations.

A major result of the imbalance in the acquisition of commercial and technical skills was the creation of the Parent

Commission in 1961 by the provincial Liberal government of Jean Lesage. It was charged with the task of identifying the major constraints in French education. The commission criticized French schools for maintaining a classical system of education. It further urged the need to modernize secondary education and to reduce the dominant role of the Catholic Church in controlling instruction. Regarding the need to innovate in secondary education, the commission suggested that "It is at this level that the demands of contemporary society will oblige us to depart from our traditional academic organization...."[4]

The growth of French nationalism in the 1960s, generally known as the Quiet Revolution, gave impetus to structural changes in secondary education. The reforms that were implemented culminated in the erosion of Catholic control of instruction. In keeping with this trend, a single Ministry of Education was established in Quebec for the first time in the 20th century[5] and charged with the task of coordinating educational policies. The centralization of education signalled a shift in the nature of formal schooling in the province. The change revealed a strong determination by the government to tighten its control over schools. Most evident in dramatizing the reforms was the creation of Junior Colleges called Collèges d'Enseignement Général et Professionnel (CEGEPS). The CEGEPS were introduced at the end of five years of high school and consisted of two types: the two-

year academic CEGEPS leading to university entrance, and a three-year technical program providing terminal education. A common feature of the CEGEPS was their comprehensive focus, which was designed to diversify students. The vocational emphasis of these institutions has in recent years been seen by some observers as having been responsible for allowing Francophones to compete with Anglophones more effectively for jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. According to a recent study that correlated the educational reforms that had stemmed from the Quiet Revolution to a decline in wage disparities:

> If the data are converted to an hourly basis to adjust
> for differences in hours worked during the years,
> Anglophones led by 11 percent in 1971, but the situation
> 10 years later is reversed with Francophones showing an
> edge approaching 2 percent.[6]

As these reforms were being implemented in Quebec and the United States, the role of education as an agent of social change came under scrutiny in the LDCs. In Africa, this was lauded by a report of the conference of African Ministers of Education held in Ethiopia in 1961.[7] In order to illustrate the atmosphere prevailing in this period, it is necessary to examine the reforms adopted in Tanzania, since they reflect the general mood of African governments toward colonial education. In common with the emergent nations, the Tanzanian Government invested both human and physical resources to accelerate political and economic

development. In order to comprehend the origins of the reforms, it is important to assess the purpose and structure of colonial education.

Colonial schools were influenced by three motives that determined the nature of instruction provided. One was to serve the interests of the internal aspect of colonialism[8] by providing training in manual skills and educating a literate and compliant labor force such as domestic servants. In some colonies also, education was structured to train Africans for the junior civil service.

Under British and German rule in Tanzania, agriculture was established in schools as an academic subject. Due to the expansion of coffee and sisal plantations by the British, there was a growing demand for farm workers. As a result, the colonial government began to provide schools with agricultural specialists. A further result was the provision of school farms[9] on which students were instructed in modern agricultural techniques. In an attempt to increase the number of Africans employed in the commercial sector and the public service, the state established specialized boarding schools for this purpose such as Tabora - a boarding school modelled after the English public school of Eton. Tabora's clientele were mainly sons of chiefs such as President Nyerere. Because of their political orientation, these schools featured instruction in bookkeeping, typing, and other basic

administrative skills required in the civil service.

Another aspect of education in the colonial period was the importance attached to instruction as a vehicle for welding the British East African Empire. The instruction which existed suppressed African customs by dispensing European values. For instance, the British established English as the medium of instruction to replace German and Swahili, which were dominant languages prior to British rule. This was followed by a period of open political socialization during which the schools were to assist in establishing the sovereignty of British monarchs, especially after the Second World War, when the threat of communist influence prompted the British to prepare Africans for self-rule. As one writer reports, colonial authorities insisted that "The theme of the British King as a father should be stressed throughout the syllabus and mentioned in every classroom."[10] The result was that most classrooms in Tanzania, as elsewhere in the Empire, had a picture of the royal family. Implicit in this practice was the objective of spreading Western values to replace the existing indigenous cultural milieu.

The reformist attitude of the independence government in changing colonial policies appears to have surpassed those taken by other African nations. The reforms implemented in education were inaugurated by the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which set the climate for the social, political and economic changes. Through

the declaration, President Nyerere introduced reforms which moved education from its British affiliations. The government also terminated the affiliations of secondary education in the East African Examinations Council formerly comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

These reforms were justified by the nation's hegemonic group as arising from a need to dramatize the country's commitment to self-determination and the socialism that Kenya and Uganda had steadfastly rejected. After creating a highly centralized system of education, a considerable amount of foreign content was eliminated from text books, especially in the social sciences material.[11] The reforms enabled curricula to be adapted to the political, economic, and cultural aspirations of the new state. In accord with the typical socialist practice of linking instruction to the economy, Tanzanian schools were linked to cooperative farms and villages. However, the extent to which these policies have helped Tanzania to maximize its economic potential remains to be seen, as there appears to have been limited progress in the national economy.

This survey of educational innovations in the three societies shows that nationalism was a dominant force in transforming the structure and content of education. As seen in the American case, the ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union brought major changes in curriculum theorizing. The

ideological contest between the two superpowers prompted the United States Government to intervene directly in some of the nation's educational policy issues. In the 1960s, this new attitude resulted in greater state intervention in education. Both Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard Nixon, for instance, cautioned that national security depended on American schools.[12] The impact of the 'Sputnik Scare' on Teacher Education was even greater as new pedagogical methods designed to upgrade the quality of the country's teaching force were introduced. A further outcome of the reaction to the Sputnik was an attempt by scholars to establish elite high schools[13] capable of training bright students. These educators believed that by sifting gifted students they could produce the top scientists needed to compete more effectively with the Russians in space exploration.

In scientific and technological disciplines, the impact of the Sputnik was even greater, especially in transforming national educational policy. The passing of the National Defense Act in 1958 showed official concern with the state of American education. The Act resulted in increased government funding of technological and space research projects. What this shows is that American schools became more nationalistic than before. As one writer has observed, the ideological forces began to impinge on American schools, as

Crash programs were called for to produce engineers and

scientists, to teach intensive courses in mathematics and sciences at all educational levels, to prune the curriculum of high schools and colleges of dry rot of needless cultural courses, and to favor the gifted students by accelerating their educational development.[14]

Like the reforms in American schools, the innovations made in Tanzania and Quebec were chiefly due to a heightened sense of nationalist consciousness. In Quebec, the main cause of educational reforms was a perceived threat of cultural extinction. Demographic trends showing a decline in birth rates among Francophones had created a sense of cultural insecurity. The apprehension was further aggravated by the influx into the province of immigrants who tended to gravitate towards the Anglophone community. The hostility toward immigrants was compounded by the jobs they were offered, for some began to fill posts which the nationalists believed should be reserved for the French. These developments led to cultural cohesion among Franchophones that further resulted in language reforms intended to curb the political and economic ascendancy of minorities. The new labor policies sought to assert French control of Montreal - a high density cosmopolitan attraction in which the threat of French cultural extinction seemed to be real.

In order to control access to jobs by Anglophones and immigrants as well as to protect French culture, the government introduced Bill 22 in 1974 - a legislation that abolished official

bilingualism in Quebec by proclaiming French as the language of work. Proficiency tests in French were set up for minorities aspiring to public service careers. The Bill was effective because it imposed barriers on English universities aspiring to recruit professors outside Quebec. Under this law, new faculty members were required to demonstrate proficiency in French. In 1977, the government introduced Bill 101, which increased the status of French as the dominant language in the province.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the educational experiences of the countries examined, including the province of Quebec in Canada, is that the reforms implemented were chiefly motivated by nationalist sentiments. However, nationalism was expressed in various forms in the educational systems studied. In both Tanzania and Quebec there was cultural and economic patriotism. In the cultural arena, French and Swahili gained prominence as languages of national cohesion and upward social mobility. The degree of economic nationalism was however admirably higher in Quebec than in Tanzania, as seen in the creation of the CEGEPS, which were designed to make Francophones compete more effectively with Anglophones in the economy. The intensity of economic nationalism in Quebec stemmed in part from the fact that the cultural groups competing for economic paramountcy were more sophisticated than the ethnic groups of Tanzania. On the other hand, the nationalism that permeated the American school system

arose from the East-West ideological conflict. Because the Sputnik profoundly changed the American view of the world, that nation's schools became very nationalistic. In view of these international experiences, it is now necessary to ascertain how nationalism influenced education and development in Zimbabwe.

National Conflict and Education Change in Zimbabwe

To understand the relationship between Education and Development in Zimbabwe, it is helpful to examine the role of the state in a typical modern society. Among the various studies conducted on this topic is one by Almond and Powell who concluded that all modern political systems perform four functions, namely: extractive, distributive, regulative and symbolic.[15] As extractive systems, political entities levy taxes and military services in addition to exploiting a nation's physical resources. Under both settler and African governments in Zimbabwe, taxation has been the dominant method of extracting resources. Revenue from taxation had a more direct impact on social transformation of the state since its distribution to various regions determined the extent of their development. Under the African government which was formed in 1980, a larger amount of tax revenue was allocated for rural development. The administration levies higher taxes than was the case under white rule, with a proportional tax of 20 percent currently imposed on all incomes for this purpose. Furthermore, consumer taxes on certain items have been fixed. These fixed sales

taxes are regressive, since people with lower incomes spend a larger proportion of their wages on the taxed items. As well, greater emphasis on equality through a controlled tax policy for technocrats and elites may adversely affect motivation and the quality of services rendered by individuals.

Another role of the state identified by Almond and Powell is its distributive function[16], which essentially pertains to the provision of services such as health and education. In settler and independent Zimbabwe, the various governments performed this function by distributing funds and establishing development schemes in the major sectors of the economy. As with extractive activities, it is important to ascertain inequalities in the allocation of funds in order to determine groups that benefited most from the distributive process. Development can be said to have occurred only if there is progress towards parity in the state grants. Again the allocation of grants for African and European education systems serves as a good example of the distributive policies favored by the various administrations. Table three shows government expenditure on education for Africans and Europeans in the 1971 fiscal year.[17]

Evidently, the state spent nine times more on each white student than the amount it allocated for his African counterpart. This policy was justified by some government officials on the assumption that Europeans in Zimbabwe paid higher taxes than

Africans.[18] Because some scholars have supported this policy on the basis of the territory's tax structure, it is necessary to evaluate the validity of that practice. The higher taxes paid by white employees in relation to those levied from Africans should not be viewed as the main reason for explaining the ascriptive

TABLE III

Government Expenditure on European and African Education in 1971

Expenditure on:	European Education	African Education
Primary School Enrollment..........	40,094	639,043
Expenditure	$6,631,336	$11,931,625
Cost per primary pupil	$165.39	$18.67
Secondary School Enrollment...........	26,839	26,077
Expenditure	$8,068,680	$3,915,903
Cost per Secondary School pupil	$300.00	$150.16

SOURCE: Report on Education (Salisbury: Government of Rhodesia, 1971), p. 26.

nature of wages under the various settler administrations. This is shown by the fact that African university graduates were paid lower salaries than their European counterparts who had acquired the same training--a policy which indicates that the wages stipulated for Africans and Europeans in this category had a

political motive. The political objective behind this policy is evident, especially in light of the fact that the electoral system gave more clout to voters earning high incomes. As Nelson et al have observed with regard to the electoral system, "No racial test was applied, although the net effect, given the low level of income of all but very few Africans, was to make the upper level or 'A' role entirely white...."[19]

The concentration of educational and financial institutions in regions largely occupied by Europeans gave them an added advantage over Africans which was in turn reflected in wage disparities. Thus, the higher taxes paid by Europeans concealed the enormous disparities in the distribution of resources in urban and rural areas. Furthermore, the total amount of tax revenue paid by Africans far exceeded that derived from the white community that comprised only 5 percent of the population.

The initiative of the African government is difficult to quantify, since this study was completed only nine years after the present administration came to power. However, some tentative estimates can be made with regard to its performance in the distributive area, since a number of concrete changes have occurred as a result of its policies. These changes arose from an attempt to counteract most of the settler policies discussed above. Unlike the first Development Plan, which was cautious in implementing such changes, the Transitional Development Plan of

1982 to 1985 eradicated some of the inequalities reminiscent of the previous era. As in Quebec, where education was used as an instrument of social change, the first step taken in Zimbabwe was to centralize the power of the Ministry of Education. Thereafter, the ascriptive salary structures which the government had inherited were scrapped by creating identical salary structures for Africans and Europeans. A major shift occurred in favor of Africans in the distribution of grants for education from the public exchequer, as the government was keen to bolster skilled manpower required in the development of rural areas.[20] Apart from the changes in wage and funding policies, secondary education was expanded considerably as the government established new schools in rural areas. In 1982, for instance, the state embarked on a scheme that created forty government secondary schools in the District Councils in order to boost both social and economic transformation of these regions. This was an important strategy, since social programs such as the national literacy campaign and agricultural extension projects depended largely on the supply of secondary school graduates as teachers.

The development of literacy programmes shows the greater attention paid to the role of education in fostering the economic and ideological thrust advocated by the government. After independence, the government established the Adult Literacy Organization of Zimbabwe (ALOZ) to combat illiteracy that was

estimated in 1982 to be above the two million mark. This organization did not restrict its activities to providing adults with reading and writing skills; it also intended to make them functionally literate. This was a departure from the literacy campaigns of the pre-independence era which had limited objectives. Mission organizations, for example, had provided literacy projects that were primarily designed to make adults read the Scriptures. Likewise, most settler governments funded literacy campaign programs for the purpose of making Africans read official bulletins. Thus, both missions and settler governments overlooked the significance of integrating literacy and numeracy skills into economic programs. Their emphasis was on transforming the mind through the types of instruction they instituted.

But it should also be noted that the African administration equally uses literacy programs to inculcate its socialist ideology.[21] As a result the content emphasizes the political dimension necessary to instill the consciousness which the state believes is crucial to social and economic transformation. Functional literacy therefore has been designed to stress teaching farmers to read and comprehend instructions on fertilizer bags and to prepare simple agricultural accounts showing whether their transactions are yielding profit or loss. In addition, basic instruction is offered in safety education to farmers and individuals employed in the various industries. In most districts,

for instance, the government runs several projects in hygiene and nutritional education. Because of the shortage of qualified teachers and the existence of a large number of adults who desperately require the ALOZ programmes, the state supplements the face-to-face instruction with the use of electronic media and picture codes. While the use of radio and television for this purpose has led to the electrification of some rural areas, the importance attached to picture codes has resulted in an unprecedented production of posters and textbooks depicting the norms of industry and nationhood.[22]

Apart from delivering the above services, all states regulate the political behavior of individuals and social groups. In this study, the focus will be on finding out differences in the degree to which the governments controlled social and geographical mobility of the various nationalities under the settlers and after independence was achieved. But since much ground has been covered in these areas in the previous chapters, it will only be necessary to concentrate on those aspects of social control that have relevance to national policies in the period under review. For the purpose of brevity and specificity then, this investigation of the regulative performances of both settler and African administrations will briefly examine the social groups that were mostly controlled by the state and the devices that were used in conditioning them to conform to the political system established

by the respective governments.

As noted earlier, social control under settler administrations was directed toward Africans, who constituted a major threat to the established government. In addition, liberal whites who sympathized and supported the political aspirations of Africans were equally subjected to punitive treatment such as detention without trial or even deportation. Terrence Ranger, a prominent British lecturer in the territory, was one such victim who was banished from the territory for his indigenist interpretation of the development of African nationalism in Zimbabwe that was considered by the state to be subversive to political stability. Ranger had asserted in most of his publications that contemporary accounts of the causes of resistance to white rule were biased since they portrayed Africans as the aggressors in the uprisings of the 1890s discussed in chapter three. The expulsions of Europeans are an indication that besides controlling political views during this period, the state also regulated scholarship and institutions of higher learning which deviated from the diffusionist tradition.

Besides policing academic activities, the government watched the activities of some missionaries who supported the ideals of African nationalism. In the late 1970s many clergymen in this category, such as Bishop Lamont of the Anglican Church, were expelled from Zimbabwe for providing medical assistance to

nationalist guerillas and declaring support for African self-determination. The government was further disturbed by white journalists whose coverage of contemporary political developments the state considered to be subversive to its interests. Later, this led to the imposition of the Official Secrecy Act - a legislation that restricted the circulation of information considered dangerous to the welfare of the state. Both foreign and local journalists as well as civil servants were required to endorse the Act by signing a code of ethics governing their coverage of political developments.

In this light, it is possible to identify some of the restrictive devices that were used to achieve conformity to official policy. The pass system referred to elsewhere in this study was an effective instrument used in checking the migration of Africans from rural into urban areas, where unemployment had the potential of turning the towns into politically explosive communities. The mass media were also used successfully, not only to distort information available to foreign and local correspondents, but to curtail freedom of expression. As Franck Clements - a former white mayor of Harare during this period - has observed with respect to government control of the press, the escalation of censorship in the 1960s turned the territory's radio and television networks into a propaganda machine.[23] In the same period, state control of the press was translated into educational

practices which resulted in the introduction of distance education in primary and secondary schools throughout Zimbabwe. Radio programming for social studies, for instance, was the most dominant instrument used by the state in its attempt to contain nationalism. When the political conflict between Africans and Europeans turned into a fierce armed confrontation in the 1970s, state provision of political education for adults through the electronic media also increased dramatically. The intention was to portray African guerillas as terrorists whose objective was to create chaos in rural areas and transform the country into a communist state.

The regulative policies of the African government have their origins in nationalist reaction to settler policies. Whereas the aim of the white administration was to determine the political destiny of Africans, the nationalists were motivated by their desire to end European control of all social institutions. Once this goal was achieved, entrepreneurs and elites of the previous era were the next groups they sought to neutralize in the transition to socialism. In reality, however, the task of transforming Zimbabwean economy from its present structure to socialism has proven to be a difficult task, for unlike the simple economies of Mozambique and Tanzania, which were not firmly integrated into the international trade and commercial networks established by the former imperial nations, Zimbabwean economy is

more diversified and highly sophisticated. Along with the traditional links with South Africa, its trade partners include Britain and the United States, all of which process most of its crude minerals. An abrupt shift towards socialism therefore would not only alienate important trade partners, but could result in critical shortages of consumer goods and the foreign exchange revenue that is needed to adjust the economy from its unbalanced structure to a system that attempts to resolve the problem of regional inequalities.

More recently, dissidents have emerged as one of the groups posing a major problem to the African administration. The view presented here is that if the anti-government organizations and the state resolve their differences, the country could experience remarkable economic growth because the groups that are currently resisting its mandate to govern are also reluctant to implement its economic programmes. Up to now, the accord signed by ZAPU and ZANU leaders to resolve the dispute has not produced concrete results. The political solution explored by the parties in an attempt to alleviate the crisis so far needs to be supplemented by a more pragmatic educational strategy formulated by influential representatives of the dominant ethnic groups. The pertinent question to be addressed before making recommendations for instruction designed to promote national unity is whether coercion or consensus within the territory's political culture yields

unification. Another question that could be addressed through social studies curricula would focus on the experiences of other African nations in resolving civil strife since attaining independence. In the social studies syllabuses examined for this purpose, there was a marked absence of subject matter directed toward defusing the sort of ethnic tensions that are today the source of political instability and slow economic growth.

As a regulative exercise, the purging of elites of the previous era in Zimbabwe has been fairly accomplished mainly because the liberation movements were partly established for this purpose. In schools that were built by expatriate nationalist organizations in Mozambique and Zambia during the struggle for independence, for example, the content and community life were highly ideological and critical of the privileged middle and upper social classes. It was for this reason that the African government criticized privileged social mobility that was viewed by policymakers as a legacy of white rule. From their respective bases in Zambia and Mozambique, the liberation organizations pledged to maintain socialist principles by creating a non-elitist educational system in Zimbabwe fashioned after those they had established in exile. Most of the textbooks published by these organizations were intended to foster the spirit of the revolution.

An English Reader prescribed for ZANU schools in a military

base in Mozambique deserves attention since it shows the political background of students who had lived in refugee camps and top administrators in the independence government. The organization of the material in this reader is consistent with the evolution of the territory from conquest to the civil war. In recounting these developments, the publishers contrast the conflict arising from the aspirations of Africans and Europeans through antagonistic visual scenes of leading political figures in the crisis.[24] Another dominant feature of the content is that comprehension passages in the text do exalt the revolution as the most pragmatic approach to the consitutional stalemate. The vocabulary that was used to articulate these themes is highly emotive, since it was drawn from the harsh conditions existing in war zones in Zimbabwe and the Front Line States. In a unit dealing with confrontation between the guerillas and government forces, for example, hunger experienced by guerillas and ammunition fired by settler forces on the refugees are discussed.[25]

In a more comprehensive report outlining the adoption of these policies in the educational system, the ruling party explains some of the measures taken to neutralize former elites. One is the implemention of quantitative reforms at the primary level. The government increased enrollment for the school-going age from 43 percent at independence to 63 percent by 1981.[26] But it was expansion at the secondary and tertiary levels of education

that greatly reduced the purchasing power of academic credentials held by ex-colonial elites, since the influx of new graduates into the labor market greatly reduced the scarcity of educated people. Employers responded by lowering salaries to take advantage of the many unemployed graduates willing to work for whatever wages were offered. This bargaining power of employers was strengthened by the scarcity of jobs in the early 1980s, and a further influx of Western-educated Africans who inundated the labor market. Thus, the expansion of education and the return of African students from overseas assisted the government in curbing wages and emasculating the power of the elites. The rise of a new military class and public service personnel consisting mainly of ex-guerillas and Patriotic Front[27] supporters also helped to eclipse the elites.

Finally, Almond and Powell identified what they called symbolic performance[28] as one of the most important roles of the state. Although there are various forms of political symbolism outlined by the two authors, this discussion will focus on those aspects of political symbolism that were incorporated in curricula by settler and African governments as a vehicle for promoting their respective political ideologies. Under settler governments, monuments, national holidays and the courage shown by the Pioneer Column in occupying the country by force were the most cherished symbols of unity among Europeans. In most cities, the statue of Rhodes, who was instrumental in occupying Zimbabwe, was erected on

major streets for public viewing. Rhodes' image also appeared in textbooks and on most of the currency that was in circulation. The Matopo Hills where he was buried became an important shrine to which many schools were expected to organize educational excursions. In all schools, the country's history was dominated by several themes dealing with his important role in establishing British rule in Central Africa. Rhodes' great stature in Zimbabwe's political arena is shown by the fact that even his African adversaries acknowledged his significance as a beacon of unity and stability among the settlers, who otherwise could easily have been fragmented by the fact that they were drawn from various European communities. For that reason, many nationalists focused on attacking his political image by portraying him in readers[29] as the major source of the difficulties experienced by Africans.

Among Europeans, however, the image of Rhodes was held in high esteem; and as that of their national hero it improved immensely as the racial conflict progressed. In addition to ordering all schools to observe the 'Rhodes and Founders' national holiday, both African and European students were given instruction on how a courageous pioneer force assembled and despatched by Rhodes established peace and stability in Zimbabwe. Although European scholars in the territory often distorted facts about the impact of white settlement, it is true to say that to some extent the arrival of Europeans brought order and stability by

interrupting the existing ethnic conflicts. However, the stability resulting from the occupation was a temporary phenomenon, since a more violent confrontation between Africans and Europeans erupted in 1896. And even though following this a longer period of reasonable political stability appeared, the territory was again plunged into a fierce and costly war in the 1960s and 1970s.

In common with settler administrations, the African Government adopted political symbolism to enhance national solidarity. From the rise of nationalism in the 1950s, the Zimbabwe Ruins played an important symbolic role to successive generations of African nationalists. The massive ancient palace, which as seen in chapter two was built on granite rock near Masvingo, was at one point the political capital of the Rozvi Empire. This imposing structure continued to be the focus of academic controversy between African and white scholars in the country. As seen earlier, before such methods as carbon-dating and oral tradition confirmed that the Great Zimbabwe was produced by African ingenuity, Europeans had strongly maintained that its architectural design could not be correlated to geometrical signs known to Africans prior to European occupation. They had concluded that either the Arabs or Phoenicians had built the ruins. Such controversy improved the image of the ancient palace, since Africans were proud to be associated with its construction. The interest of foreign academics in this debate was sustained up

to the 1970s, and added an international dimension to the status of the Great Zimbabwe. All these developments prompted the nationalists to dispute the term 'Rhodesia' when referring to the territory. They proclaimed that 'Zimbabwe' was the most appropriate name - one which the new state ultimately took as its own.

The educational ramifications of the new evidence about the origins of the ruins were immense. Introduction of the new data boosted self-esteem among African students, particularly because the political climate prevailing under white rule often shattered their confidence to learn, especially since diffusionist subject matter frequently attributed anything of such importance to external origins. Confirmation of Africans as builders of the ruins prompted them to view the past as one in which their ancestors had exhibited great wisdom. The psychological impact of this evidence was shown by the jail terms imposed by settler governments on anyone heard referring to the state as Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, these administrations permitted both African and European schools to organize educational tours to the ruins. But despite allowing these excursions, the governments prevented the new evidence from filtering into subject matter taught in the schools. Except at the university level, where African students had access to the discoveries, the dissemination of new facts about the Great Zimbabwe was through open-air mass political

rallies.

Besides viewing the ancient site as a great national
treasure, the African government has elevated some of the
distinguished political martyrs to national prominence. The most
outstanding heroes in the development of national liberation today
are Nehanda and her acolyte Kaguvi, political legends to Africans
in Zimbabwe whom readers have already encountered in detail in
chapter three of this study. As will be recalled, it was their
articulation of African religion that welded the rival ethnic
groups into a cohesive military force that resisted white rule in
1896. As a result, the resistance movement of that year formed the
nucleus of the political culture of the liberation organizations
in the territory. After independence, that culture began to weaken
European values, since the success of the revolution implied the
triumph of African customs under the auspices of the Mwari
religion. As one ZANU document puts it:

> It is this role of maintaining social cohesion which is
> of significance when looking at traditional religion,
> rather than its theological beliefs. This is clearly
> borne out by the history of the Zimbabwe struggle, where
> one of the towering figures of our struggle was a spirit
> medium Mbuya Nehanda and her acolyte Kaguvi who inspired
> the 1896 Chimurenga.[30]

The guerillas who died during the war of independence are
today seen as disciples of the spirit medium of the 1890s. In
order to extol their political image, their bodies were exhumed

from the Front Line States after independence and buried in an area specifically reserved for national heroes. In addition, a national holiday was established by an Act of Parliament to recognize their contribution to African self-determination. Indeed these ex-guerillas, some of whom are cabinet ministers in the government today, have emerged to form a reference group replacing its white predecessors. Various cultural changes arising from the influence of this group can be cited to demonstrate its impact on education. A case in point is the reforms introduced in the nutrition syllabus for secondary schools. Contrary to curriculum developers of the previous era whose focus was on teaching students to prepare European dishes, the new course combines both African and Western food items. As this syllabus clearly states, one of the major objectives of the course is to teach students how to prepare local and foreign meals.[31] The incorporation in the syllabus of instruction on how to prepare African dishes such as okra, and traditional soft drinks[32] formerly despised by colonial elites, is due to the influence of the nationalist culture which espouses the values of the past.

Besides influencing reforms in the nutrition syllabus, the former guerillas are responsible for changes that have occurred in clothing and musical tastes. During the greater part of white rule, Western-type dress was seen as a mark of sophistication and modernity. Today this is no longer the case, as nationalists have

provided leadership in promoting the values of African personality that are shown in clothing fashions. This is also the case with a new appreciation of African songs and dances that has arisen, that were often associated with religious and economic backwardness. However, there is no cause to believe that the surge of interest in traditional customs is about to eliminate the social structure created by Europeans because while the elites of the independence era have provided leadership for the cultural renaissance, they had greatly internalized the norms of the technological culture introduced by Europeans.

Development Strategies and Education Under Settler and African Governments

In the earlier survey of educational innovations in the various countries, it was established that the changes that occurred resulted from internal and external conflicts impinging on the school systems. The reform of secondary education in Quebec, for example, was a response to the cultural conflict emerging between French and English Canadians. In Tanzania as well, the policies of the post-independence government stemmed from the political rivalry between Africans and colonial administrators.   The intensity of the conflict between Africans and Europeans in Tanzania, however, was mild when compared to the violent confrontation of the October Crisis of 1970 in Quebec. Yet despite this difference, the educational reforms adopted in

Tanzania were far more radical. Not only was the status of Swahili promoted in the cultural domain and academic circles, as was the case with French in Quebec, but the state also moved swiftly to nationalize the Tanzanian economy in the late 1960s.

Although the racial crisis in Zimbabwe was the most violent of any examined to this point, the educational reforms resulting from the political turmoil to date are the least dramatic. For example, unlike the secondary schools in Quebec and the United States which experienced concrete reforms as the result of the respective national crises, the greater amount of innovations made in Zimbabwe have been largely administrative and structural. When reforms were introduced in American education as a result of the Sputnik, they transformed both teaching methods and the content of curricula. In independent Zimbabwe, there has been little attempt to overhaul the existing approaches to pedagogy in order to adapt them to the cultural environment of the new state. Furthermore, although some reforms already mentioned have been introduced in social studies and nutrition courses, these changes were made in a way that did not undermine the existing international characteristics of instruction, particularly at the secondary level of education, where the external links are still quite strong.

Many reasons for maintaining the content of secondary school curricula introduced by Europeans can be established. The

persistence of affiliations with the Cambridge University syndicate which sets and marks the examinations presents obstacles to reforms anticipated by the African government. Thus, although some reforms have been implemented in primary schools and at lower levels of secondary education such as Forms One and Two which are examined locally, the overseas examinations format for Forms Four and Six still dictates the general scope of instruction at every level of education. The desire to protect the quality of instruction during the transitional period was a major influence on the decision to maintain the overseas relations. To some extent this was a good strategy, since the expansion of education that followed independence led to the hiring of many untrained teachers. The Cambridge examinations system was thus a device that protected educational standards as only those students who demonstrated academic rigor succeeded. Another reason for maintaining the overseas affiliations stemmed from the fact that in order to secure the confidence of Europeans, it was necessary to maintain an educational system with standards they accepted. The abrupt shift toward a national examination system that took place in some African countries at independence, had the potential of increasing the exodus of Europeans with valuable skills.

The persistence of a British system of education in Zimbabwe is also partly due to the strong influence of Western educational models on the schools of peripheral countries. When historical

relations exist between an emergent and a developed nation, the education system of the developed nation is often retained by the emergent state through its schools. The degree to which a developing nation retains the educational legacy of an advanced nation is sometimes determined by the extent to which it is industrialized. For instance, whereas the most advanced African nations have educational institutions that are closely linked to those of Western nations, the less developed nations exhibit weaker links. The existence of more powerful Western-type social institutions and elites who have acquired European values in the relatively advanced nations accounts for the intimate relations with Western schools. It is for this reason that policymakers in an advanced African country like Zimbabwe find it more difficult to reform its educational system than their counterparts in less developed nations like Tanzania and Mozambique.

Another conclusion that can be drawn here is that international conflict results in more radical reforms, particulary if the conflict involves world powers, as seen in the impact of the Sputnik on American education. In the Napoleonic period in Europe, for instance, the humiliation of Prussia in 1806 led to the modernization of German universities. As well, the major reforms implemented in Chinese education in this century arose from similar international rivalry, first with the United States and later with the Soviet Union. Again, Cuba in the 1960s

introduced radical innovations in its schools because of the missile crisis and the ideological conflict with the United States. Although Zimbabwe is a small state when compared with China and the United States, the internal conflict which it experienced in the period under review had international connotations which influenced the reforms implemented at independence. Thus, it is important to examine the relationship between Education and Development under African and settler governments in both local and international contexts.

In chapter five of this study, it was stated that development in Zimbabwe should be gauged primarily in the light of the ability of the economy to reduce inequality in access to wage employment and other factors of production which generate income. One of the advantages of securing wage employment is that it allows individuals to purchase goods and services required to sustain a basic and decent existence. In addition, the ownership of land capable of yielding crops beyond the subsistence level improves the quality of life for every household that sells its surplus to the nation's Grain Marketing Board. In cases where individuals own very little land or have failed to secure a job in the modern sector, village polytechnics should be established in order to maximize the participation of a nation's manpower in the economy. Such small-scale industries should emphasize teaching how to produce articles that are oriented toward the tourist industry

rather than the domestic market, if they are to fetch good prices. Again political stability is a prerequisite for the success of this type of scheme, as tourists are often reluctant to vacation in countries where their security is at risk.

One of the greatest advantages of small-scale industries is that such economic activity can be translated into educational experiences. When examining the relationship between education and the development strategies, therefore, it is important to ascertain the degree to which the above economic activities were linked to instruction and the social structure in general. And in order to determine those links, it is important to trace the evolution of the training and recruitment of labor under the various governments.

Before independence, the training of individuals for jobs in the country's economy was as seen above based on the dual policy[33] that differentiated between the skills considered appropriate for Africans and Europeans. From 1903 onwards, the government articulated this policy by appointing H.S. Keigwin, the first Director of African Development, who as seen in chapter four, pioneered in formulating a theory of industrial education for Africans. Keigwin's policy culminated in the setting up of Domboshawa Training Institute in 1921 - a government school that offered agricultural, building, and carpentry instruction to Africans from the various parts of Zimbabwe. It should be noted

that the type of industrial education offered at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo - a similar government foundation established in 1922- was rudimentary in order not to present standards of instruction which threatened the careers of Europeans. It was for this reason that the typical occupational destinations of graduates from these institutions were the rural areas and the mining and forestry regions, where the interests of white tradesmen was weak. Even so, it was customary to reserve posts for Europeans in firms that were established outside the cities.

An important observation that has come to light while examining government policies between 1897 and 1930 is that the dual system which guaranteed higher educational standards for Europeans played the role taken later by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1930, which imposed barriers on Africans wishing to acquire technical skills. The new industrial training institutions established by the state cooled off the pressure from Africans who demanded the provision of higher technical education equal to that offered in European schools. The fact that the government began providing secondary education to Africans after this Act was firmly in place, shows that prior to its operation a rigid approach in the distribution of core skills protected official policy. The general attitude of white settlers during the first decade of this period was resentful of any proposal for providing Africans with more than a basic industrial education.

Their approach to the status of Africans in the country's economy was that those who gained employment in the modern sector should primarily be supportive of Europeans. When asked to express his opinion on skills to be acquired by Africans, for instance, one European settler explained this policy as "A systematic training in household work or agriculture...."[34]

Missionary organizations in the territory supported the policy of providing Africans with instruction that was inferior to that offered to Europeans. In fact, most of them opposed the establishing of government schools for fear that there was a danger of these institutions producing Africans with a secular rather than a religious view of life.[35] It is interesting to note that the missionaries did not express this concern when the government set up schools for Europeans.

Besides providing instruction in the Three Rs, mission schools offered sound training in agricultural, building, and carpentry skills which was to some extent influenced by the educational ideology of the Phelps-Stokes Commission. This body had concluded that Africans should be trained to develop rural areas by acquiring basic skills in industrial, crop husbandry, land management and community health education. Thus, rather than emphasizing intellectual instruction, the curriculum eatblished by the Phelps-Stokes officers was basically vocational in nature. It should be stressed, however, that the educational theories

advanced by the missions and the commission for African schools in Zimbabwe had already been formulated by Keigwin, as seen elsewhere in this study.

During the height of settler nationalism in the 1960s, the policy of separate development was revived and adopted with vigor, particularly at the secondary level of education. The government stipulated that only 12 1/2 percent of African students from primary schools should proceed to academic secondary schools while 37 1/2 percent of this group were to be provided with Junior Secondary Education[36]--education that had a strong vocational emphasis. Although some writers praised this policy as being consistent with international trends toward industrial education,[37] the real motive in Zimbabwe was to provide Africans with an education that did not improve their franchise, since the weight of votes was determined by high academic credentials and property acquired by individuals.

Before making comparisons about the impact of such policies on the dispersal of Africans and Europeans in the territory's economy, it is necessary to review briefly the nature of education provided to Europeans. From the establishment of the first secondary school for the settlers in 1896, the curriculum for European schools differed greatly from the instruction catered for in African schools. The St. George Jesuit College established in Harare that year reflected this distinction, especially in its

role as an institution set up to produce students with a strong military background required by the young settler community. This has prompted one writer to suggest that "Military-style activities continued to play a prominent part in the life of the school during the years which followed."[38]

In 1936, the Fox Commission recommended the setting up of a tripartite secondary school system consisting of academic, technical and modern streams.[39] But except for the one technical school established in 1927 in Bulawayo, which offered building, engineering and commercial courses, secondary education in Zimbabwe remained highly academic due to professional and administrative careers that were held in high esteem. Later, however, expansion in technical education elsewhere supplemented the Bulawayo program. The result was the founding of the Harare Polytechnic - the largest and most diversified institution of this type in the territory. Besides these arrangements, a large number of Europeans had access to the National Technical Certificate program offered by South African educational institutions, which in accordance with that country's official policy of separate development did not admit Africans.

In 1979, the government attempted to make artificial changes by creating a single Ministry of Education to replace the dual system. This was prompted by nationalist pressure that had resulted in the formation of the transitional government of Bishop

Muzorewa. In keeping with the new spirit of compromise, the first African Minister of Education was appointed in the same year. The government introduced an Education Act that was intended to satisfy the new spirit of racial integration. The Act divided schools into three categories: state, community, and private schools.[40] State schools were further subdivided into three groups corresponding to the old system of European, Asian and Colored, and African government schools. This division reflected the fee structure of the new system which actually enhanced the old racial boundaries regarding access to high quality instruction. Other legal structures preventing the criss-crossing of the races into the various educational categories were the residential requirements, which stipulated that for parents to enroll their children in schools outside their communities, they had to live and own homes near the schools.[41] In view of the fact that the Land Appointment Act that was still in place had allocated separate residential areas for Africans and Europeans, it was difficult for students to enroll at schools outside their designated regions. Further obstacles to student mobility were imposed by a clause in the Act that authorized headmasters to determine admissibility of students on the basis of age, academic performance, and language proficiency.[42]

Despite these obstacles, Europeans began to experience considerable competition from Africans. In particular, the

expansion of technical instruction at all levels of education begin to have an impact on how African school leavers gained more representation in technical employment. This was partly due to the strengthening of technical instruction in the former Junior Secondary Schools created by the Judges Commission. But of greater importance was the decline in racial discrimination that allowed Africans in the 1970s to filter into technical fields formerly reserved for Europeans. Enrollment figures at the University

TABLE IV

Enrollment Statistics for Post-Secondary Institutions
Indicating Distribution of Africans and Europeans in 1977

Institution	No. of Students	Africans
University of Rhodesia	1,506	55%
Harare Polytechnic	1,936	10%
Bulawayo Technical College	700	40%

SOURCE: Roger Riddell, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Education for Employment, (Gwelo: Mambo Press, 1980), p. 28.

of Rhodesia, the Bulawayo Technical College, and the Harare Polytechnic - the three major institutions providing technical education - reflected this trend. In 1977, for instance, enrollment statistics for these institutions were beginning to show improvement in African representation, as shown in Table Four.

In concluding this chapter, it is necessary to summarize the role played by education in selecting and recruiting manpower in the economy. As seen throughout this study, pre-independence education in Zimbabwe was highly elitist and ascriptive. By contrast, the post-independence educational system is so far a progressive one directed toward reducing inequalities. However, the full impact of the new policies has yet to be seen as a longer period is required in order to make objective judgments on how unemployment and inequalities have declined since independence.

In the first two decades of white rule, agriculture and mineral extraction - the chief primary industries - did not rely much on local schools to provide manpower as employers recruited both skilled and semi-skilled labor from overseas and the neighboring African countries. This changed after the educational systems for Africans and Europeans were firmly established. In agriculture, the setting up of Domboshawa and Tjolotjo training centres for Africans on one hand, and Gwebi agricultural college for Europeans on the other, symbolized the racial division of labor in that industry, particularly because entrance requirements into European colleges were much higher than those for admission into the African agricultural schools. So, whereas graduates from the white agricultural colleges secured jobs as managers on commercial farms and forestry estates owned by the government and the British South Africa Company, their African counterparts were

largely dispersed in rural areas where they worked as community health and agricultural advisors. And when the territory's university began to offer degrees in agriculture, most of its graduates were Europeans. The outcome was an agricultural structure characterized by the dispersal of highly qualified European soil and plant scientists into rich farmland, and poorly trained Africans into arid farmland, respectively. In this regard, the training policies were governed by inequalities in the distribution of land. A final ramification appeared as the differences in land allocation and training were further replicated in the quality of agricultural produce and the standard of living experienced by Africans and Europeans.

The mining industry was also stratified, due to educational policies and salary structures that were highly selective and ascriptive. In fact, disparities in the possession of appropriate skills were much sharper in this sector than in agriculture because of the dearth of institutions offering technical training and the impact of the Industrial Conciliation Act, which strictly controlled the admission of Africans into high level technical institutions. One important result of the emergence of this industry was the rise of an African working class that gradually lost some of its traditional values as a result of leaving the barter system and entering into a monetized economy. This mobility of African labor gave rise to sharp class differences in mining

communities stemming from enormous gaps in salaries and technical skills acquired by Africans and Europeans. When these policies were moderated toward the end of white rule, the gaps gradually ceased to widen, more so as technical institutions began to integrate their training programs. Liberal hiring policies in this era further led to an erosion of white monopoly of managerial and other top occupations.[43]

In the secondary industry, the relationship between education and recruitment practices was comparable to that in the primary sector. Due to their lack of technical skills, most African employees were over-represented in the semi-skilled occupation category.[44] Even today, the legacy of colonial education policies is responsible for the large number of Africans occupying the lower stratum of the manufacturing industry. In that era, for example, while Africans in the construction industry had been trained as brick-layers or journeymen; it was rare to find Europeans utilizing these skills, for they were more often placed at the top of the occupational hierarchy where they were employed as architects or draftsmen. The same conditions prevailed in the processing industry, where Europeans dominated the upper echelons. Because the settlers monopolized the scarce middle and high-level technical skills required in processing crude minerals into finished products, their salaries and positions in the conglomerates that carried out these operations were high. By

contrast, few Africans were capable of conducting simple operations in a blast furnace; let alone handling complex procedures in vehicle assembly plants. These technical deficiencies combined with the ascriptive forces prevailing in many industrial organizations to produce racially stratified occupational structures throughout the territory.

The tertiary sector was the most elitist of all, since the territory's 'intellectual aristocracy' preferred to compete for posts in the public service sector rather than elsewhere in the economy. This was because the higher prestige accorded to the civil service attracted the most qualified individuals, as it does today. Accordingly, the majority of candidates who applied for vacant posts in this sector were university graduates possessing impressive academic credentials. Due to this criterion of selection, few Africans qualified for positions in government departments. A further reason that prevented Africans from securing top posts was the Public Service Act of 1931, which excluded them from qualifying for tenure in any category of that sector.[45] These constraints were responsible for producing a labor structure which showed Europeans dominating top administrative and technical positions and Africans filling the least prestigious posts. The lower social stratum occupied by Africans, however, was to a great extent caused by ascriptive rather than the highly selective educational system, since the modern sector of the

economy was protected from African competition by the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Act erected insurmountable barriers even to highly-educated Africans aspiring to top posts. Only its removal could have allowed education to play its selective and allocative roles unhindered.

Another reason why Africans were pushed down the social scale was the policy of recruiting cheap indigenous labor from the surrounding territories of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. While African labor organizations in Zimbabwe demanded higher salaries, migrant workers from these territories were willing to work for wages that were far below the basic income demanded by the country's nationals. Consequently, employers were able to keep wages at a minimum level, due to the influx of foreigners that gave entrepreneurs a strong bargaining position.

As shown clearly when dealing with the role of the state in the independence era, one of the major goals of the African government which took power in 1980 was to rescind the ascriptive occupational structure created by Europeans. The degree to which this goal has been achieved varies from one sector to another. In the primary industry, the administrative and recruitment changes made are fairly modest because of the nature of that industry which demands large capital outlay and technical expertise to operate efficiently. As a result, the mining sector is still mostly controlled by Europeans, although African prospectors have

joined this industry since independence.

There is no doubt that the demise of the Industrial Conciliation Act and other pieces of repressive legislation has been responsible for the reorganization of the whole occupational structure. A case in point is the Education Amendment Act of 1981, which revoked certain clauses of the 1979 Education Act and its intent to maintain a segregated school system. The 1981 Act rendered official discrimination in education void.[46] In general, therefore, these reforms have contributed to the hiring of Africans possessing high academic and technical qualifications. Nonetheless, the current labor structure in Zimbabwe cannot be entirely attributed to post-independence reforms in education, for it stemmed partly from nationalist policies formulated during the struggle for independence, and partly from the African families who educated their children overseas in the 1960s and 1970s.

Most Africans who occupy high positions in the processing and manufacturing industries today belong to these groups. Because of the shortage of higher institutions of learning and settler policies that limited access to commercial and industrial training, those African families who could, along with political organizations, sponsored students to study outside the country. Since Britain and the United States were popular destinations, almost every large educational, industrial, or political organization is now dominated by graduates from these countries.

Nationalist organizations had a dual approach when it came to educational preference for their supporters. Whereas the Patriotic Front sponsored students to acquire managerial and technical training in Western countries, they also sent large numbers of Africans to Warsaw Pact countries and China for military and ideological training. Today the army and the police force are mostly controlled by these people. On the other hand, the public service is mainly staffed by Western-educated party members who are loyal to the official ideology.

What this shows is that since independence, there has been an active policy of Africanizing labor in all sectors of the economy. However, the present generation of elites does not consist of graduates of the educational system of the independence era. In the next chapter, it will be necessary to evaluate the relationship between education and political as well as economic development in the light of the conflict between African and settler nationalism.

NOTES

1 Jerome S. Bruner, <u>The Process of Education</u> (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 1.

2 Ibid., pp. 11-15.

3 Alphonse Marie Parent, <u>Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec Part II</u> (Quebec City: Pierre Des Marais Printer, 1964), p. 4.

4 Ibid., p. 125.

5 Paul Gallagher, "Power and Participation in Educational Reform," <u>McGill Journal of Education</u> VII (Fall, 1972):152-153.

6 The study is cited in William Johnson's article "Francophones Have Closed Income Gap," <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, 20th January, 1984, p. 5.

7 UNESCO, <u>Final Report on the Meeting of African Ministers of Education, 26-30, March, 1962</u>, p. 17.

8 Anthony R. de Souza and Philip W. Porter, <u>The Underdevelopment and Modernization of the Third World</u> (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1974), pp. 40-52.

9 James R. Sheffield et al., <u>Agriculture in African Secondary Schools: Case Studies of Botswana, Kenya and Tanzania</u> (New York: The African-American Institute, 1976), p. 51.

10 Walter Rodney, <u>How Europe Underdeveloped Africa</u> (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing Company, 1972), p. 247.

11 Julius K. Nyerere, "Education for Self-Reliance," in <u>Tanzania: Revolution by Education</u>, ed. Idrian N. Resnick (Arusha: Longmans of Tanzania Ltd., 1986), p. 57.

12 James Bryant Conant, <u>The American High School Today: A First Report to Interested Citizens</u> (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 49.

13 Jeffrey Herold, "Sputnik in American Education: A History and Reappraisal," <u>McGill Journal of Education</u> IX No. 2 (Fall, 1974):149.

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15 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, <u>Comparative Politics</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 286-287.

16 Ibid., pp. 298-307.

17 The table is compiled by B. J. Dorsey, "The African School Leaver," in <u>Education, Race and Employment</u>, ed. M. W. Murphree (Salisbury: Mardon Printers, 1975), p. 54.

18 Ibid., p. 53.

19 Harold Nelson et al., <u>Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia</u> (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 157.

20 Republic of Zimbabwe, <u>Transitional National Development Plan 1982/83 - 1984/85 Vol. I</u> (Harare: Government Printer, 1982), p. 90.

21 Ibid., p. 92.

22 United States Agency for International Development Project Report, "Adult Literacy Organization of Zimbabwe, 1981," Appendix 2, pp. 1-3. (Mimeographed).

23 Franck Clements, <u>Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society</u> (London: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 212.

24 Zimbabwe African National Union, <u>English Reader, Grade III</u> (Maputo: Zimbabwe African National Union Department of Education and Culture, 1979), pp. 1-18.

25 Ibid., p. 11.

26 Foundation for Education with Production, <u>Education and Culture for Liberation in Southern Africa</u> (Gaberone: Gaberone Printing Works, 1981), p. 20.

27 The Patriotic Front was a political alliance formed by President Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo during the struggle for independence to neutralize moderate African political parties compromising for an internal settlement with Mr. Smith.

28 Almond and Powell, <u>Comparative Politics</u>, pp. 286-287.

29 The picture of Rhodes appeared in Readers and periodicals

published by liberation movements to remind guerillas about the origin of the conflict. For example, Rhodes' picture is reproduced by the Zimbabwe African National Union cited above in English Reader, Grade III, p. 2.

30 Foundation for Education with Production, Education and Culture for Liberation in Southern Africa, pp. 78-79.

31 Ministry of Education and Culture, Zimbabwe Junior Certificate Cookery and Nutrition Syllabus, Forms I and II (Harare: Curriculum Development Unit, 1984), p. 1.

32 Ibid., p. 1.

33 Norman Atkinson, Teaching Rhodesians (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1972), pp. 11-12.

34 Comments made by a Resident Commissioner cited by Atkinson, ibid., p. 90.

35 Ibid., p. 101.

36 Ibid., p. 186.

37 For example, Atkinson is impressed by this scheme, yet the real motive was to allocate a quota of African students enrolled in the academic stream of secondary education. The scheme was not universal, appling only to African post-primary graduates. See ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 32.

39 Ibid., p. 75.

40 Ministry of Education and Culture, Zimbabwe: Review of Education 1959-1979, Current Problems and Prospects for the Next 20 Years. Paper Prepared for MINEDAF V Conference of Ministers of Education and Those Responsible for Economic Planning of African Member States on Education Policy and Cooperation, 29th June to 3rd July, 1982 (Harare: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1982), p. 9.

41 Ibid., p. 11.

42 Government of Rhodesia, Education Act, 1979 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1979), p. 178.

43 Murphree et al., Education, Race and Employment in

Rhodesia, p. 213.

44 Ibid., p. 296.

45 Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 62.

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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The Effect of Settler Nationalism on Educational, Political and Economic Development Before Independence

As this final chapter will examine the relationship between education and economic as well as political development in Zimbabwe, it is helpful to consider first the significance of Kwong's contention regarding the forces which determine a nation's educational system. As seen in chapter one, her research concluded that the hegemonic group which controlled the Chinese economy and the state apparatus also dominated education through its ideology, which provided a mediating link between these social institutions.[1]

However, the differences that existed in the social structures of both countries make it necessary to exercise caution in relating Kwong's assertion to the development of education in Zimbabwe. In the first place, while economic development was an important feature of official policy in China, the Rhodesian regime clearly adopted a stronger economic ideology than the Asian nation. For example, whereas the Chinese hierarchy combined political and economic strategies to achieve national development, the Rhodesian settlers established a political superstructure that was inspired by economic motives.[2] The degree to which economic motives determined the dominant ideology among the settlers became

evident early in the colonial era when the potential of a massive
northward migration of South African labor force and companies
diffused conflicts between Dutch and English settlers in the young
state.[3] As a result there emerged potent settler nationalism that
prompted Europeans to reject amalgamation with the Union of South
Africa formed in 1910. Also, the demands of the settlers'
delegates to the Lancaster House Conference of 1979 attempted to
resolve the constitutional crisis in a way that further reveals
the degree to which the economic ideology was given priority. It
was economic rather than political issues that stalled the talks
due to representatives of the settlers who were reluctant to
accede to the terms of the accord until clauses safeguarding the
status quo of the territory's economic structure were included in
the agreement. It was when this condition was met that Ian Smith
was able to sell the accord to the settlers. What is being
stressed here is that under European rule, the state apparatus and
political developments were influenced by the ideology of separate
development which found expression in economic nationalism.

By contrast, although bureaucrats in China also introduced
policies that were designed to attain economic development, there
was less disparity in the emphasis given to the economy and the
political superstructure as their objective was to create a
socialist state in which the vast majority of people were expected
to achieve economic parity. This was different from the objectives

of settler development policies which sought to accentuate social inequality as revealed in the economic policies examined in chapter five.[4] In particular, the 'African factor' in a society governed by the settler minority and the fact that Europeans had come to Zimbabwe primarily for economic reasons, added strength to the economic ideology to the extent that could not be matched by a homogeneous nation such as the People's Republic of China with its more egalitarian ideals. In this light and using Kwong's terms of reference, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the hegemonic group that controlled the economy in Rhodesia was more visible and stronger than its Chinese counterpart.

Another difference was that the policies of the hegemonic groups in the two societies were implemented when these countries were at different stages of development. To illustrate, unlike the Chinese authorities who introduced their policies to an economic system that had acquired considerable Western influence, the Rhodesian settlers imposed their rule on a pre-capitalist society. The result was that even though they initially failed to secure the support of Africans, who violently opposed their rule and still adhered to the values of the precolonial society described in chapter two, they were more successful in implementing their policies once the resistance was suppressed as confirmed by the reformist politics of the 1920s.

The economic superiority which the settlers enjoyed in

Zimbabwe was the result of the development strategies that were designed to secure their control of the economy. As was shown in chapter five, the economic structure[5] that emerged in the territory was due to a series of laws that were codified to establish European dominance over the African population. Beginning in 1930, the Land Apportionment Act that legalized geographical segregation of the races assigned the most fertile land to Europeans while it allocated the least productive areas to Africans.[6] Four years later, the Industrial Conciliation Act that reserved most of the crucial occupations in the modern sector to Europeans came into effect.[7] Even as late as 1969, the Land Tenure Act that was enforced that year was an improved version of the above Acts; not only because it reaffirmed these laws, but because it was the most restrictive legislation to affect the division of land and labor between Africans and Europeans.

This has been evident from the survey of the development policies adopted by the settler administration, which has revealed a strong relationship between the emerging economic structure and the educational policies adopted by the colonial state. In the early 1920s, for instance, the low-level trade schools for Africans established at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo[8] differed from the advanced technical colleges attended by Europeans: for whereas graduates of the trade schools were dispersed in the lower levels of the economy, those who completed the requirements set by the

colleges were placed at the top of the occupational hierarchy. Also, the education plan circulated by Britain to its colonial dependencies in Africa in 1925 was adapted to the territory's unique economic ideology. The Bulawayo Technical College for Europeans established in 1927, for instance, was intended to reinforce the policy of separate development.[9]

But although these developments reveal a link between the educational and economic policies that were formulated, it was the marriage of the Land Apportionment Act to the Industrial Conciliation Act in the early 1930s which legalized the relationship between the two sectors. As one distinguished scholar of this period has so aptly declared, these two pieces of legislation firmly established a pattern of social and economic organization in the territory[10] through the regulation of educational and economic institutions. The fact that this relationship was protected by law even made it impossible for the liberal government of Sir Garfield Todd to deviate from the basic philosophy of the Rhodesian school system[11] in the 1950s. This was also the case with the territorial government of Sir Edgar Whitehead which established the Junior Secondary Schools to provide low-level technical instruction to African students, in contrast to the more advanced institutions for Europeans.

The policy of maintaining a dual educational system which differed in the quality of the programs they offered and the

economic sectors they served, even defied the logic of the Central African Federation which was established as a multiracial experiment since most of the policies that were introduced contradicted its ideal of partnership between Africans and Europeans.[12] Contrary to what one might expect of the spirit behind the formation of the federal state, the gap between African and European education was widened by the fact that African education remained under the jurisdiction of the territorial government, whereas European education became a federal responsibility.[13] Although neither level of government could adequately justify this policy, it is reasonable to conclude that it was prompted by the emergence of the federation, which allowed for the creation of a larger budget for education. Enhancing this policy was the fact that revenue from Zambian copper was allocated to develop federal projects and institutions located in Zimbabwe including the university, hospitals, and schools. While this unbalanced funding disproportionately increased the number of Europeans who entered into elite occupations,[14] the creation of Junior Secondary Schools in 1962 was responsible for the production and dispersal of their graduates, together with extension officers, into the council system established in that decade. Again, this illustrates that the ideology of separate development was maintained even under the federal system of partnership.

However, the data analyzed for this study has confirmed that the most extreme measures in this direction were taken in 1965 following the declaration of independence. As will be recalled from the discussion of the legal reforms that were adopted in chapter three, this period saw the unprecedented articulation of the ideology of separate development which epitomized the peak of settler nationalism. Since the objective was to eliminate loopholes that had allowed employers, the business community, and religious organizations to abuse the Land Apportionment Act governing the status of Africans in European residential areas, two major pieces of legislation were introduced to resolve the situation.

Initially, the Municipal Act of 1967 began to segregate public facilities in areas that were administered by the local government. But it was the Land Tenure Act[15] of 1969 which made it possible for Europeans to realize their dream of living in a country where a radical policy of separate development was a reality rather than an ideal as before. As early as 1962, the adoption of the recommendations of the Judges Commission that was instrumental to the creation of the Junior Secondary Schools had pointed in this direction since they only affected African education. Also in the early 1960s, the revival of the old council system established in 1937 inaugurated a period of[16] continuous alienation of Africans from urban areas. Finally, when the Land

Tenure Act came into effect, it was illegal for Africans to reside in European suburbs. Even though its direct impact on higher education was minimal since African students attending the university were exempted from complying with this law, the legislation affected the children of domestic workers attending school in African townships as it basically required Africans to live in the suburbs for the purpose of working.

There is also evidence that in addition to the major organs of government such as the army, the police force, the media, and the legal system used to administer the territory, Rhodesian schools contributed significantly to the political stability which the settlers needed to achieve their economic objectives. Partly due to the effect of the diffusionist subject matter that permeated the educational system, the resistance to settler colonialism that had dominated a greater part of the 1890s disappeared in the first half of the 20th century as Africans conformed to a world view that was consistent with European values.[17] The impact of the advanced technology introduced by Europeans which improved the lives of many Africans further reinforced the role of schools as agents of political socialization. As a result, until the 1950s when the education acquired in Rhodesian schools began to stimulate an African renaissance,[18] the material found in social studies curricula which often placed European values above African culture was not

critically examined. But as will be seen later, the revival of interest in the values of the precolonial era encompassing the Mutapa and Rozvi Empires described in chapter two, which stemmed from knowledge of the development of similar movements in Europe, began to undermine the relationship between education and the political superstructure.

There was however a difference in the emphasis placed on education as an agent of political socialization in China and in Zimbabwe during the settler period. For although education indeed played an important role in the development of the territory's political culture, it did not reach the same level of indoctrination attained by Chinese education in its attempt to transform the ideology of the population.[19] For example, the Chinese system was based on the relationship between a Marxist ideology and the communes that were established to develop rural areas during the GLF era, whereas the Rhodesian Government delegated its educational responsibilities in that sector to voluntary organizations which implemented a system inspired by the policy aimed at adapting education to the needs of rural areas originated by H. S. Keigwin as argued in chapter four.[20] Even so, the impact of education in transforming the rural economy in China surpassed the effect of Rhodesian schools because unlike the settlers who emphasized formal instruction for young people, Chinese authorities developed a system for every adult living in

the communes. The result was that, due to the utilitarian bias of instruction offered in the communes and the strong political ideology which reinforced it, Chinese education was more successful in transforming the rural areas than the Rhodesian system.

There were also limitations to the degree by which Rhodesian schools could have been used to enhance the local political ideology, especially in the post-war era when the Cambridge School Certificate syllabus was clearly the dominant basis for evaluating students' performance at the high school level. Thus, although the South African Joint Matriculation Board Examinations[21] system still existed, it had lost its monopoly as the main basis for teaching and evaluating students at the secondary level of education. The Cambridge syllabus was in this case advantageous to the settlers in that while there was little conflict between their cultural identity and its content, the African culture was far removed from its values. Nevertheless, the existence of the external examinations systems at the secondary and university levels illustrates that, in contrast to the Chinese state in which the hegemonic group determined the political ideology of the content of subject matter at every level of education, the settlers developed academic curricula only for primary schools and the Junior Certificate component of secondary education that was examined locally. Even then, the content at both levels did not

approach the ideological emphasis[22] of Chinese education, as the Rhodesian schools had established links with the external examining boards. All this shows that in contrast to the Chinese leadership which generally gave equal attention to educational and economic matters in order to establish a socialist state, the Rhodesian settlers formulated educational policies which conformed to the economic ideology of separate development that allowed them to monopolize the territory's resources.

The political unrest of the 1960s and the guerilla warfare which dominated the 1970s further illustrate the limitations of Rhodesian schools in gaining full control of Africans as argued by some scholars who have studied colonial education.[23] For although these institutions indeed dispensed values which transformed the culture of the colonized and thus assisted the settlers in achieving their economic objectives, their ability to permanently capture the minds of Africans was neutralized by the resurgence of nationalism. As this study has demonstrated, the knowledge acquired from colonial schools played an important role in destablizing European control of Zimbabwe. Mastery of the English language by Africans, for instance, became a cohesive force that made it possible for any competent African, irrespective of ethnic origin, to lead the nationalist movement. This was the case with Joshua Nkomo from the Matebeleland region who was elected President of the ANC of 1957 and the ZAPU organization formed in

1962 - both of which had their national headquarters in Harare, the major city of the Mashonaland province.

Another paradox was that some of the topics developed by the government for discussion in the social studies also produced nationalist attitudes instead of the behavior anticipated by the administrations and mission organizations. The studies of the Reformation and the French and American Revolutions, originally intended to demonstrate how far the Western nations had advanced in creating democratic political and religious institutions, were adopted by Africans as models for influencing social change. Because of their violent nature,[24] these movements convinced African intellectuals to regard the use of force and opposition to the established government as acceptable solutions to the existing crisis. A typical example was the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who regardless of a strong theological training acquired in the United States, where the civil rights movement advocated a non-violent approach to social conflict, became the first nationalist to assemble an army that openly used violence as a means of achieving political goals. All these contradictions reveal that even though democratic ideas may remain dormant for a long time after having been introduced in the school system of a colonized society, they become a formidable weapon used by intellectuals to challenge the local authority once the period of incubation has been completed, as was the case throughout the African Empire.

The study also supports the assumption that ideological conflict within the hegemonic group can affect educational outcome as was the case in China under Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. Thus, although the two leaders adhered to socialism, their loyalties to the national ideology differed to the extent of affecting their policies.[25] The same development occurred in Zimbabwe, particularly in the late colonial period when conflict in the settler ideology resulted in divisions among their policymakers. To cite some examples, the formation of the Central African Federation realigned loyalties to the settler ideology as there emerged Europeans who opposed the proposed system of partnership, while others viewed the multiracial experiment as a device for improving their economic position[26] in addition to extending European control to Zambia and Malawi, both British crown colonies. These conflicting attitudes were, as seen earlier, replicated both in the educational and economic policies that were formulated at the federal and territorial levels of government. The expansion of primary, secondary, and technical education as well as trade schools for Africans by Sir Garfield Todd in the 1950s was a reflection of his liberal government, which differed from the right wing administration of Sir Edgar Whitehead which moderated these policies.

Lastly, the reaction of policymakers to economic isolation resulting from sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security

Council after UDI was similar to the behavior of the Chinese administration during the period of Retrenchment which followed the withdrawal of Soviet aid.[27] The strategies that were adopted in both countries as a measure of reacting to the deterioration of international economic relations are important in understanding how the economies of peripheral nations formerly linked to more developed societies can be adapted to local needs. The experience of both countries shows that in the periods during which they attempted to resolve this crisis the respective governments, including their most important social institutions, became highly centralized.

In Zimbabwe, steps that were taken to reorganize the transportation system illustrated the importance of that sector in combating the sanctions, particularly since the territory was landlocked. The blockade of Beira in 1966, for example, by British naval units patrolling the Mozambique Channel in order to check oil-tankers carrying fuel bound for Zimbabwe, combined with sporadic guerilla activity in Mozambique to make the eastern outlet unreliable. Furthermore, the ascendancy of FRELIMO in 1974, as a party governing the former Portuguese colony, increased the urgency for redirecting all traffic to the traditional South African outlets. These developments led to the construction of a railway line connecting the Rhodesian towns of Rutenga and Beit Bridge to Pretoria[28] - the South African capital, thereby

integrating the new link to that country's entire railway system. This link covered a stretch of only 145 km., yet its significance in reducing problems confronting the economy in this period was immense. Its opening alleviated a major crisis, as the blockade of Beira was followed by a closure of the border in 1976 after the government had put an embargo on Rhodesian goods - a policy which prevented its rolling stock from reaching Maputo. The result was that in addition to the old trunk line passing through Botswana to Cape Town and Natal, the Rutenga route vastly improved the capacity of the Rhodesian Railways to carry goods to South African transit facilities.[29]

Besides the structural changes which were introduced in the railway system, the government implemented innovations that were urgently needed to compensate for the declining oil reserves. A major strategy that had a lasting effect on the energy policy was a shift from diesel to steam engines. While the impact of this innovation should not be exaggerated, particularly in view of the effect of the sanctions designed to stop the wheels of Rhodesian industries, it is true to say that the commercial transportation sector comprising the national railways and large vehicles began to depend more on thermal power produced by coal from Hwange - the territory's mining centre containing one of the largest coal reserves in the world.[30] Greater reliance on this source of energy did not impose major strains on the energy situation because the

Kariba Dam, a giant hydro-electric scheme completed in 1957, generated about 70 percent of the electricity required by industries and homes. Exceptions were aeroplanes and heavy farm machinery which continued to depend on imported gasoline. The Rhodesian climate, with its long summers and mild winters, also helped to make the situation manageable.

Apart from the adjustments that were made in both energy and transportation sectors, there were significant changes introduced in agriculture which had an effect on the capacity of the territory to achieve self-sufficiency in food supplies and commercial products. Among food items that were formerly imported and later replaced by domestic products which began to be processed locally were powdered milk, cheese, breakfast cereals, jams and canned fruits. The resilience shown by the territory's agricultural sector in the decade following UDI enabled farmers to export surplus products to world markets, for unlike Rhodesian tobacco which could easily be identified by organizations seeking to enforce sanctions due to its chemical content characterized by low nicotine and high sugar,[31] cotton, corn, and other agricultural products could easily evade the sanctions. Commenting on the remarkable success of the Rhodesian regime in establishing itself as an agricultural nation amid these circumstances, one study concluded that:

In the case of products such as tea, coffee, beef, and

citrus fruits the trends are similar to those reported
for maize, wheat, and cotton; namely expansion of
output, greater productivity, and world wide reputation
for quality.[32]

The   changes   which   were   implemented   in agriculture,
transportation and other key sectors of the economy in the post-
UDI period later began to reap benefits, especially in the
manufacturing industry that had slowed down after the imposition
of sanctions. By the end of the decade, this sector was showing
signs of recovery that was sustained throughout the 1970s.
Estimates of growth achieved in this period, for instance, show
that the level of output in this sector increased from 1059
products in 1966 to 3837 in 1970.[33] As the objective of expanding
domestic manufactures was to substitute commodities that were
formerly imported with local products, structural adjustments that
were made in the economy occurred mainly in textile, construction,
chrome and steel production - industrial activities that had the
capacity not only to create employment, but also to make the
political situation manageable, as improvements in the economy had
an effect on the number of Africans who joined the nationalist
army. In addition, because Rhodesian products were usually sold at
a lower price in order to compete with merchandise from the free
world, they often lured even the most reluctant customers. Also,
the importance of making these products attractive to buyers from
Western nations was responsible for the high quality of Rhodesian

goods which reached the foreign markets. The desire to attract
foreign traders influenced farmers and manufacturing companies to
participate in international Trade Fairs where their products
occasionally won prizes for excellence. It was found with regard
to the performance of primary and secondary products that were
entered for such competitions during this period that:

> ...A Rhodesian variety of maize won championship awards
> at the Royal Canadian Winter Fairs 1970-1973 and 1975; a
> Rhodesian cereal...won a gold medal at the Monde
> Selection in Geneva in 1973; and a Rhodesian cigarette
> won a gold medal at the International Exhibition of
> Tobacco Products in 1974.[34]

The success of the strategies that were adopted between 1965
and 1980 does illustrate some degree of validity of the neo-
Marxist thesis which asserts that a degree of economic isolation
from the advanced industrialized nations can yield economic growth
and development. The exchange controls that were placed on the
repatriation of dividends by foreign companies, for instance,
forced these conglomerates to reinvest their earnings in the
Rhodesian economy.[35] Furthermore, the imposition of rigid controls
on some imported merchandise intended to increase the consumption
of local products obliged many firms to substitute such goods with
domestic manufactures. The overall impact of these strategies was
a highly planned economy that performed well under difficult
conditions, and laid a foundation on which the present
administration was able to lay some of its most successful

policies. The extent to which the Rhodesian regime established itself as the major industrial state in the region became evident when food shortages in Zambia forced President Kaunda to reopen the border which had been closed as part of enforcing the sanctions. That action gave Zambia access to Rhodesian corn in addition to facilitating the shipment of its products to world markets.

National Sovereignty and Educational, Political and Economic Development in the Independence Era

Before assessing the extent to which African and settler nationalism achieved their respective objectives, it is important to ascertain the state of the territory's social structure in 1980, when the African government was formed. As seen above, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence had resulted in a restructuring of the economy in order to compensate for the loss of regional and international trade partners. Hostility from the vast majority of African states, for instance, had been responsible for integrating the territory's air transportation networks into the South African system, as Rhodesian planes were denied landing rights by most African nations.[36] This was also the case with the railway networks which now depended on the South African seaports. By this time, the agricultural sector had attained a high degree of self-sufficiency to the extent that Zambia, Malawi, and later Mozambique relied on it for their needs.

The reappointment of a cabinet member of the settler administration to the agricultural portfolio by the African government following independence signified its intention not to interfere with a sector that was performing admirably under adverse conditions.

Also, the embargo placed on imported products had accounted for the emergence of factories which manufactured goods for both the domestic market and dealers from nations that violated the sanctions. The demand for Rhodesian processed goods including textiles, canned fruits, beef, tobacco, and other commodities had given impetus to the creation of an industrial sector without much of the external assistance it formerly depended on for servicing the physical plants or acting as expatriate staff. The guerilla war itself had led to preference in training local personnel for the secondary industry, as expatriates from the more advanced nations were reluctant to work in a country plagued by civil strife.[37]

Despite the artificial changes that were implemented in the public service as a result of pressure from the war, most government departments continued to be dominated by Europeans. In fact, the prospect of resolving the constitutional stalemate in the period preceding the Lancaster House Conference had given rise to the promotion of Europeans to senior posts; thereby consolidating their position in the upper echelons of the

occupational hierarchy. But as seen in the previous chapter, few Africans had made inroads into areas formerly reserved for Europeans including appointments to senior positions in the government. The guerilla war, for instance, had been responsible for the emergence of Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister of the territory with a cabinet that reflected a shift in the ideology of the settlers as far as political participation of Africans was concerned. Although these changes were cosmetic in nature, they clearly showed the degree to which the settlers had been compelled to deal with a crisis that was increasingly getting beyond their control. The decision on the part of the government to officially rename the territory 'Zimbabwe Rhodesia',[38] in addition to economic opportunities that were being opened to Africans in the late 1970s, illustrated a pragmatic approach to the crisis of the closing years of the settler era.

Even though the educational system which existed when the African government was formed still conformed to the basic philosophy of the Rhodesian school system, it was a deformed entity due to structural changes that had been implemented both to defuse the growing nationalist pressure and to adapt to the political climate of this period. The 1979 Rhodesia Act, for instance, was introduced as a means of reflecting the adjustments that were made in government, the economy, and the public service. For despite the fact that this legislation failed to satisfy the

demands of even liberal Africans, it was important in that it created a single Ministry of Education which replaced the dual system for the first time in the territory's educational experience. Needless to say, the purpose was to bring education in line with the structure of the government which in the opinion of some Europeans no longer served only the interests of the settlers.[39]

The economy and the educational system which the African administration inherited was therefore changed noticeably by innovations that had been introduced after the war broke out. While the content of secondary education was not greatly affected by these developments, the curricula of post-secondary institutions had been adapted to the new economic infrastructure created by post-UDI policies. For example, when the territory's university broke its special relations with the University of London, it emerged as an independent institution with faculties which emphasized local rather than external content as before.

Although the African administration formulated policies which were intended to link education to the economic strategies it had developed, there were limitations as to how well this objective was achieved. First of all, the emphasis that had been placed on political rather than economic objectives during the struggle for self-determination survived the first few years of independence to the extent of overshadowing other matters that required immediate

attention.[40] More important was the fact that although Africans now had the authority to legislate laws, they did not control the economy as did the hegemonic group in China. That is, apart from Africanization of the public service and administrative changes which few sectors experienced, the economic structure that existed between 1980 and 1981 when the first Development Plan appeared, was the one established by the settlers in their struggle against the sanctions. As a result, Europeans still controlled most primary industries, including mining and commercial agriculture. Furthermore, despite the fact that some Africans established processing plants in addition to assuming senior positions in the manufacturing industries, Europeans still dominated this sector because of the large capital outlay required to set up factories.

An analysis of the first Transitional National Development Plan which appeared in 1982 shows that the settlers still controlled many key sectors of the economy even after three years of independence. Acknowledging this fact in 1982 the document stated, "The strategy requires a comprehensive structural and institutional reorientation of the inherited socio-economic system to facilitate its transformation."[41] Thus, up to this point the government, including the African middle class, did not constitute a hegemonic group which controlled the economy in the sense that the settlers and their Chinese counterparts had enjoyed a monopoly of their respective national economies. The lifting of sanctions

in the period following independence had further made it difficult
for the African elite to assert its influence on the economy, as
the return of the oligopolistic multinational corporations
reinstated the territory into the international economic system.

While industrial and higher education had fairly been
integrated into the nation's economy as a result of early colonial
policies and the sanctions imposed by the United Nations General
Assembly, secondary education retained its. relations with the
overseas examinations council. Also, since the culture of
educational institutions at these levels of instruction conformed
to the values of the settlers and the magnates who owned the
conglomerates, it was difficult for the African elite to eliminate
the influence of Europeans on education. The result was that up to
1984, the content and structure of instruction continued to
reflect the strong position of Europeans in the national
economy.[42]

However, this study has determined that despite its failure
to control education and the economy, the African elite which has
governed Zimbabwe since independence has been successful in
neutralizing settler colonialism. The most dramatic change
occurred in 1984 when for the first time African educators began
to develop curricula for the entire educational system, as opposed
to the previous era during which the settlers held a monopoly in
selecting and organizing subject matter. This change allowed the

African elite to play an important role in the political development of the new nation which was achieved through incorporation of nationalist content, particularly at the junior level of secondary education that was examined locally. As a geography textbook published that year has revealed, nationalist influence accounted for the emphasis placed on teaching students to grasp local and national weather patterns which contrasted with the old system that was heavily weighted in favor of foreign content.[43] Another development that was consistent with official policy of weakening foreign influence was the elimination of the practice of naming boulevards, mountains, hospitals, bridges and schools after European heroes and political figures. Apart from having been designed to usher a new era in the political life of the territory, such material was intended to socialize Europeans about the reality of African rule. But as one might expect, the existence of nationalist and ideological content in the social studies textbooks which European children read at school was detested by most settlers, especially illustrative material which related to nationalist heroes such as Nehanda[44] - the very same political symbol that had inspired the guerilla war in which many settlers lost their lives.

A further example of nationalist influence has been evident in another social studies textbook published in the same period which clearly shows an attempt to present world politics from an

indigenist rather than a diffusionist point of view. While some aspects of the colonization of the continent are described as having been positive, the tendency of Europeans to view African customs in a negative way is criticized.[45] Needless to say, this is not the type of material which could be found in textbooks during the settler period as the government justified its policies on the basis of introducing civilized ways. The domestic science syllabus also published in 1984 further shows the strategy of promoting political development through teaching African and European students to prepare dishes from all nationalities. This is spelled out in the document which states one of its five objectives as "To develop an understanding of varying cultural backgrounds."[46]

The ascent of ZANU as a party governing Zimbabwe, further placed the nationalist movement in a position to enhance the ability of Africans to compete with Europeans in education - a strategy which gradually began to erode their privileges. To illustrate, due to its control of the national exchequer and the fact that as a government it determined foreign policy and international economic relations, the ruling party was able to send many Africans overseas where they acquired training which continues to weaken the position of Europeans in Zimbabwe. This is a reversal of roles as the settler administration adopted the same policy which saw European students enrolling in South African,

British, and American universities. To observers who are familiar
with the extent to which the settlers dominated the professions
including medical, legal, technical and higher education in the
colonial period, the effect of the nationalist policies of the
African administration are quite evident as Europeans could no
longer feel secure about their future in these fields which they
had monopolized for almost a century. This is more evident at the
national university where the end of racial policies which
determined enrollment and hiring practices has resulted in African
faculty members dominating some departments.[47]

In addition to the above reforms implemented to foster
educational and political development of the new nation, the
government has made significant changes in the economic structure
inherited from the settler administration, not only to advance
Africans economically, but also to broaden the scope of economic
nationalism in Eastern and Southern Africa. As seen in chapters
five and six, the general procedure was to rescind settler laws
which determined access to occupations and property rights before
a policy was introduced. For instance, in order to impede settler
monopoly of urban areas and the rich farmland they owned as a
result of the unfair colonial laws, the government revoked the
Land Tenure Act before introducing the Rural Councils Act which
authorized the Minister of Local Government to exercise
jurisdiction over the land which fell into this category.[48]

Although Europeans still maintain considerable influence in urban areas and in the Rural Councils, their control of these areas has been reduced significantly as shown by the number of Africans who now reside and own property in the suburbs, which were formerly reserved for Europeans by the Land Tenure Act. Thus, the impact of the Rural Councils Act in undermining the economic position of Europeans should not be underrated; for in contrast to the District Councils Act which extended the jurisdiction of the government where the old council system had vested legal authority in the chiefs, the Rural Councils Act exposed the settlers to African competition.

The same procedure was followed in promoting Africans who joined the civil service and the three levels of industry in the post-independence period. For example, while the demise of the Public Service Act of 1931 allowed Africans to secure senior positions in the government, the abolition of the Land Tenure Act brought an end to the privileges enjoyed by Europeans in the settler period. However, it should be stressed that the real force behind African progress in the 1980s was the independence arising from the nationalist revolution, as the democratic constitution by itself could not have genuinely changed the economic structure and the hiring policies.[49]

Besides the internal dynamics which brought about the changes in education and the economy, regional conflict arising from

polarization of the nationalist movement in Southern Africa prompted the government to make further adjustments in the economic structure established by Europeans in their struggle against the sanctions. To begin with, an ambitious plan designed to minimize Zimbabwe's reliance on the more efficient South African railway system resulted in the development of a project designed to double-track the railway line connecting Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In 1986, the state gave priority to this project by allocating one-fifth of the national budget to the scheme. The goal was to increase the volume of cargo passing through Mozambique to world markets from the current level of 1.3 to 5.1 million tons by 1995.[50] Because the distance from Harare, the nation's capital, to Beira is 560 km. as compared to 2,000 km. to the nearest South African port of Durban, the estimated savings for the Beira route is approximately $269 million.[51] Another recent development in the same direction is a plan to reopen and increase the efficiency of the railway line that formerly linked Harare to the Mozambican capital of Maputo.

Even though this link will alleviate some of the difficulties arising from the nation's dependence on the South African system, it is currently beset with problems which retard its progress. The Mozambican National Resistance Army, a South African-backed guerilla force seeking to overthrow the established government, constantly sabotages the scheme. In recent months, this has

prompted the Government of Zimbabwe to deploy a large force in the region infested by the insurgents. A further constraint facing the government in its attempt to rely more on the Mozambican outlets, stems from their lack of capacity to handle freight from Zimbabwe and other countries[52] that are anxious to increase their use of these ports; especially as Beira will be highly congested as a result of this need and the general inefficiency of the system will increase from the hiring of inexperienced staff.

A more ambitious scheme adopted in another attempt to extricate the economy from South African dominance was the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) - a regional cartel established to assert the economic nationalism of the Front Line States. In practical terms, the cartel has established trade agreements among member states including such commodities as corn, citrus fruits, and manufactured goods.[53] The feasibility of this scheme in achieving its desired objective is, however, limited by several factors. Zimbabwe's continued dependence on the South African transportation system which still handles more than 50 percent of its import and export trade goods, makes it difficult for the cartel to become a viable organization outside the South African economic orbit. In addition, the shortage of hard currency combined with the scarcity of jobs that are required to expand the monetized economy, impose restrictions on the expansion of

consumer markets in the SADCC nations.

At a geopolitical level, Zimbabwe together with the vast majority of its Central, Eastern and Southern African allies including Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, formed the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)[54] in 1984 to provide trade among the African states. By 1987, fifteen countries had joined the cartel. In order to protect its markets from the more powerful multinational corporations, the PTA drafted a constitution which required Africans to own 51 percent of the shares[55] as a prerequisite for allowing the conglomerates to join the economic organization. But while this condition deters foreign companies from joining the cartel, it also restricts growth in employment as the lack of industrial expansion inhibits companies from recruiting more workers.

The economic policies adopted by Zimbabwe and other SADCC nations in the effort to reduce South African control of their economies are not likely to achieve all their desired effects, due to insurmountable obstacles. The situation is complicated by the fact that some countries in that cartel such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have economies, railway systems, and even air spaces that are dominated by the South African regime, so that any irrational fiscal measures against that state can lead to economic suicide on their part.[56] Lesotho, for instance, is completely surrounded by South Africa besides relying heavily on that state

to provide employment for thousands of its nationals. This is also true of Swaziland, which despite sharing one of its borders with black-ruled Mozambique, finds it difficult to curtail linguistic ties with the South African blacks with whom its people share a common cultural heritage. Also, as an English-speaking country, Swaziland finds it much easier to maintain its economic relations with the Anglophone provinces of Natal and the Cape Province rather than trading with Mozambique which has retained Portuguese as one of its official languages.

In view of South Africa's economic superiority in the subcontinent, it is evident that countries with institutions which are highly integrated into its economic system find it more difficult to discard these links than those exhibiting weaker ties. As a nation having the most advanced industrial sector outside South Africa when compared with that country's other economic satellites, Zimbabwe's economic institutions continue to maintain their traditional relations with the South African republic.[57] This particularly explains the resistance by some sectors to official policies designed to wean Zimbabwe's economy from its dependence on the more advanced South African economy. Furthermore, besides the inefficient transportation system which is partly responsible for maintaining the country's commercial sector in the South African economic sphere, the shortage of technical skills and physical capital required to extract minerals

or manufacture goods, firmly ties Zimbabwe to the international economic system. The result is that, instead of maintaining a favorable balance of trade through supplying foreign markets with more finished products in relation to imported goods, there is a growing demand for luxury items which impose strains on the precious foreign exchange earnings.[58]

The Relationship Between Education and Development
Under the African and Settler Administrations

The evidence from the survey of the conflict undertaken in this study has clearly revealed that to a great extent, settler nationalism was more successful in developing a link between education and the modern economy than was the case with African nationalism in the period covered by this dissertation, for several reasons. First of all, when the Rhodesian school system was established in the 1890s its main objective was to complement a political superstructure which had emerged as a result of the settlers' strong economic motives, and this set a precedent for subsequent policymakers to conform to the tradition of maintaining an educational system that reflected the economic interests of Europeans.[59] This has been evident in chapters five and six where it was demonstrated that the legal system which was introduced by the settlers sought to enhance the relationship between education and the Rhodesian economy that was structured to protect European privileges. To illustrate, while the Land Apportionment and

Industrial Conciliation Acts were codified to ensure settler monopoly of the economy, the Public Service Act of 1931 made it impossible for Africans to challenge the position of Europeans in the government. Thus, regardless of the level of education they had attained, there were limitations to the extent to which Africans could use formal education to secure positions that were reserved for Europeans.[60] By contrast, despite the fact that some of the policies adopted by the African administration are clearly nationalistic, they lack the legal mechanisms that are intended to exclude other groups from competing for positions or working in specified areas, as was the case with the above pieces of legislation.

Also, the intimate relationship that existed among the values of Europeans, the nascent economy, and the culture of the Rhodesian school system, accounted for the stronger link between education and development in the colonial era than was the case with African nationalism, which up to this day has not been fully assimilated into the institutions established by Europeans. This advantage was compounded by the immense South African support which the territory's economy and education enjoyed during the settler period, which contrasts with that nation's current policy of destabilizing Zimbabwe's institutions.

Another element responsible for the stronger link between education, the economy and settler nationalism is that in contrast

to African nationalism, which was preoccupied with political objectives, settler nationalism continued to consolidate its position in the economy. The different emphases adopted by these ideologies were sustained into the independence era, to the point of distracting the focus on economic reform as shown by the Development Plan of 1982, which reaffirmed the status quo of Europeans in the national economy when it said:

> ...Whilst the main thrust of the Plan is socialist and calls for greater role of the State through State enterprises, worker participation, and socialist cooperation, ample room has been reserved for performances by private industry.[61]

This situation was accentuated by the fact that in the 1980s, the settlers articulated economic nationalism to compensate for the loss of political power and to justify their remaining in a state governed by their political adversaries. Thus, although Europeans had lost their power to legislate laws and to control economic and education policies, they continued to influence developments in these important areas. The policy of national reconciliation which followed the formation of the African government, in addition to the liberal fiscal policies designed to maintain economic growth and political stability, policies that were crucial in providing employment for Africans and the guerillas who had fought in the war of libertation, further reaffirmed the strong position of Europeans in the national

economy.[62]

Most important was the fact that although the nationalist conflict outwardly manifested itself as a struggle for the control of political and economic institutions, it was also a contest to determine the way people made sense of the social and physical environment. If the subject matter taught in the nation's school system is an indication of the outcome of the conflict in terms of influencing individual and social consciousness, the evidence shows that the content dispenses values which weaken the traditional way of life.[63] For instance, the concepts that are taught in science and mathematics together with the French and English languages initiate Africans into the commercial and industrial sectors established by Europeans--a process which clearly works to the advantage of settler nationalism.

However, since development as construed in this study encompasses the total impact of social institutions on a nation's entire population measured through the PQLI criterion, it is important to identify areas in which the policies of the present administration surpass those of the settler government in promoting African nationalism. The extension of full voting rights to everyone, which differs from the practice of maintaining the franchise as a monopoly of Europeans, ushered in an era of genuine political development. The universal suffrage and political participation which followed independence are cohesive forces

which develop a sense of nationhood unknown during the settler period. This is shown by the fact that the notion of development held by the African administration is based on a holistic approach to social engineering.[64] The ALOZ program described in the previous chapter was also established to enable Africans in the rural areas to exercise their rights in local, regional, and national politics, in addition to improving their basic commercial and agricultural skills. Again, the attempt to elevate the education of people who are affected by this program improves their sense of nationhood and their ability to relate to Zimbabweans whose culture is different from theirs. The point is that in contrast to the high-powered settler education policies which focused on the development of the areas occupied by Europeans, the current policies, though modest, are directed toward combating regional inequalities. The introduction of a unified salary structure for individuals employed in the Public Service was another development which symbolized the extension of economic nationalism into key sectors by the African government.

In regard of the extent to which the nationalist conflict influenced the link between education and development in Zimbabwe, therefore, the conclusion to be drawn is that, although the settlers lost political power, they still maintain their status as a hegemonic group which controls the economy and influences education despite the dissolution of the ideology of separate

development. This is due to the fact that although Africans
control the political superstructure, the persistence of the
settlers' traditional role in the economy,[65] combined with the
presence of the oligopolistic multinational corporations and the
education introduced by nations from which both originated, all
create a sense of Europeans as custodians of the formal school
system. While the position of Europeans in education and the
nature of instruction offered in the nation's school system today
strengthen the assumption that the hegemonic group which controls
the economy dominates education, the Zimbabwean case reveals that
controlling the political superstructure does not confer the power
to determine the knowledge acquired in schools. This is shown by
the weak position of the traditional instruction described in
chapter two in the educational system of the post-independence
era. The position of Zimbabwe in the global economic system and
the open international education relations which it encourages,
contrast with the sheltered Chinese system which enhanced the
power of local entrepreneurs in education.[66]

The difference in the degree to which political elites in
Zimbabwe and their counterparts in China wielded economic power is
further reflected in the social structures which they created.
While the Chinese hegemony achieved its objective of creating a
Marxist state, the African government has achieved limited success
in this direction. To make this point clear, the current state of

Zimbabwe's social structure should be contrasted with major components of the GLF reforms which greatly transformed the condition of the economy established by the nationalist regime between 1958 and 1959.[67] After these reforms were implemented, the economy was transferred from private to state ownership. The program also resulted in the creation of the communes which enhanced cooperative development in rural areas. In addition, the academic aspect of education that had dominated the nationalist era was phased out and replaced with a system which bridged the gap between mental and manual work.[68] By contrast, the socialist development strategy adopted in Zimbabwe has not affected education and the rural areas to the extent that it did in the Chinese case.

Contrast in Educational and Development Ideologies

In considering the extent to which the educational and development strategies which have occurred in Zimbabwe compare to those adopted in Tanzania, it is important to contrast progress that has been made both in eliminating historical links with the former colonial powers and in articulating socialist development as official policies suggest. While both countries have implemented many changes designed to enhance their respective national ideologies, the reforms adopted in Tanzania are far ahead of those implemented in Zimbabwe. One reason for the difference is

the fact that instead of losing its momentum, as was the case in Zimbabwe, the vigor of Tanzania's nationalism was sustained for a long period following independence. The existence of a more developed national language which in daily use competed with English on an equal footing in urban areas, made it easier for the government to smash the power of the ex-colonial elites who had emerged under British rule. The result was that in addition to becoming a cohesive force, Swahili served as a vehicle for releasing the energies of cultural and economic nationalism.[69] This contrasts sharply with the situation before independence in Zimbabwe when English was the only language through which individuals could gain upward social mobility. Only those Africans who spoke it well could secure respectable positions in the modern sector.

The promotion of Swahili as a language of the Tanzanian Parliament, for instance, had an impact on the class structure that was left by Europeans, as it removed a major barrier which had prevented competent individuals possessing little or no formal education from running for public office. From 1963 when Swahili became an official language in the National Assembly up to now, that move also began to affect the economic structure of the various regions, as the new language policy made it possible for poor areas to elect representatives who voiced their grievances in the National Assembly.

By contrast, Zimbabwe has not adopted a national language policy comparable to the above case for the following reasons. The interracial makeup of its national legislature could have seen the adoption of a similar policy transform the current political balance into a fragile coalition, not because Europeans were unwilling to accept such change, but because an abrupt shift in that direction had the potential of splitting the two major ethnic groups. The fact that both Shona and Ndebele - the only African languages spoken in Zimbabwe, were not developed to become official lingua francas of the Central African Federation, strengthened the position of English as a language for the elite. At the same time, the status of Swahili in the East African Community colonies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, was that of a cosmopolitan language for Africans living in that region. Also, because proficiency in the English language in Zimbabwe generally determined one's station in life, it was unlikely that the African vernaculars could be developed like Swahili, as this would have greatly altered the existing class structure, especially as the African elite partly derived economic power from its acquisition of the foreign language.[70]

There are also striking differences in the degree to which the two African nations have transformed both formal education and the rural development policies which they inherited from the respective white governments. Since Tanzania's independence had no

major restrictive conditions that were attached to the constitution by the British, that country was able to explore more radical changes in education and land reform with a higher degree of flexibility than was the case in Zimbabwe, where reforms of that nature had to take into account the reaction of the settlers and their implications for the entire economy.

The reforms introduced at the secondary level of education illustrate these considerations as they show how policymakers in Tanzania moved swiftly to implement changes which were seen as being important in recruiting schools to foster national development. The absence of a large white population there made it possible for Tanzania, together with Kenya and Uganda, to create the East African Examinations Council, which replaced the Cambridge syndicate immediately following independence. As there was no potential of local resistance to this innovation, because the government believed that it was impossible for Tanzania to foster social, political, and economic development within the common educational system of the East African Community nations, it also seceded from that organization in order to introduce more radical changes ranging from greater emphasis on agricultural instruction during the first two years of secondary education to more emphasis on practical skills at the same level.

The reforms which appeared in the post-Arusha period prompted one observer to suggest that the actual impact of agricultural

instruction in Tanzania is probably ahead of any African country.[71] The Arusha Declaration which had inspired these reforms also contributed to greater emphasis in vocational instruction by giving rise to two distinct types of secondary schools which were established to reflect socialist development that was popular among top administrators of the independence government in the late 1960s and early 1970s. One of these was an academic system leading to the professions such as medical, teaching, scientific and legal careers; while the other system had a more vocational orientation and emphasized agricultural, technical and home economics instruction.

In the case of Zimbabwe, it has been difficult to implement reforms of this nature as secondary schools still follow the Cambridge High School Certificate syllabus which is responsible for maintaining a highly-centralized educational system. While decentralization and dualism in educational practice has allowed Tanzania to adapt instruction to local and regional needs, the persistence of a unified system in Zimbabwe imposes limitations on the extent to which schools can dispense skills that are desperately required to develop rural areas, as the Cambridge syllabus is basically a curriculum that was developed for urban schools.[72]

However, the progress which Tanzanian policymakers have achieved in linking education to the rural economy should not be

seen as having originated exclusively from the strategies of the African administration which formed the first independence government in 1961, as most writers have claimed, because there are some elements of these reforms which were influenced by colonial policies. A comparison of the rural development strategies which emerged as a result of the reaction of settler governments to nationalist pressure sheds light on the attitude of Europeans in Tanzania in the early 1950s. As in Zimbabwe where the Republican Constitution of 1969 had given rise to rural councils that were placed under the trusteeship of the chiefs, the emergence of the Mau Mau in Kenya in 1952 destablized the entire East African region and gave impetus to the Swynnerton Commission which investigated how this situation could be controlled. In 1955, that taskforce concluded that political unrest in the region could be contained by diverting the attention of Africans to meaningful agricultural activities in the rural areas.

Because the East African colonies were administered by the British as if they were a single political entity, the recommendations of the Swynnerton Commission were also adopted in Tanzania. The rationale for implementing an identical policy there arose from the fact that if measures were not taken to prevent political activism in Tanzania through economic incentives, violence could have escalated there as well since the three colonies shared many common institutions including a common

currency and the East African Railways and Airways, in addition to Makerere University in Uganda - all of which proliferated anti-colonial ideas. Although the provisions of the Arusha Declaration had a more far reaching impact on the development of rural areas than was the case with the Swynnerton Plan, the extent to which the plan contributed towards laying a foundation for a future rural policy in Tanzania was more advanced than the programs that were introduced by the Rhodesian Government in 1969. For whereas the Rhodesian council programs were left entirely under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities who did not receive any subsidy to administer them, the agricultural programs established by colonial administrations in East Africa usually received government assistance. Therefore the structures which both nations inherited differed in the degree to which they were oriented to strategies which appeared in the post-independence period. While the African administration in Tanzania found institutions whose structures had considerably shifted from those initially established by colonial authorities, its counterpart in Zimbabwe took over institutions that had slightly moved in the same direction since the reforms implemented as a result of the sanctions were generally urban-oriented.

In concluding this study, it is necessary to identify more clearly its major findings. In Zimbabwe, the development of educational policies shows that, under white rule, they were

largely inspired by economic motives, as the search for material benefits was the main factor which had given impetus to colonization. Because colonization destroyed the social structure that had existed prior to formal occupation of the territory, the resistance movements of this era gave priority to the restoration of self-determination. But once independence was achieved, the economic motives that had earlier been given less attention became more important than the political conflict that had dominated the 1960s and 1970s.

However, because the vast majority of people in Zimbabwe had acquired new social tastes as a result of their contact with Europeans over a long period, the brand of black patriotism that emerged in the mid-1980s exhibited a synthesis of both settler and African nationalism. This was due to the fact that the social institutions that had been established by Europeans all functioned as the cradle from which the government implemented its political, economic, and educational policies. This was one of the major reasons that made it difficult for the state to radically reform instruction and the economy, as both were firmly entrenched in a foreign culture. Also, despite the apparent decline in the popularity of the Marxist ideology that had been incorporated into the revolution, some of its elements were blended in the development schemes that appeared in rural areas where few cooperative farms were established. At a national level the

taxation structure clearly favored the poor, and along with this the provision of free medicare and education reflected the extent to which economic nationalism had been imbued with socialist influence. Nevertheless, if economic nationalism is to be measured by the degree to which Africans and Europeans have achieved economic progress as separate groups, it is evident that a longer period is required in order to close the gap that existed before independence.

It has also become clear that despite its commitment to socialism, Zimbabwe's educational and economic systems are by no means more socialist in terms of promoting equity between the rich and the least advanced groups in society, than what one may find in the typical welfare state of Western industrialized nations. This calls for a re-evaluation of policies that can be classified as socialist and those which may be versions of free enterprise. Even in education, it is not clear whether the present system can be considered a Marxist one as it is still firmly tied into the British tradition.

This study has further demonstrated that the settler administration of Prime Minister Ian Smith took advantage of international isolation to develop an economic infrastructure which despite its strong links with the Republic of South Africa, did provide a sound basis on which the current government has developed some of its most successful policies. The educational

sector similarly gained from the international protest, particularly at the higher level where a decision by the University of London to discontinue[73] issuing its degrees to students at the national institution forced the University of Rhodesia to modify instruction in the various faculties to reflect local realities. As a result, in spite of the fact that the reforms that were adopted thereafter still reflected the values of the settlers, a fair number of them genuinely sought to integrate education into the political and economic life of Zimbabwe.

Finally, the study finds that the reforms that were implemented in the 1960s and 1970s in American and Quebec high schools respectively, were more concrete than the innovations that were introduced at the same level in the two African nations, for three major reasons. In the first place, because both Quebec and the United States of America are advanced Western industrial societies, their strong economies and technological know-how gave educators the ability to innovate in their secondary schools without fear of alienating external sources of aid, as all financial and educational resources such as teachers and textbooks originated within their territorial boundaries. By contrast, as peripheral nations existing on the fringe of the developed world, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have not developed viable educational institutions that can afford to do without knowledge that is produced outside their national boundaries.

Furthermore, the two Western societies were more successful in introducing tangible reforms because of the nature of their respective nationalist ideologies, which though different, were seen by their founders as having their greatest potential for success through pragmatic instruction. Among Francophones in Quebec, this meant abrogating the classical curriculum and replacing it with a modern syllabus that dispensed technical skills which began to reap benefits in the 1980s as graduates of the CEGEPS were more represented in technical occupations. The American high school performed equally well as emphasis that was placed on improving science and mathematics in the post-Sputnik period eventually gave the United States leadership in space exploration. On the other hand, African nationalism was more political than economic, partly because when it originated it lacked social institutions through which it could assert itself.

NOTES

1 Julia Kwong, <u>Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution</u> (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1979), p. 163.

2 James A. Chamunorwa Mutambirwa, <u>The Rise of Settler Power in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1923</u> (New Jersey: Associated University Press, 1980), p. 66.

3 Ibid., p. 204.

4 Ibid., p. 210.

5 Colin Leys, <u>European Politics in Southern Rhodesia</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 31.

6 T.R.M. Creighton, <u>The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation</u> (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1969), p. 103.

7 A.K.H. Weinrich, <u>Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power</u> (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1971), p. 12.

8 Gloria Passmore, <u>The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia</u> (Salisbury: University of Rhodesia, 1972), pp. 14-17.

9 Creighton, <u>The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation</u>, p. 114.

10 Leys, <u>European Politics in Southern Rhodesia</u>, p. 31.

11 The reforms implemented by Sir Garfield Todd merely expanded the existing educational system without changing its basic structure. But even then they were viewed as undermining the foundations of settler colonialism, to the extent that they led to the defeat of his government in 1958. For the Five-Year Plan which contained the proposed reforms refer to Creighton, <u>The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation</u>, pp. 164-166.

12 Ibid., p. 101.

13 Ibid., p. 166.

14 The federal university enrolled more European students

than Africans. This unbalanced aspect of its student clientele was replicated in the economic structure. Ibid., pp. 166-170.

15 Martin Meredith, <u>The Past is Another Country, Rhodesia 1890-1979</u> (London: Fakenham Press Limited, 1979), p. 63.

16 Weinrich, <u>Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power</u>, p. 18.

17 Values that emerged as a result of colonial rule were initially resisted by Africans throughout the continent. This included resistance to education introduced by missionaries as described in John Anderson's study entitled <u>The Struggle for the School</u> (Nairobi: Longman Group Ltd., 1970), p. 118.

18 Weinrich, <u>Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power</u>, p. 97.

19 Kwong, <u>Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution</u>, p. 67.

20 As a result of the evidence from the publications and documents examined to determine the origin of industrial education in Zimbabwe, this author rejects the standard explanation that the Phelps-Stokes Commission originated industrial education everywhere in the African colonies. For evidence which supports the author's argument refer to Gloria C. Passmore, <u>The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia</u>, p. 83. For the standard explanation, refer to David G. Scanlon, <u>Traditions of African Education</u> (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964).

21 Besides few secondary schools which continued to follow the South African syllabus, the Joint Matriculation Board Examinations could be taken through correspondence.

22 This is not meant to underestimate the diffusionist curricula of Rhodesian schools, but to indicate that there was a difference between the latent and manifest ideologies of the two educational systems.

23 Among the most distinguished works in this area are notably one by Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly entitled <u>Education and Colonialism</u> (New York: Longman, Green and Co., 1979); and a more elaborate study by Martin Carnoy entitled <u>Education as Cultural Imperialism</u> (New York: David McKay Company, 1974). Arguing from the standpoint that subject matter is not neutral, these authors contend that instruction offered in

educational institutions of peripheral nations produces behavioral outcomes which inculcates foreign values.

24 Although Martin Luther, who inaugurated the Reformation, did not advocate violence, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) which broke out in Europe was a conflict arising from a desire to resolve the religious schism. In some countries, the split gave rise to the destruction of church property by groups competing to assert their theological beliefs.

25 Kwong, Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution, p. 164.

26 One of the recognized authorities on partnership in the Central African Federation viewed it rather as a continuation of separate development since the government rejected integration of the races. For this opinion refer to Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation, p. 105.

27 Kwong, Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution, pp. 117-129.

28 Harry R. Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978), pp. 172-174.

29 Ibid., p. 94.

30 For an overview of some of the effects arising from the territory's international isolation, refer to Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics 19 (April, 1967):379-416.

31 Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, p. 94.

32 Ibid., p. 95.

33 Ibid., p. 90.

34 Ibid., pp. 143-144.

35 Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 315.

36 This included the use of air space, although the supremacy of the Rhodesian army made it difficult for the African nations to enforce the ban.

37 As the future of the territory's constitutional stalemate continued to be uncertain, this situation was aggravated by the exodus of Europeans in the 1970s.

38 Up to this period, incorporating the name 'Zimbabwe' was seen as caving in to the demands of the guerillas. The settlers had hoped that by including the African name, they could isolate the nationalists and gain the support of Africans.

39 For the changes that were introduced by this legislation refer to Government of Rhodesia, Education Act, 1979 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1979).

40 The strong economy of the first few years of the 1980s may have contributed to this development.

41 Republic of Zimbabwe, Transitional National Development Plan 1982/83 - 1984/85 Vol. II, p. 24.

42 Idem, Transitional National Development Plan 1982/1983-1984/1985 Vol. 1, p.27.

43 Ministry of Education, Zimbabwe Junior Certificate Geography Learner's Guide (Harare: Curriculum Development Unit, 1984), pp. 32-42.

44 Ibid., p. 41.

45 Idem, O Level World History Pupil's Book (Curriculum Development Unit, 1984), p. 48.

46 Idem, Zimbabwe Junior Certificate Cookery and Nutrition Syllabus (Harare: Curriculum Development Unit, 1984), p. 1.

47 This appears to reject the Jensen thesis discussed in the literature review, especially since many African members of the staff are graduates of universities whose standards are accepted by most English-speaking institutions of higher learning throughout the world as seen in the University of Zimbabwe prospectus.

48 Republic of Zimbabwe, The Rural Councils Act (Harare: Government Printer, 1980).

49 The presence of armed dissidents and the general instability of this period called for employers to demonstrate their support of the settlement through progressive hiring and

wage policies.

50 John Eldin, "The Fight for the Beira Corridor," New African No. 227 (August, 1986):91.

51 Ibid.

52 Patrick Nagle, "Africa's Rail Links Blamed: Development of Track," The Edmonton Journal Journal, 16th January, 1989.

53 Republic of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe at Work 1987 (Government Printer, 1987), p. 79.

54 New African, "Detonating the PTA Boom," New African No. 229 (October, 1986), p. 91.

55 Ibid., p. 94.

56 The Economist, "Zimbabwe and South Africa," The Economist (12-15 July, 1980):38.

57 Ibid.

58 A more persuasive argument along this line is advanced by Rolph Van den Hoeven in the article "Zambia's Economic Dependency and Satisfaction of Basic Needs," International Labour Organization Vol. 121, No. 2 (March-April, 1982):217-231.

59 Franklin Parker, "Education in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland," Journal of Negro Education Vol. XXX (1961):289.

60 Ibid., p. 290.

61 Republic of Zimbabwe, Transitional National Development Plan 1982/83 - 1984/85 Vol. I (Harare: Government Printer, 1982), p. 1.

62 This is not to diminish settler acceptance of African rule, but to show that they entrenched their position in the economy. Their desire to learn African languages as described by Oakland Robs in "Tables Turned: Zimbabwe's Whites Learn Language of Blacks," The Globe and Mail, 29th August, 1988, p. A8, for example, points to the beginning of a new era in social attitudes.

63 Walter Werner et al., Whose Culture? Whose Heritage? (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1977), pp. 34-35.

64 Therefore, although African nationalism has made limited

progress in achieving its goals, its policies are in the main a step in the right direction.

65 Ross, "Tables Turned: Zimbabwe's Whites Learn Language of Blacks," p. A8.

66 Kwong, <u>Chinese Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution</u>, p. 163.

67 Ibid., pp. 82-88.

68 Ibid., p. 95

69 James N. Karioki, <u>Tanzania's Human Revolution</u> (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), pp. 11-12.

70 Baldev Raj Nayer, <u>National Communication and Language Policy in India</u> (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 15.

71 James R. Sheffield, "Agriculture in the Secondary Schools of Kenya and Tanzania," in <u>Agriculture in African Secondary Schools</u>, ed. James R.Sheffield (New York: The African-American Institute, 1976), p. 11.

72 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, <u>A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (The Swynnerton Plan)</u> (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1955), p. 52.

73 Strack, <u>Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia</u>, p. 232.

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